Intramental fictional minds in Ian Mcewan's Amsterdam and On Chesil Beach

Abstract

This dissertation examines the mental workings of the characters as well as representation of what it is like for them to undergo some certain experiences in Ian McEwan's Amsterdam and On Chesil Beach. The study primarily depends on the terminology offered by the cognitive narratologists Alan Palmer and David Herman for the analysis of characters' mental aspects as well as the concept of narrativity. This dissertation argues that the initial fragile intermental units within the selected narratives break down towards their ends because, encountering conflicts, the fictional minds tend to dissent intramentally, and that the degree of narrativity in these narratives is high because they fundamentally represent the fictional minds' conscious awareness or the impact of the dissenting events and situations on their consciousness. In Amsterdam, the incipient intermentality between the major characters Clive Linely and Vernon Halliday comes to its end when the close friends' strong egocentricism and aspectuality lead them fundamentally towards intramental thought and action. And in On Chesil Beach, the development of Edward Mayhew's and Florence Ponting's small intermental unit halts when their intermental or shared thoughts are replaced by their inflexible intramental dissents. Moreover, in both cases the primary concern of the narratives seems to be representation of the impact of mostly disrupting narrative events and situations, both before and after the disequilibrium, on the experiencing minds throughout the narrative progression. Keywords: Fictional Minds, Intramental Thought, Narrativity, What it's like, Narrative Experience, Amsterdam, On Chesil Beach, Ian McEwan.