**KARADENIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY * THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**


**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**MASTER'S PROGRAM**


**TURKEY AS A STATE-BUILDING ACTOR IN SOMALIA: A COMPARISON OF TURKEY AND OTHER ACTORS**


**MASTER'S THESIS**


**Mohamed Sharif MOHAMED**


**JANUARY – 2022**

**TRABZON**

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**Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Alper Tolga BULUT**

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# APPROVAL

Upon the submission of the dissertation, **Mohamed Sharif MOHAMED** has defended the study "**Turkey As A State-Building Actor In Somalia: A Comparison Of Turkey And Other Actors"** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University, and the study has been found fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis by unanimous/ majority vote on **04.02.2022.**

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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Director

**DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY**

I, **Mohamed Sharif MOHAMED**, hereby confirm and certify that:

- I am the sole author of this work, and I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution,
- This work contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other university or institution,
- No data or finding in the work has been falsified or embellished,
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Signature……………….

Date: 06-01-2022

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# ÖZET

Bu tez, Türkiye'nin Somali devlet inşa sürecindeki genel rolünü araştırmayı ve anlamayı amaçlamıştır. Daha fazla detaylandırmak gerekirse, bu araştırma, Türk politika yapıcıları tarafından kullanılan devlet inşası yaklaşımının yanı sıra bunun Somali'de yer alan diğer aktörlerden nasıl farklı olduğunu göstermeye çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamda, çalışma Türkiye'nin Afrika ve Somali'ye yönelik genel dış politikasını keşfetmeyi amaçlamıştır. Özellikle, bu çalışma Türk hükümeti ve Somali'de devlet inşa sürecinde yer alan diğer bölgesel ve uluslararası aktörler tarafından kullanılan devlet inşa yaklaşımları arasındaki farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri araştırmayı ve tartışmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu nedenle, çalışmada hem birincil hem de ikincil veriler kullanılmış ve politika yapıcılar ve akademisyenlerle yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Bu çalışma, 2011'den sonrası dönemde hem Somali-Türkiye hem de Türk-Afrika ilişkilerinde yeni bir döneme geçildiğini ortaya koymuştur. Bu ilişkinin 1998'den beri güçlendiği gerçeği göz önüne alındığında araştırma Türkiye'nin Somali'ye yönelik dış politikasının, kıtayla olan genel ilişkilerinde ile ayrılmaz bir şekilde bağlantılı olduğunu göstermektedir. Tezdeki bulgular ayrıca, hem Türkiye'nin hem de diğer aktörlerin Somali'deki insani yardım ve devlet inşa projelerine katkıda bulunduğunu göstermiştir. ancak, en önemli ayrım yaklaşım ve katılım yöntemidir. Bu çalışma, kritik bir zamanda insani yardım, kalkınma yardımı ve güvenlik yardımını entegre eden kapsamlı yaklaşımın Somali'nin devlet inşa sürecinin kaderini önemli ölçüde etkilediğini savunmaktadır. Çalışma ayrica, Türkiye'nin öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin kapsamlı yaklaşımının eğitim, sağlık, ekonomik altyapı ve toplumun refahını iyileştiren kalkınma projelerini geniş ölçüde kapsadığını ortaya konulmaktadır. Orduyu yeniden inşa etmenin yanı sıra diplomatik kanallardan siyasi destek ve arabuluculuk yoluyla barış inşası da Somali'nin devlet kurma çabalarına katkıda bulunan diğer önemli faktörler arasında yer almaktadır..

Bu tez, Somali bağlamında uluslararası toplum tarafından desteklenen devlet kurma projelerini de irdelemektedir. Bulgular ayrıca, belirli devlet inşa projelerinin neden başarısız olduğunu ve diğerlerinin neden başarılı olduğunu daha iyi anlamayı kolaylaştırmaktadır. Somali'de yapılan aynı hataların tekrarlanmasını önlemek için gelecekteki devlet inşa girişimleri için de değerli olabilir ve bu nedenle gelecekteki devlet inşa projelerinin kapsamlı bir yaklaşım kullanmasını çağrıda bulunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Devlet inşası, Geleneksel Bağışçılar, Somali, Türkiye, Uluslararası Topluluk

# ABSTRACT

The study intended to investigate and understand Turkey's overall role in Somalia's state-building process. Furthermore, the study sought to demonstrate the state-building approach employed by the Turkish policy-makers and analyze how it differs from other actors involved in Somalia. In addition, the study aimed to study Turkey's overall foreign policy towards Africa and Somalia. Specifically, this dissertation aimed to investigate and discuss differences and similarities among state-building approaches used by the Turkish government and other regional and international actors involved in the Somalia state-building process. Therefore, the study utilized primary and secondary data, and consultations and semi-structured interviews were conducted with policymakers and academicians.

The study found that Turkey's recent engagement in Somalia in 2011 marked a new era of Turkish-African relations. Given the fact that this relationship has been growing in strength since 1998. The study demonstrates that Turkey's foreign policy toward Somalia is inextricably linked to its overall engagement with the continent. The findings show that both Turkey and other actors have contributed to humanitarian and state-building projects in Somalia. However, the crucial distinction is the approach and engagement method. The study argues that the comprehensive approach that integrated humanitarian, development assistance, and security aid at a critical time significantly impacted the fate of Somalia's state-building process. This dissertation posits that Turkey's approach to state formation in Somalia differs from other traditional actors. It reveals that Turkey's comprehensive approach has widely covered education, health, economic infrastructure, and development projects that have improved the well-being of the society. In addition to rebuilding the army, political support through diplomatic channels and peacebuilding through mediation were other key factors that contributed to Somalia's state-building efforts.

This dissertation serves as a snapshot of state-building programs sponsored by the international community using the context of Somalia. Its findings may help better understand why specific state-building projects fail and why others thrive. The results may also be valuable to future state-building initiatives to avoid repeating the same mistakes made in Somalia, and therefore urges that future state-building projects use a comprehensive approach.

**Keywords** State-building, Traditional Donors, Turkey, Somalia, International Community

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD                : Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı)

AKP                  : Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma parti)

AMISOM           :African Union Mission in Somalia

AU                    : African Union

EU                    : European Union

IGAD                : Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGOs                 : Intergovernmental Organizations

IHH                   : insani yardim vakfi

NATO                : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs                : Non-governmental Organizations

ODA                  : Official Development Assistance

OECD                : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIC                   : Organization of Islamic Cooperation

SDM                  : Somali Democratic Movement

SFG                   : Somali Federal Government

SFP                   : Somali Federal Parliament

SNA                   : Somali National Alliance

SPM                   : Somali Patriotic Movement

SRC                    : Somali Revolutionary Council

SRRC                  : Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council

SSDF                  : Somali Salvation Democratic Force

TFG                    : Transitional Federal Government

TFP                    : Turkish Foreign Policy

TIKA                  : Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

| | |
|---|---|
| TL | : Turkish Lira |
| TRC | : Turkish Red Crescent |
| TRT | : Turkish Radio & Television Corporation |
| TUSKON | : Türkiye işadamları ve Sanayıcılar konfederasyonu (Turkish Conferderatıon of Businessmen and Industarialists |
| UNDP | : United Nations Development Programme |
| UNPOS | : United Nations' Political Office in Somalia |
| UNOSOM I/II | : United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| USAID | : United States Agency for International Development |
| USC | : United Somali Council |
| USD | : United States Dollar |
| WFP | : World Food programme |
| WHO | : World Health Organization |

**INTRODUCTION**

Since the fall of the central government in 1991, international efforts to re-establish Somali state institutions have failed to generate positive results or a viable solution to the Somali conflict. As a result, the country remained in anarchy, with no fully functional state institutions. After the Somali government collapsed in the early 1990s, the first international intervention was the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which failed to rebuild state institutions and bring warring parties to the negotiating table. It is argued that the international community-sponsored stabilization and state-building efforts have often ignored focusing on the root causes of the Somali conflict to fix the country's deep crisis (Hagmann, 2016).

Consequently, due to the prolonged war in the country, Somalia has been described as the most failed state in the world and remains currently the second most failed state. However, the increasingly complex and complicated state-building process in Somalia has drawn the attention of many state-building authors over the past two decades. This has also created a debate on the strategies employed by the international community to stabilize fragile states.

Somalia's state-building efforts can be traced back to the 1990s. However, many efforts and reconciliation conferences were held in neighbouring countries that could not produce the anticipated outcome, but the first time a potentially recognized government was agreed upon was in 2000, when the transitional national government (TNG) was established in neighbouring Djibouti. Although, it has failed to succeed after relocating back into the country due to opposition from local warlords. As a result, there was the need for a second reconciliation conference and the establishment of a new government (Bradbury, 2010).

The transitional federal government was established in Kenya in 2004 after lengthy discussions among the most influential stakeholders, including traditional elders, civil society members, and warlords who came together to establish a new government that could move forward and leads the country to stand on its feet again. The TFG, established in Kenya, dealt with many oppositions from warlords and later the Islamic Courts Union. In 2006. the TFG, assisted by Ethiopian troops, seized most of the south and central Somalia from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU subsequently split into more radical groups, most notably Al-Shabaab, which has since been fighting the Somali government and the AU-mandated AMISOM peacekeeping forces to control the country (Dagne, 2010).

Following the failure of the TFG and a political deadlock with the presence of the Ethiopian troops, a peace conference was held in Djibouti, which resulted in the formation of a new unified government. Although the challenges faced by this administration mounted, the TFG successfully conducted elections in the country and adopted a provisional constitution which is in place now. During the  TFG's term, Turkey's engagement in Somalia officially began when the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Somalia for a humanitarian cause and launched a campaign to save the lives of many Somalis who were severely affected by the drought. After a successful humanitarian campaign, the Turkish support for Somalia continued and shifted towards state-building.

The first non-transitional federal government was established in 2012, marking a turning point for Somalia's state-building process. Adopting the provisional constitution and holding elections within the country was another success story for Somalia's state-building process. However, Turkey's significant support for Somalia's state-building process has kicked off after 2012. Turkey's initial humanitarian engagement has shifted towards developing state institutions and providing tangible support to ensure that Somalia could successfully survive and avoid repeating the same famines and droughts and be better prepared for these types of natural disasters.

Turkey's overall activities and efforts in state-building in Somalia, including budgetary support, trade, in-kind donations, infrastructure rehabilitation, and development projects, have been enthusiastically praised by Somalis both inside and outside the country. However, Turkey's involvement in Somalia is a symbol of soft power practices, and Turkey aims to showcase itself as an emerging power (Cannon, 2016).

Besides this, Turkey's recent intervention in Somalia in 2011 signalled the start of a new era in Turkish-African ties. This collaboration has been growing since 1998 after adopting Turkey's opening to Africa Policy. Turkey's success in Somalia has opened doors for more interaction with the African continent. Somalia became the focal point of Turkey's strategy towards the continent. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy in Somalia is linked to the country's general approach to the region. The Turkish success in Somalia has shaped and significantly boosted Turkey's overall engagement in the continent and Turkey-Africa relations.

The main aim of this study is to evaluate and compare the Turkish state-building efforts in Somalia by comparing it to that of other actors as well as to Turkey's overall policy towards the African continent. Additionally, in order to get a clear understanding of the international community's role in rebuilding failed states, this dissertation will try to assess the role of the international community in Somalia's state-building process since the state collapse and attempt to analyze the state-building approaches employed by Turkey after its 2011 engagement. In this

context, the study is going to explore Turkey's role in Somalia's peacebuilding and stabilization process, under six areas: political support through diplomacy, peacebuilding through reconciliation, enhancing the capacity of state institutions, budgetary support, Improving social services institutions and economic infrastructure and rebuilding security institutions.

Previous studies on Turkey's role in Somalia state-building have focused on their contributions and strategic interest in Somalia. However, this study seeks to determine the difference between the Turkish state-building approach and the other actors involved in the Somali case. It has been suggested that the Turkish role was crucial in the stabilization efforts. In light of these arguments, the study seeks to answer these questions:

- What is Turkey's role and approach in Somalia's state-building process?
- What is Turkey's general approach towards Africa, and evaluate whether/how Turkey's approach towards Somalia is different from its overall policy towards the region?
- What are the differences or similarities between the state-building practices employed by the Turkish government and other regional and international actors involved in Somalia's state-building process?

The study's central argument is that Turkey's state-building experience in Somalia is different and unique. More specifically, Turkey adopts a more comprehensive approach to state-building that involves a multitude of parameters. The study argues that Turkey has played an essential role in Somalia's state reconstruction and stabilization efforts and explores the difference between the state-building approach used by the international community and Turkey, which has been on the ground since 2011. Furthermore, the study seeks to explain the Turkish contribution in peacebuilding, institution building, diplomatic support, security sector development, improving social service delivery, and developing economic infrastructure. Finally, the study will compare the Turkish state-building practices in Somalia and other actors based on their contributions to the reconstruction of the Somali state and engagement methods and approaches.

In order evince these arguments and lay out the details of Turkish state-building efforts in Somalia, this dissertation will rely on original semi-strucured interviews conducted with key Somalia policymakers, Turkish bureaucrats, prominent academics and journalists. This unique data source contributes to the literature by providing a more direct and first hand perspective to the Turkish-Somalia relations.

When it comes to state-building in fragile nations, a holistic strategy (a mix of humanitarian relief, development initiatives, institution building, and peacebuilding is more successful and yields better outcomes than state-building merely focused on institution building. As a result, it is

essential to achieve the proper combination of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives (Fanning & Fullwood, 2019). Compared to the state-building techniques employed by traditional donors in Somalia over the last two decades, Turkey's post-2011 engagement in Somalia was substantial and contributed to Somalia's state-building process. Turkey's comprehensive strategy was more effective and provided better outcomes.

There are three main arguments related to Turkey's engagement with Somalia: the first argument sheds light on the historical relations between the two countries in the 15th and 19th centuries. Many Non-Turkish scholars use the Muslim identity and historical relations as the main factors that renewed Turkey's engagement with Somalia. The second argument is that Turkey's engagement with Somalia is humanitarian-oriented. Many Turkish and Non-Turkish scholars argue that the sole purpose of Turkey's engagement with Somalia is humanitarian-oriented but nothing else. Another argument developed by (Abdulle, 2019) argues that the Turkish engagement with Somalia is not only humanitarian-oriented or the revival of history, but Turkey has a strategic interest in the Horn of Africa region to establish its hegemonic power and protect its economic interests in this very geostrategic position. Despite the challenges and risks, Turkish policy-makers decision to engage with Somalia shows their importance to Somalia.

With all these arguments in place, the Turkish engagement with Somalia gained momentum after 2011, and it is evident that Turkey's first engagement with Somalia was humanitarian-oriented in the first place. Still, the engagement continued after the humanitarian crisis was cut short. This study develops another argument related to Turkey's efforts to present itself as a political /State-building actor in the international system. Turkey plays a vital role in peacebuilding and state-building initiatives in many countries, and its method is considered a success. As a rising power, Turkey took advantage of the vacuum left by the international community, who expected Somalia to stabilize itself and invested in the process labelled a success. The study argues that Turkey's primary goal is to see a stable and functioning Somali government capable of delivering services to the public. Furthermore, Turkey's approach is based on working with Somalis and helping them achieve establishing resilient and robust institutions.

The study will contribute to the literature of state-building by exploring why some approaches to state-building become successful while others fail using the Somali-Turkish experience. The study also encourages further research in this field as it explores a new state-building approach that needs to be considered and debated. The study will contribute to understanding the international community's role in Somalia's state-building. It will provide significant insight of the Somalia policy-makers on the Turkish engagement in Somalia. The findings and the study's recommendations will be beneficial to policy-makers and concerned regional and international actors in the Somali state-building process to have feedback on their efforts to rebuild the Somali state.

Additionally, this dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature on state-building and Turkish-Africa relations as it utilizes original semi-structured interviews with key Somalia policymakers and academics. The study findings also contribute to understanding why Turkish engagement in Somalia is a success and the contributing factors. The results of the semi-interviews highlight several key points:

The interview with the Minister of Public Works Abdi, demonstrates that:

- Somalia policymakers see Turkish efforts as unique, more efficient, and addressing the key areas that Somalia needs to be supported.
- The Turkish projects are coordinated well and in cooperation with the central government.
- Security and budgetary support, rebuilding the economic infrastructure, and improving social service institutions have extensively contributed to Somalia's state-building process. Moreover, Strengthening the security sector is the stand-out successful project which Turkey continues to deliver.
- The Traditional donor's expenditure on Somalia is spent on logistics and salaries paid to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, resilience programs, and humanitarian aid, which are not tangible.

On the other hand, the interview with Wasuge, a prominent researcher who has done extensive research on Turkey-Africa relations, reveals that:

- Turkish state-building projects use a comprehensive approach combining all necessary tools, including humanitarian, development assistance, and trade.
- Somalis believe that Turkish projects are more efficient than the intangible projects by the traditional donors because of the visibility on the ground.
- Turkey is distinguished from others for sending its expertise and knowledge to Somalia. The physical presence of the Turks, on the other hand, is what brings them closer to the people and makes them appear as a trustworthy partner.

Finally, the interview with Yusuf, a prominent Somali academician, demonstrated that Turkey's projects are more tangible and visible on the ground and emphasized that Turkey has been highly effective and improved Somalia's social service-providing institutions. Also, the Turkish contributions in the health sector are widely visible on the ground, and it is considered the most successful Turkish project in the country.

The study tried to explore the state-building practices employed by Turkey and other international and regional actors in Somalia. To better understand the differences and similarities of the actors in concern, the study used both primary and secondary data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key Somali policy-makers, and academics. Despite the significance of the findings of this study, one may argue that it has limitations; For example, one limit to this study comes from the number of semi-structured interviews conducted and the selection process. Although I have interviewed a number of policy-makers, academics, bureaucrats, and experts, some of the officials requested confidentiality. Finally, the study results are generated from a thematic analysis on the conducted semi-structured interview transcripts and relevant quotes from the semi-structured interviews were included and quoted in the analysis of the study.

This study will be organized and divided into four main chapters with subsections. The first chapter covers the literature review on state-building. The second chapter of the study focuses on the Somalia State reconstruction efforts and International Community's support. The third chapter of the study focuses on the Turkey-Africa relations past and present and the historical ties between Somalia and Turkey. The fourth chapter of the study will focus on the Turkish state-building approach in Somalia, the characteristics of Turkish engagement in Somalia, and compare the similarities and differences of Turkey and other actors' state-building practices in Somalia.

<div align="center">**CHAPTER ONE**</div>

## 1. LITERATURE REVIEW: STATE-BUILDING

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war marked the emergence of fragile and failed states. Failed states collapsed due to their inability to maintain legitimacy and capacity to govern effectively. In some countries, violence, civil wars, and even terrorist groups have gained power due to a power vacuum and the collapse of state institutions. Despite the efforts to rebuild failed states to bring state institutions, many state and peacebuilding projects sponsored by the international community have failed. This chapter discusses and presents the literature and the secondary data of this study, beginning with defining the study's key concepts and terms.

### 1.1 Understanding The Concept Of State-Building

Human beings had lived for centuries in cities and towns without a functioning state institution until 5000 B.C. when towns and villages gradually formed a political organization that unites them under one umbrella. It did not take long for the first state to be established around 4000 B.C.; however, in the early 16th century, Machiavelli played an essential role in familiarizing the word "State" by defining it somewhat similar to the meaning of the modern state.

State-building is a concept that has been widely debated over the past decades and gained momentum after 9/11 when Afghanistan became a failed state, whose recovery took longer and efforts to reconstruct state institutions faced ambiguous challenges. Many scholars have defined state-building as the process of rebuilding state institutions, with the ultimate goal of establishing a state capable of delivering essential services to its citizens. OECD report defines State-building as "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state-driven by state-society relations." Hence it is "primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited" (OECD 2011).

For Carneiro (1970), "state is an autonomous political unit, with power over its territory where a centralized government operates with authority to collect taxes, draft men for work or war and decree and enforce the law." Considering that definition, a state is identified as failing when it cannot maintain domestic order by monopolizing force within its borders. Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, Liberia, and Somalia are recent examples of failed states. Failed states do not have an

operating justice system, strong law enforcement, a weak economy, and a lack of infrastructure. Failed states may either totally collapse or are inefficiently operational and are on the brink of collapsing (Heywood, 2007).

As Henning describes it, "as a general term used to describe the (re-)construction of functional countries, in other words, countries that are capable of providing their citizens with basic functions and services and that meet their responsibilities and obligations as members of the international community" (Henning, 2017). The ultimate goal of rebuilding the state is to achieve constituting state institutions capable of providing their citizens with the essential services that states should provide to their citizens. On the other hand, O'Dwyer defines State-building as "the construction of a state apparatus defined by its legitimate use of force in a given territory. Because of the wide variance between states across history, state-building may be best understood not in generic terms but as the result of political dynamics bearing the indelible imprint of their historical moment" (O'Dwyer, 2016). In his definition, O'Dwyer focuses on building state apparatus, which is defined by the legitimate use of violence and the political history of states.

Whaites defines State-building as" the process through which states enhance their ability to function. While an underlying political settlement determines the structure of the state, the forging of a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organizing political power" (Whaites, 2008). With all the above definitions of state-building, throughout this dissertation, we define state-building as the process of reconstructing and reinstituting state institutions vital for a state to provide services to its citizens and are capable of maintaining law and order.

## 1.2  Post-Conflict State-Building

States fail due to internal violence that erupts and becomes incapable of delivering services to the public. Individuals' misuse of governmental power may result in internal violence and weaken the state institution. As a result, the state loses its legitimacy in the public's eyes, and chaos and violence replace the stability and peace ensured by the state. Failed states lose control of their borders, disharmony among the community, increase in criminal violence, incapable of providing social services and security to the public (Rotberg, 2003).

It is worth mentioning that the literature contains little debate about the type of state that the international community should attempt to establish in fragile states (Samuels 2004). The institutional assumption is that a state is defined as a liberal market democracy spread across a geographical territory. As a result of this interpretation, state-building is primarily concerned with transferring Western ideals, institutions, and norms, exposing it to neo-imperialism allegations. Advocates of state-building believe that this type of neo-colonialism differs from past incarnations

of colonialism. It is more humanitarian, multi-lateral, engages the non-governmental sector, and interventions push for early withdrawals from a country (Paris, 2002).

According to (Nina & Willen, 2015), "a post-conflict state is still in a fragile phase, but it does not belong to the more urgent phase of violent conflict and is, therefore, less likely to receive as much attention and aid as a country that is not categorized as post-conflict." The social implications of the international community's actions may be costly to the post-conflict nation since they may choose to exit knowing that the country's condition is fragile. Even if external donors and partners do not depart or even limit their presence in the host country, they are most likely adjusting their behaviour, planning, and strategy to a post-conflict environment, which might have far-reaching implications.

The importance of 'local ownership' is emphasized heavily in the literature on state-building, which is agreed across all disciplines (Chesterman et al., 2004, Narten 2006). This generic 'call' is rarely decomposed into particular recommendations on ensuring local ownership in a situation where various opposing factions, powerful elites, and profoundly uncompromising and conflicted external actors. Many authors express broad concerns about the necessity to fit state-building techniques to the specific local situation. Still, again, there is little practical advice on how to do so, which is frustrating (Narten, 2006).

Over the past few decades, international actors (states and non-state actors) have been involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in fragile states. The first initiatives to rebuild state institutions by the international actors have been undertaken in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique to the most recent and ongoing state-building initiatives in Somalia and Afghanistan. The fundamental elements for state-building are securing legitimate and effective state institutions to be in place and functioning to deliver social services and protection to its citizens. According to (Blair & Ammitzbell, 2007), the following five areas should be focused on caring for a successful post-conflict state-building. Security, Political Governance, Economic Governance, Administrative Governance, and Judicial Governance.

Although the state is the sole source of the legitimate monopoly of violence, this is lost due to the collapse of state institutions and the escalation of intra-state conflict. In the post-conflict state-building initiative, the first phase of security-related activities is employing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy used to ensure the disarmament of former and newly armed militias and facilitate their reintegration into the society. This could be achieved through a peacekeeping mission such as the United Nations peacekeeping missions in several countries. Another important job that is also expected to be done by the post-conflict state-building initiative is safeguarding and protecting the returning refugees and the reintegration of internally displaced people and delivering humanitarian aid to the affected people, and ensuring the protection of the

borders of the state and the internal security. After securing this, political governance follows through the adoption of the constitution and holding elections that will result in the emergence of executive, legislative, and judiciary branches that operate in the country and give space to civil society and free media.

Economic governance is another critical factor in the post-conflict state-building process, which relates to managing public finance, creating employment opportunities for the public, and managing natural resources effectively. Administrative governance relates to the development of the civil service through reform and ensuring that they are paid. They are providing the management of state service delivery activities and infrastructure provision. The final factor is the judicial governance which relates to the promotion of the rule of law and conducting truth and reconciliation conferences to solve the underlying factors that resulted from the conflict and also in the judicial governance, the customary law is considered the most helpful mechanism or tool to solve internal problems.

State-building in post-conflict countries is a highly complex process as the driving forces of the conflict are limited to internal actors and the involvement of regional actors. The participation of conflicting interests in state-building in post-conflict countries and the competing local actors make the process ambiguous and rigid. Satisfying local, regional, and international actors' interests is a very tough task and remains one of the contributing factors in prolonged post-conflict state-building initiatives.

As state-building refers to strengthening and building institutions of the state. It also involves enhancing the legitimacy of the state institutions by supporting rebuilding the state to fully and independently function and deliver basic social and security needs. According to the RPPS paper, there are five significant tension and challenges that state-building initiatives encounter and deal with that make the process complex; external intervention is used to improve self-government: state-building aims to build a national autonomy and self-government through international intervention, which is seen as disturbing as external actors are involved in the process of shaping the transitional governmental institutions, delivering social services and providing security and finding a solution to the problem of transitional justice and also the duration of the mission "How long will the mission continue and when it is going to finish".

The second challenge that state-building missions encounter is that foreigners are the final decision-makers of the legitimate leader and the source of legitimacy. The involvement of international actors in the state-building process would not have been there if there had been effective local ownership who could implement peace negotiations and settle the dispute. The involvement of international actors in identifying the legitimate leaders in state-building initiatives defies the principle of local ownership, creating chaos. The opposition uses this opportunity by

creating rhetoric that actions taken by the external actors are a violation of the country's sovereignty.

The third challenge is that universal values are used to solve local problems. States collapse due to civil war, and the driving forces of the conflict include both local and external actors. Finding a solution to the problem, international intervention emerges when the local people cannot solve the problem. The international intervention has its principles and strategies to rebuild state institutions. The universal values that the international intervention aims to promote may include democracy, human rights, good governance, transparency, accountability, and capitalism. These universal values are challenged by the host nation's local norms, political traditions, and cultural expectations. The fourth tension involves reaffirming history and refraining from past actions that led to the conflict. Transitioning from war to peace is a process that needs continuity and change. State-building uses different approaches to resolve the dispute, which contradicts the local conflict resolution mechanism.

The fifth challenge that state-building encounters are that short-term interests hinder long-term objectives in state-building operations. In the early days of the international intervention to rebuild the state apparatus, external actors face pressure to solve short-term needs to avoid the conflict that escalates at that moment. In contrast, this hinders the long-term interests of rebuilding the state institutions. The political bargains made to stop the conflict and recognize certain leaders, whether legitimate or not, will burden future efforts to establish compelling and legitimate state institutions (Paris & Sisk, 2007).

## 1.3 Role Of The International Community In State-Building

State-building practices are commonly implemented by international actors whose involvement becomes necessary after local actors fail to solve their problems internally. The participation of international actors in local politics of a state has been controversial and faces many challenges posed by the local actors and other international and regional actors who disagree with the engagement method of other states involved in the process because State-building entails a complex interaction of interests related to security, legitimacy, and economic, political, and social developments, external stakeholders must take a whole-of-government approach (Paris & Sisk, 2007).

The literature focuses on the highly restricted role that external players can play in state-building processes, which is a point that should not be overlooked. Writers on state-building are almost uniform in asserting that the international community is not a significant actor in reconstructing a state. They argue that state-building activities must come from within the state to succeed. The presence of external actors in state-building undermines the ability of the young state

to learn to govern freely and disrupts patterns of local ownership, often resulting in discontent and the formation of spoilers (Chesterman 2004, Narten 2006).

As many authors have mentioned numerous times, external actors are urged to have realistic expectations of their position and accomplish in other countries (Samuels 2004). It would be an understatement to argue that the international community should ignore failed regimes and refuse to support them; instead, assistance should be targeted to assist rather than directing the process in mind. Not least among these considerations is that the international community must cultivate a sense of patience and recognize that grassroots solutions to governmental failures may take time to evolve rather than forcing and imposing a resolution from the outside (Carothers, 2007).

According to several authors, the primary role of external actors should revolve around the provision of human resources - both military in conflict zones and civilian workforce in non-conflict areas - and the provision of financial support. However, a contradiction exists: by imposing conditions on financial assistance, the international community undermines the processes taking place on the ground (Paris 2002). However, given that donors are responsible to their taxing authorities, it is unrealistic to expect donors not to require some level of formal accountability for the funds they provide.

In recent years, the international community has been strongly criticized for failing to harmonize its state-building efforts (Samuels 2004, Paris 2006, and Rubin 2006). Whenever questioned why state-building missions have been so hampered by the international community's failure to collaborate effectively, Paris (2006) offers several possible explanations. He concludes that the lack of harmonization is a sign of a severe underlying issue: the lack of harmonization of values and standards in society. Because there is no consensus on optimal practices in state-building, the international community cannot adopt a coherent and strategic approach at this time.

Some authors have called for establishing a new international organization to assist in coordinating state-building operations (Rubin 2006). As per some suggestions, the ineffectiveness of the US mission in Iraq is paving the way for a more significant, more widely backed role for the United Nations in state-building in Iraq (Rubin 2006 and Samuels 2004). Regardless of whether a new organization is established, the international community must recognize the negative impact their fragmented state-building methods have on the success of the missions.

The role played by the international community is critical in reconstructing the state apparatus and finding solutions to the problems underlying the conflict that led to the state collapse. One of the most controversies surrounding the international community's role is that their intervention violates the state's sovereignty. They are trying to rebuild their state institutions. Still, the international community's involvement in such a state is based on protecting human rights,

safeguarding the interests of the public, and ensuring the revival of state instructions capable of delivering essential social services to the public.

There are three significant aspects that the international community supports to increase the state's resilience. The three dimensions include political settlement, which reflects the implicit or explicit agreement (among political elites) on power-sharing, and the political processes through which state and society are connected. Second: enhancing the capability and responsiveness of the state to fulfil its principal functions and provide critical services effectively. The third aspect is building social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, what the terms of the state-society relationships should be, and the ability of society to articulate demands that are "heard" (OECD, 2011, p. 30).

The role played by the international community is limited to the facilitation and support given to the state-building process. Hence, and the key actors that play a pivotal role in the state-building process are the local actors. They have the ultimate part in solving the issues hindering the state's recovery. The international community aims to support and embrace the emergence of states capable of delivering essential social services and political rights and being accountable and responsive to the public.

Another vital role that the international community should play is engaging with local actors and creating a space for interaction and dialogue. (Chesterman 2004) "There has been a tendency to accept partnerships with local elites as indicating a good degree of local ownership" realistically, and the international community should not only focus the elite participation in state-building efforts. Still, it should instead work on a more inclusive process, including the other sections of society. Considering the development community's long history of supporting participation, it should be well-positioned to guide the international community in adopting best practices in this area.

To sum up, State-building in a globalized world is a contentious arena in which local, national, and international perceptions and interests are not necessarily intersecting or reconcilable. The ideas generated by self-referential logics of bureaucracies and thinks tanks form the basis of the thinking and the international community's approaches in engaging state-building projects. However, rather than giving genuine opportunities for state-building, this phenomenon contradicts the reality "on the ground" that actually adds to the problem rather than fixing it. At the same time, international engagement impacts the options and choices of local elites as intervening actors. The intervening international community pursues a "state-building agenda" to achieve their own goals. To avoid this and find a sustainable solution, studies on state-building should focus on how these two worlds interact with and impact one another.

Foreign aid and overseas development assistance to fragile states have increased in the last two decades as a result of greater international involvement and interaction in global politics. Implementing peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict countries aimed at repelling security concerns and, in some cases, claiming to protect countries from failing to properly function and execute governmental activities. Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq are just a few of the most recent examples of countries that have been substantially affected by this process (Soares, 2011).

With the intention of building strong institutions in conflict ravaged countries, many international institutions both state actors and non-state actors have been involved and participated in the peacebuilding, democratization, improving governance and enhancing the economy. Researchers from different fields have been interested in this notion of nation building .( Newman 2006), argues that the notion of nation building developed in the aftermath of World War II.

Following the success story of the United States' postwar reconstruction attempts in Germany and Japan, the concept and its practices encountered criticisms and become a matter of controversy and debate in the post-cold war era, this debate arose from the critics that  aid intended to bolster up democratic institutions has supported and yielded the emergence of authoritarian and undemocratic regimes in the majority of the developing world, At the same time, the alternative notion of state-building emerged and gained momentum. (OECD, 2008) indicates that the both terms nation-building and state-building are used interchangeably, but this has led to misunderstanding.

The Development Assistance Cooperation (DAC) was initially established in 2005 by the OECD (DAC), and its goal has been to monitor assistance flows to fragile governments. Similarly, the fragile state idea is a novel concept that evolved after 9/11 in the international community's political environment, which was designed by the World Bank and OECD's aid frameworks. The notion of fragile states arose from the convergence of two areas of study and activity concerned with poverty alleviation and social inequities, as well as international security (Chataiger and Ouarzazi; 2007).

Since then,  numerous countries throughout the world, including Haiti, Afghanistan, and Somalia, have been labeled as fragile states. A significant amount of research has been devoted to studying foreign aid to fragile nations, donors have been accused of failing to engage sensitively and strategically with all relevant stakeholders, particularly domestic actors, both governmental and societal groups, in their intervention and engagement, thereby contributing to the country's "political instability" however, this is a common feature of those countries undertaking state-building and depending on foreign aid. Goldsmith Studies on assistance to African states has revealed that donors and legislators reached inconsistent findings about the aid's impact on the

continent's statehood and that the provided help had a very tiny influence or was just a "minimal net plus" for African nations' abilities to rule successfully (Goldsmith, 2011).

On the other hand, Barakat contends that in the case of Afghanistan, donors failed to meet their obligations, limiting the country's efficacy in the state-building process. Donors have a tendency to prioritize strategic objectives over the development impact of the country's reconstruction endeavor .(Barakat, 2009) From the perspective of Soares, he points out that the most of the international community intervention or engagement on the state building process in contemporary post conflict countries has resulted in mixed records, if not entire failure (Soares, 2011).

The process of state building has been characterized as a continuing endeavor, and it is apparently the major duty of national actors such as the government, the public, and civil society groups. However, the role played by external actors involved in this process is very crucial, taking into account that the external actors do not have the responsibility of performing the core obligations, but rather of facilitating the essential tasks for a successful state-building project both technically and financially.

The debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid and official development assistance (ODA) and the existing facts that they have been and still used as a soft power tool in international politics has hindered the positivity of its image. Certain factors, including geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic related opportunities have always played a key role in determining the country's foreign aid strategy.

Despite the changing international engagement and cooperation methods and improvements to the aid and development systems in the twenty-first century, foreign aid is still employed to preserve and achieve the national interests of the state. However, the impact of foreign aid to the beneficiaries' socioeconomic and political stability or rebuilding state institutions is the point of discussion these days. With many arguing that aid lacked the ability to contribute successfully to rebuilding state institutions and bring stability to the country but rather led to competition and political instability.

In the last two decades, new donors with distinct aid policies have arisen, as opposed to traditional donors who have traditionally connected their national interests with their overseas development assistance. The new donors that emerged recently once were aid recipients from the traditional donors. The contributions and the overseas development assistance provided by countries like China, Brazil, Turkey, and India are given to countries recovering from conflict especially located in the African continent. Debate on the intentions of these aid providers have led to controversy among western scholars and non-western scholars.

15

<div align="center">**CHAPTER TWO**</div>

## 2. SOMALIA STATE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SUPPORT

With the collapse of the central government in 1991, state institutions became dysfunctional. International efforts to revitalize and rebuild institutions have not gained substantial momentum until September 2012. This marks the adoption of the provisional constitution, which was a significant milestone and a strong trajectory for future developments. The adoption of the provisional constitution paved the way for holding elections within the country for the first time in three decades.

Somali state-building is considered one of the most complicated and complex as many efforts to solve its challenges failed. Since 1991, many state-building projects have failed miserably. The international community state-building initiatives through the United Nations could not implement a top-down state-building approach. A considerable amount of money has been spent by the international community on the institution-building efforts in Somalia, and yet today, the state institutions are fragile. Considering that the transition period ended in 2012, Somalia remains the second weakest fragile state in the world, behind Yemen (Fund for peace, 2021).

Somalia's conflict drivers and shapers have changed with time. These changing dynamics have contributed to the deepening crisis in the country. Previously, the Somali conflict actors were the clan warlords whose interests were to gain control over resources and power. The solution to the Somali conflict was incredible as it has taken different paths, and later radical extremist groups have taken control of the south and central Somalia. The Ethiopian intervention exacerbated the situation since many Somalis saw it as a breach of Somalia's sovereignty; the dark history among Somalis and Ethiopians fueled the opposition to their intervention.

The escalation of the conflict and the growing opposition against the TFG have led to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the country and a newly formed transitional federal government. The transitional federal government's mandate was to federalize the country and hold elections in the country. The TFG succeeded in holding elections and adopting the provisional constitution, which was a big step in Somalia's state-building process. The next government was established within the country in late 2012. The election and the adoption of the provisional constitution marked the end of the transitional zperiod. This government was the first officially

recognized and non-transitional government since 1991. Since then, the international community has supported the country's successive governments and state-building projects. The fragility of state institutions and lack of harmony among Somali leaders is still a critical challenge to Somalia's state reconstruction efforts.

State-building in Somalia has witnessed highs and lows; however, the 2012 election was the turning point of this journey that Somalia has taken over the past three decades since its state collapse. This chapter will highlight and briefly give a general understanding of the Somali conflict, causes and consequences, the international community-sponsored political reconciliation and peace conferences, and the peacebuilding initiatives.

## 2.1 State Collapse: Causes And Consequences

Following its independence, Somalia dealt a blow from the cruel colonial actions after colonial partition. Unlike other East African countries, Somalia was partitioned into five parts by the colony in the nineteenth century. Due to its strategic location, France, Britain, and Italy divided the Somali territories to colonize. The French gained the authority of Djibouti, and the British took control of Somaliland, Kenya's North Frontier District (NFD), and Italy took control of southern and central Somalia.

The colonial actions have equally affected the past and the present setbacks encountered by the Somali nation. The colony's uncalculated activities have created hostility among the horn of African region countries. This hostility started when the British colony handed two regions inhabited by Somalis, North Frontier District (NFD) and Ogadenia, to Kenya and Ethiopia. As a result, Somalia leaders' goals and priority were to reclaim lost Somali territories and unite the Somali people into a "Greater Somali republic." The objective of uniting Somalis into a single state influenced domestic politics and led to militarization and establishing a strong army capable of regaining those lands. This dream also shaped Somalia's foreign policy toward its neighbours and created a hostile environment in the horn of the African region (Agyeman et al. 1985).

The conflict in the horn and most of Africa is a legacy of colonial states dividing homogenous people into different territories and creating borderlines that later turn into a source of conflict. "One is the division of various ethnic groups among several states," People of similar origin live across state borders, contributing to the current conflict, especially inter-state conflict. Because most of the states on the continent are colonial creations, the degree of uncertainty around state boundaries and the subsequent division of ethnic groups has been a significant setback to Africa (Agyeman et al. 1985).

According to (Samatar 2006), the disintegration and division of ethnic groups affected Somalis socially, culturally, and economically. Considerıng that Somalis are pastoralists who seek better environments based on seasonal changes. They also seek food, water, and pasture for their camels, goats, sheep, and cattle. In addition to this, the Somali people's fragmentation led to three major wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, many other ethnic groups have had problems with their states.

The underlying problems of boundaries and territories are the second legacy of colonial states. The unclearly demarcated or delineated by the colony created a visible conflict among states leading to several inter-state wars in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Somalia-Kenya. One of colonialism's legacies is the unequal development of regions and ethnic groups within countries. The main reason colonialists came to the region was to exploit natural resources. Territories rich in natural resources and fertile land were hotspots for colonizer competition, and colony resource extraction was rampant. The dispersion of modes of production and the affiliated institution of administration is the fourth legacy of colonialism (Mengisteab, 2011).

According to Menkhuas, the repressive security sector was built to serve the political interests of the ruling party and only focused on the regime's survival after the disastrous Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977-1978. The insurgents overthrew the central government and ousted President Mohamed Siyad Barre because the insurgents claimed that people who share a family lineage or clan are treated better than those who do not. Nepotism and favouritism were the underlying reasons why insurgents rose and overthrew the administration. As a result of the civil conflict that erupted in 1991 resulted in many deaths, displacements, and migrations to neighbouring nations (Menkhaus, 2014).

(Elmi & Barise, 2006), argued that "the root cause of the Somali conflict was a rivalry for power and resources, as well as a repressive state and colonial legacy, and cited as contributing factors to the conflict the politicized clan identity, the availability of weapons, and the high rate of youth unemployment." Thus, the conflict in Somalia is complex and unpredictable, involving multiple foreign actors with diverse interests and hosting proxy wars between emerging powers. The Gulf States Conflict has brought rivalry and competition to Somalia, and other powerful actors are visible in Somali politics, which adds to the country's political impasse and endless conflict.

The aftermath of an 11-year war waged by insurgents whose main goal was to overthrow the dictatorial rule led by Mohamed Siyad Barre succeeded. Barre was forced to leave the country, and the state institutions collapsed. Millions of people were displaced internally, and others migrated to neighbouring countries due to the conflict in Mogadishu. The lack of necessities such as food, clean water, electricity and the collapse of other essential governmental institutions such as the law

enforcement branch responsible for maintaining law and order exacerbated the situation in the capital and other regions. The first attempts to recover and save state institutions in Somalia began in 1992 with the arrival of the UNSOM peacekeeping mission (Christopher, 2010).

Elmi & Barise (2006) contended the idea that the driving factors of the Somali conflict were clans competing for power and resources, while (Farah, 2107) argues that clans never fought against each other but rather individuals and families representing internal actors using lines to access resources and power. He further argued the accuracy of how individuals could represent a whole clan while he pointed out that the greed for control of some leaders drove the Somali civil war.

Efforts to enforce peace using a top-down approach were not successful between 1993 and 1997, focusing on warlords as key conflict drivers and major stakeholders in Somalia's state-building process (from the first Addis Ababa peace agreement to the Cairo Agreement). (Battera, 2003)). The following sections will try to explain the support provided by the international community to Somalia in rebuilding state institutions. The breakthroughs in Somalia's state-building process will be highlighted under the two main themes peacebuilding initiatives and political reconciliation and peace conferences.

## 2.2 Peacebuilding Initiatives

The Somali conflict began when various armed opposition groups fought against the military regime, overthrowing a 21-year dictatorship. The regime's fall has resulted in one of the most defining post-Cold War state failures and civil wars. As an outcome, Siyad Barre left Mogadishu, but the warring factions started to fight each other, leading the country into chaos and violence. (Hall, 2015). In the northern part of the country, a self-proclaimed state was declared and claimed that they are a separate and independent state from the rest of Somalia. As things developed and the central government was ousted. A local businessman Ali Mahdi announced himself as the new president and appointed a new cabinet. Consequently, his administration has not recognized groups other than his supporters (Battera, 2003).

The Somali government and security apparatus have been dysfunctional. It was also clear that Somalia was a low-income country where most people's lives relied on livestock trade. Concerns grew when droughts occurred because the central government/state that handled the situation was not in place. Multiple attempts to re-establish a central government have failed. Many scholars consider the Somali scenario a complicated and complex situation shaped by conflict dynamics resulting in prolonged state failure and non-functioning government institutions since 1991.

Democratization, Economic reform, and human rights emphasis were the main themes in liberal peacebuilding after the cold war. The first international interventions in Somalia after the

state collapse can be categorized into three phases; the first one is the United Nations operation in Somalia UNSOMI, a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a UN peacekeeping mission led by the United States with many troop-contributing countries involved aimed to create a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to needy people in the south and central Somalia. This operation restores hope started on 5$^{th}$ December 1992 and concluded on May 4$^{th}$, 1993. The failure of this operation led to the third phase of the international intervention in Somalia, which was named UNOSOMII mandated to restore peace and law and order (UN, 2003).

With all the attention and eyes on Somalia and increased media coverage of the Somali conflict and the draught that resulted from the food crisis, which turned into hunger and famine, the United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, whose term was going to end at the time, decided to get involved in the efforts seeking to solve the Somali crisis. On January 23$^{rd}$, 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 733 to impose an arms embargo on Somalia – after a year since the Siyad Barre rule was overthrown. The United Nations Security Council adopted this resolution unanimously to minimize the heavy loss of lives, the destruction of public and private properties and dismantle any threat that could impact regional peace and stability (UN 2003).

The United Nations interfered Somalia through United Nations operations in Somalia, humanitarian aid mission, and a peacekeeping task force called the United Task Force (UNITAF), but this did not last long as the mission failed to deliver its mandate through the United States-led "restore hope" operation. On April 24, 1992 – The United Nations Security Council approved the deployment of ceasefire observers to ensure the distribution of food aid to Somalis affected by the droughts and famine. This also marks the time Siad Barre fled from the country days after the authorization of the U.N Security council of the deployment of the peacekeeping mission.

The scale of the international intervention in Somalia was visible when the outgoing American president, George Bush, ordered US forces' deployment to lead a multi-national Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to strengthen the UN operation and observe peaceful delivery of humanitarian aid. The operation aimed to 'enforce peace' under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the early days of the operation went successful but did fail to disarm the warring factions. With all this heavy military presence and humanitarian-driven operation. The United Nations also tried to bring factions that were growing in number at the time into the table to solve the Somali crisis. One of the early attempts to engage with this issue and bring the warring factions was the Addis Ababa accord in March 1993 (CRD & Interpeace, 2009).

The greedy warlords who competed for power in the country, the two most influential clan lords, Mohammed Aidid and Ali Mahdi, fought to take the leadership role of building state institutions. As a result of this conflict, hundreds of thousands of Somalis were displaced while

others migrated to neighbouring countries; thousands lost their lives and others wounded. By 1992, an estimated 350,000 Somalis had died due to starvation, diseases, or the casualties of the infighting between warring clan lords (Hogg, 2008).

After talks between Somali faction leaders, a ceasefire was agreed upon by 15 Somali political movements at the national reconciliation conference organized by the Secretary-General in early 1993. As a result, all weapons were promised to be handed over to UNITAF and UNOSOM at the time. An accord on disarmament, reconstruction, and the establishment of a transitional government was endorsed by the leaders of 15 clan factions during a reconciliation meeting hosted by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Somalia. The United Nations Security Council adopted a new Resolution (814) to ensure that the UN's role in Somalia is effective and result-oriented. UNSOMII, the most significant peacekeeping force and the most ambitious one, deployed more than 20,000 peacekeeping forces in Somalia. The mission's mandate was to restore stability, peace, law, and order and, more importantly, reconstitute national government.

On October 3, 1993, eighteen United States Army Rangers and one Malaysian soldier were killed when Somali insurgents shot down two U.S. helicopters over the Somali capital of Mogadishu, sparking a firefight. There were also civilian losses resulting from the conflict. Immediate action was taken by the United States to formally terminate its involvement in the operation, which was tasked with rebuilding government institutions in Somalia and restoring peace, law, and order. This mission cost the United States $1.7 billion and resulted in the deaths of 43 American soldiers and the wounding of 153 others (Dotson,2016).

President Clinton's newly sworn-in US administration withdrew its forces from Somalia in 1994 after facing mounting domestic pressure, other troop-contributing states followed its footsteps. In 1994, UN officials started brokering a new power-sharing deal through negotiation among clan warlords to convince them to be part of a coalition government. This conference was held in Kenya and attended by 16 clan militia leaders, including the two influential leaders, Mohammed Aidid and Ali Mahdi. Still, that effort did not yield the desired result. UNOSOM forces withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, which ended the operation.

The United Nations operation in Somalia failed to achieve its mandate to bring peace back and rebuild Somalia's collapsed state institutions. Despite the numerous challenges encountered by the mission, the UN intervention initially was seen as an excellent chance to revive the Somali collapsed state institutions. As Ridout argues, "humanitarian intervention of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) also fueled conflict, as it created further competition over resources." (Ridout, 2012). This argument is entirely credible and can be considered as the conflict was fueled by competition over resources and control over who has the power to distribute these resources to the public who was facing food shortage and famine at the time.

Another factor that contributed to the downfall and failure of the United Nations mission in Somalia is the competing interests of the troop-contributing countries, regional, and neighbouring countries, primarily Ethiopia and Egypt, which sought to exercise their influence on the crisis and show how they can influence the Somali situation if they are not considered important actors in the region as both countries had conflicting interests and their Nile River dispute was ongoing. This was open ground for them to compete and exert pressure on Somali warlords to come together to solve the deepening crisis in the country. However, their aim was not for the sole purpose of a peaceful Somalia but rather political gain and exercising their regional leadership role.

The United Nations Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM) has failed due to its top-down state-building approach, as it failed in many countries that suffered from state collapse and civil war. The top-down state-building approach fueled the conflict as it was expected to be the solution. Pierre Englebert has argued that "state sovereignty and recognition tend to be used by the most powerful groups, which exclude other minority groups whose influence in the issues is less and they tend to monopolize the state for their advantage and enrichment. Considering this, trying to rebuild the state after the intra-state conflict is likely to bring power monopolization and fail to provide representation" (Englebert, 2009).

When the most ambitious and largest United Nations peacekeeping operation in terms of personnel contributions, which attempted to restore peace and stability to Somalia, failed to achieve its goals, it marked a significant setback for global peacekeeping operations. Instead of reaching its intended result, the mission engaged in a conflict with the clan leader Mohammed Aidid. This led to the operation's abrupt termination and laid the groundwork for the complete collapse of government institutions and the outbreak of violence. The aftermath of the United Nations' withdrawal from Somalia has been characterized by anarchy and unending violence, discouraging the Somali people's expectations. Nothing has changed with the departure of the UN mission, and the predicament remained unsolved.

After UNOSOM's withdrawal from Somalia in March 1995, as a result, United Nations Secretary-General had established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was mandated to continue the United Nations involvement in finding a solution for the Somali crisis as the two missions failed. The office aimed to advance the search for peace and reconciliation through direct contacts with Somali leaders, civil society organizations, and the state and non-state actors concerned. The office was designated to be based in Nairobi. The UN indirectly sustained its engagement with Somalia by carefully watching and monitoring the situation and delivering reports to the United Nations Secretary-General. However, the United Nations abandoned the leadership role of the diplomatic initiative, and the European Union and regional actors took the role

The United Nations restore hope, and peace-making missions have failed due to numerous reasons discussed in this section. The failure of these projects supported by the international community and the US has marked a significant era in the state-building approach as a top-down approach which is the one used by the United Nations and the US who led the mission used in their pursuit/search for peaceful and fully functioning governmental institutions in Somalia.

After the failure of previous attempts to restore peace and stability in Somalia, another peacekeeping mission was launched in 2007 under the umbrella of the African Union. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is currently an ongoing and active peacekeeping mission in Somalia implemented by the African Union fully supported by the United Nations. Its creation and establishment came through the approval of the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate (Amisom, 2020).

On February 20th, 2007, the United Nations Security Council approved the deployment of African Union peacekeeping forces with an initial six-month mandate by adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The peacekeeping mission aimed to oversee and protect a national reconciliation congress launching. After its deployment, the IGASOM mission was requested to provide a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission to Somalia. If things did not go as planned, the IGASOM mission became less effective.

Since the UN operation in Somalia ended in the mid-1990s, the role of the international community was limited to supporting peace processes until the African Union mission in Somalia replaced its predecessor, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace support mission to Somalia which in short called (IGASOM), this was proposed protection mission by IGAD and approved by the African Union in September 2006 and also authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

Intending to try to restore peace in Somalia and enable the state institutions to properly function and deliver social services, Ugandan and Burundian army under the umbrella of AMISOM peacekeeping forces and the Somalia National Army (SNA) took offensive to capture and take control of Mogadishu in 2011, and this operation was concluded successfully. The year 2007, which marks the year that AMISOM peacekeeping mission started operating in Somalia till 2012, which marks the end of Al-Shabaab's influence and control of the capital Mogadishu shows the struggle and sacrifice made by the African Union Mission in Somalia.

The Somali National Army, backed by AMISOM that defeated Al-Shabab in Mogadishu and succeeded in taking control of the capital Mogadishu was later joined by the Ethiopian and Kenyan forces. This led to the takeover of large cities previously controlled by Alshabab and ended

Alshabab's control of the portal city Kismayo, a strategic location. Transitional Federal Government forces were trained by different foreign countries, including regional and international actors, including Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, USA, EU, and other regional actors like UAE and Qatar. The main goal of these efforts was building a strong military for Somalia and ultimately taking over the responsibility of securing the borders, the internal insecurity, and safeguarding peace and stability in Somalia from the AMISOM (Burgess, 2013).

The African Union Mission in Somalia has been operational in Somalia over the past 15 years, and the mission encountered many challenges during the mission. AMISOM has supported the successive governments in Somalia since 2007 by providing security services and protection to the government's significant headquarters, including the presidential palace, the port, the airport, and parliament buildings. One of the apparent challenges that the AMISOM mission encountered is working in one of the most complicated and complex environments. This meant that the challenges ahead were not easy and needed much attention. One of the continuing challenges that the African Union Mission in Somalia is that it is funded by actors other than the African Union, which means that the mission does not decide its destiny as the actual decision-makers are the funders of the task (Amisom, 2020).

The mandate of the AMISOM mission in Somalia was to protect the government institutions and build a safe environment for Somalis everywhere in the country by reducing the threats posed by al-Shabaab. The mission's success has played a pivotal role in securing Mogadishu and providing security support in holding two elections in Mogadishu between 2012 and 2017, which established two federal governments. It also took part in training and preparing the Somali national army to take full responsibility for securing the country.

The AMISOM peacekeeping mission could not solve the fundamental problems. Although the AMISOM has succeeded in creating political space for Somalis, the Somali leaders and important figures could not come together and capitalize on this opportunity. AMISOM is an under-resourced mission with a significant gap in transportation, reimbursement insufficiency compared to UN peacekeepers, and lack of unified command among the AMISOM headquarters and troop-contributing countries (Williams, 2019).

This ongoing peacekeeping project operates in the south and central Somalia, and the troop-contributing countries are committed to supporting Somalia's efforts to regain powerful government institutions. It is not clear how long this mission will take, but Somalia's friends and allies are efforts to rebuild the Somali National Army (SNA).

It is worth mentioning that the majority of the neighbouring countries trained and still give training to Somalia's army, other non-regional states support rebuilding the Somali National Army

(SNA), including the US, UK, Italy, European Union (EU), and the most important actor in rebuilding the Somali army is Turkey which has been supporting and training the Somali army and trained military units that are well-known in the country including Haram'ad and Gorgor. Turkey's efforts are seen as significant in rebuilding the Somali National Army. Turkish officials see this as the only way to strengthen governmental institutions and maintain law and order.

## 2.3   Political Reconciliation And Peace Conferences

Somalia's peacebuilding attempts have faced numerous obstacles. They have occasionally failed due to armed rebels opposed to either prevailing peace or functioning government institutions due to fear of the rule of law and judicial tribunals. The collapse of the Barre dictatorship in 1991 triggered turmoil and violence. When the central government was overthrown in 1991, the northern part of Somalia claimed sovereignty over the Somali republic. It declared itself an independent state, raising doubts on the future of a unified Somalia that already lacked other regions annexed to Ethiopia and Kenya, and Djibouti. In addition, Puntland became a regional state in 1998.

In the Somali case, the extent of international involvement and efforts to end the crisis and the minor achievement indicated the lack of state-building measures. The UN-led operation that began in 1992 - knowns as "Restore Hope" - ended miserably in 1995 after the departure of the United States in 1994, forcing the country to solve its problems by itself. Many other attempts followed to bring back peace from the powerful elites and those who hold power, focusing on specifically the warlords, who either/nor received the international community's support, followed between 1993 and 1997 (from the first Addis Ababa Agreement to the Cairo Agreement).

The UN tried to use diplomatic means to solve the conflict in Somalia. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James Jonah visited Somalia and convinced the warring factions to hold negotiation talks in New York. These talks were planned to take place under the sponsorships of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). These talks signalled the renewed role of the international community in Somalia had meant a significant milestone and a positive factor that led to an agreement to end hostilities and also encouraged other UN resolutions, which were adopted respectively on March 17 and April 24, that approved the launching of the first united nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Under the sponsorship of the United Nations, 15 factions, each representing clans, agreed to a national reconciliation process and a procedure for establishing a Transitional National Council (TNC) and government institutions. At the time, this was a real breakthrough and a step taken forward. However, the results did not lead to solving the country's problems. But instead, the chaos continued, and a solution was not imminent.

More than ten years of national reconciliation efforts, Somalia's future was still hanging in the balance. Scattered people, greedy warlords, and a lack of willingness to solve the deepening situation were the characteristics of the Somali problem. Efforts to bring peace and ending conflict were ongoing. However, the expectations were not high as the conflicting interests of those involved in the negotiation process did not seem solvable ( CRD & Interpeace, 2009). The Arta conference is an example of the new initiative which led to the establishment of a "Transitional National Government" (TNG), which was created based on national reconciliation and for the sole purpose of ending the Somali conflict. The year 2000 marked a change of strategy by the United Nations by abandoning the "building blocks" approach that guided the united nation's attempts of reconciliation and bringing the warring militia leaders into the discussion table.

The TNG received the international community's recognition, although it did not enjoy the support of all actors concerned. It is considered the first internationally recognized transitional government of Somalia since dictatorial rule. The newly established Transitional National Government (TNG) succeeded in settling back in the country, but it could not achieve due to various reasons (Lalos, 2011).

Even though the transitional national government had the potential to win the support of some clans throughout the country, it was unable to secure the help of the majority of the tribes and warlords, particularly in the country's southern and central regions. The TNG failed to seize and maintain authority in the capital city because it only controlled a tiny portion of the town. It also could not bring powerful warlords to the negotiating table to settle the crisis and restore calm to the nation.

There are various reasons that led to the failure of the Transitional National Government, to mention a few, ineffective and incompetent warlords whose greedy ambitions have overpowered the common interests of the public combined with the persistent and continuing attempts of Ethiopia and its partners to undermine the agreement and the established TNG. Over the past three decades, Somalia had 14 failed attempts to reconcile and re-establish government institutions. The main reason for TNG's failure is that it did not receive the full support of the social groups, and for this reason, it is not considered a national unity government. It encountered local opposition from warlords who controlled the capital Mogadishu and other regions supported by Ethiopia.

The Transitional national government had fought with the internal warlords who received support from neighbouring countries and their tribes. Consequently, the government could not overpower the warlords, and the stalemate continued as the term of the government came to an end. The establishment of the TNG paved the way for the decline of the sharia courts militia role temporarily as the government was ready to fill that gap, and the business groups started to support

the government and shifted from their reliance on the sharia courts militia for security. Once again, the TNG's failure opened doors for private security companies' investment by the businesses to ensure their transport of goods is safe from looting and stealing. The clan warlords remained unchallenged until mid-2006. The TNG conceded and accepted the national reconciliation conference facilitated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Following its failure, the international community approached Somali political stakeholders again, attempting to make reconciliation efforts more inclusive and ensuring that everyone was represented at the conference. This conference, scheduled to occur in Eldoret, brought together civil society representatives, warlords, and clan chiefs. After four months of debates and discussions, the meeting, which was agreed to be relocated to Nairobi, yielded no results (Battera, 2003).

In October 2002, several hundred delegates representing different regions of the country and civil society groups gathered for a national peace reconciliation conference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. It was the latest of numerous similar internationally sponsored meetings since 1991, which aimed to broker a peace deal and establish a central government in Somalia. This conference was slightly different from the previous ones. It has gained the international community's support, increased the number of armed factions' representation, and a plan to finalize this continuous conflict and find a solution. (Menkhuas, 2015). Despite these improvements, the conference ran across the same issues as prior conferences, which resulted in its failure. The conflicting interests and the lack of commitment and compromise from the Somali politicians and the armed warlords have resulted in the loss and the lengthening of this conference which was expected to be successful.

**Table 1. Conferences Held Between 1991-2004**

| Conference | Date | Attended parties | Host Nation | Facilitator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Djibouti I | 5-11 June 1991 | SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU, SDM | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti |
| Djibouti I | 15-21 July 1991 | SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU, SDM | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti |
| Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation | January 1993 | 15 factions | Ethiopia | United Nations |
| Addis National Reconciliation | January 1993 | 15 factions | Ethiopia | United Nations & Government of Ethiopia |
| National Salvation Council(Sodere) | November 1996-January 1997 | 26 factions | Ethiopia | Government of Ethiopia |
| Cairo Conference | November 1997 | Hussein Aideed's government & NSC | Egypt | Government of Egypt |
| Somali National Peace Conference (Arta) | May-August 2000 | | Djibouti | Government of Djibouti |
| Somali National Reconciliation Conference Eldoret/Mbegathi | 2002-2004 | | Kenya | IGAD/ Government of Kenya |

**Source:** (CRD & Interpeace, 2009)

Menkhuas argues that "conventional wisdom on Somalia's crisis offers several explanations. These include charges (a) that Somali leaders have been irresponsible and myopic in their search for power and their stubborn refusal to compromise; (b) that collective fear of the re-emergence of a predatory state undermines public support for peace-building; (c) that the powerful centrifugal force of Somali clannism works against centralized authority, making quests to rebuild a Western-style state a fool's errand; (d) that neighbouring states such as Ethiopia conspire to perpetuate state collapse in Somalia for their reasons; (e) that external diplomacy has been consistently misinformed and incompetent in its mediation efforts. All of these have merit and collectively encompass much of the political impasse in Somalia" (Menkhuas, 2015).

In 2004, The TFG succeeded its predecessor, the TNG. Following two years of negotiations and talks at a reconciliation conference held in Kenya under the supervision and oversight of IGAD. The neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, which sponsored the peace conference that yielded the establishment of the TFG, chose to bring together the warlords for the new government to be a successful project. At the same time, Ethiopia was able to dictate the choice of

president and prime minister and find a pro-Ethiopian government that does not pose a threat to Ethiopia and its interests.

After two years of reconciliation, the TFG administration that came to existence in 2004 in neighbouring country Kenya had faced much opposition. Still, after a long struggle, it resettled back in the capital Mogadishu. It started functioning in the capital gradually, which at the time was seen as a step taken forward and the foundation of today's success in Somalia's state-building efforts. One of the significant obstacles that hindered the success of the transitional federal government was the Union of Islamic Courts dominance in the south and central Somalia, which refused to negotiate with the TFG to end the long conflict that contributed negatively to regaining functioning government institutions capable of delivering services to the public. The threats posed by the UIC to the Somali government resulted in Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. The Ethiopian intervention weakened the UIC, and the TFG took control of the capital. Despite the initial success of the Ethiopian intervention, the situation in the country worsened, and the fight against the Ethiopian occupation continued.

After the failure of the TFG and the growing opposition, with the establishment of the alliance for re-liberation Somalia (ARS) in Asmara, Eritrea after the defeat of the UIC and the Ethiopian intervention 2006, both the former UIC members and other politicians who opposed the TFG came together. It formed this alliance to challenge the government for political gains and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops in the country.

To solve this issue and find a solution to the Ethiopian intervention, the Djibouti Peace conference brought all parts to the negotiation table. The central turning point of the conference was the signature of a peace deal signed in 2008 between the Transitional Federal Government under the leadership of President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which was the union of the former Union of Islamic Courts leaders, government officials, opposition politicians, and civil society member. The 11-point agreement extended the parliament to 550 and included representatives of the opposition alliance, civil society, and opposition members. The next parliament comprised 550 members, equal numbers shared by the two negotiating sides, the TFG and the ARS, which means 275 members each. And one of the conditions that the parties agreed on in the peace negotiation was the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from the country and the establishment of a new unified government that included all parties at the time, the incumbent government, ARS members, civil society members, and minority groups.

In 2009 the United States offered support to the transitional federal government led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called him the "best hope" for stability in Somalia. About half of the eight thousand peacekeeping forces promised by the AU have arrived operational in Somalia and only controlled a small portion of Mogadishu. (Kaplan, 2010). The

Sharif administration's primary challenges were the Islamic insurgents, weak government institutions unable to deliver services to the public, and the majority of the country was out of the control of the transitional federal government. The TFGs mandate was to implement the federalism project, build federal states in the country, and draft a provisional constitution agreed upon and ratified by all stakeholders in Somali politics.

Two critical events contributed to ending the transitional status in Somalia undertaken by the transitional federal government with the consultation of other stakeholders. The Garowe national consultation constitutional conference (GaroweI) and Garowe II are considered to have shaped the adoption of the constitution, electoral design, and government system, which paved the way for ending the transition and holding elections in the country. The foundations of the governance system and the implementation of the federalization process were laid down in Garowe after a national consultation constitutional conference attended by representatives from the transitional federal government, Galmudug, Puntland, Ahlu Suna waljama' and civil society groups representing various regions. The first Garowe conference proceedings include downsizing the national parliament (the house of representatives), establishing a bicameral federal legislature which means the establishment of an upper house representing federal member-states which are planned to be established by the government, assuring at least a 30% quota for women in parliament seats and establishing a national constituent assembly to oversee implementation of the principles. These were the fundamental principles agreed upon during this conference and were promised for another meeting earlier in 2012.

The next Garowe conference, known as Garowe II, was convened between 15-17 February 2012, and representatives from the transitional federal government, Puntland, Galmudug, Ahlu Suna waljama' and civil society groups attended it. The attendants discussed and agreed on areas of federalism, establishing the federal member states, status of the capital Mogadishu, system of government and electoral design, a bicameral parliament, and operationalizing the Garowe I principles and technical issues (Hiiraan, 2011).

In conclusion, the international community has offered substantial support to Somalia to recover from state failure. The internal divisions and greed for power and resources have fueled the conflict resulting in all efforts to rebuild state institutions failing. Imposing The top-down approach and the lack of alternative methods to solve the Somali problem by the international community have also contributed to the overall failure in the quest for a solution to the Somali conflict.

# CHAPTER THREE

## 3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA & SOMALIA

The modern-day Turkish republic was created in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, who became the republic's first elected president. Under his leadership and guidance, Turkey's foreign policy was centred on westernization and tilted toward the western world to transform Turkey into a modern state with robust principles. Turkey's foreign policy has not been designed to establish influence in the international system. The foreign policy-makers were not interested in it, as their foreign policy priorities were not open to engagement with other state actors except the western world.

Turkey's economic, political, and security interests were intertwined with the western world's. All of their efforts and attention were directed toward establishing a powerful Turkish republic that would serve as an ally of the West. Westerners were the dominating force at the period, and their influence on the international system has continued to this day. Turkey's lack of interest in connecting with other state actors and regions was a significant factor in its ineffectiveness in the international system and international institutions, which are venues for states to demonstrate their presence in world politics.

The country's foreign policy has also shifted from a monolithic Western orientation during the Cold War years to multiregional connections since the 1990s. Late 1990's Turkey has started to engage with other state actors and regions far from its geographic location, i.e., Africa. After the AK party came to power, Turkish foreign policy saw a significant transformation and started engaging with different states and regions. Since the 21$^{st}$ century, Turkey's foreign policymakers have shifted from Western-oriented foreign policy to multidimensional foreign policy. Turkey has significantly expanded its engagement in international politics, prioritizing trade and humanitarian interventions (Abdullahi, 2014).

This study tries to understand the Turkish foreign policy model towards Africa and how Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia was such a success in this short period. This has encouraged a more integrated Turkish foreign policy model in Africa. This chapter will highlight the historical background of Turkey-Africa relations, post-1923 Turkey-Africa relations, Turkey opening up Africa policy, and Turkey-Africa relations under the AKP rule.

## 3.1 Historical Background Of Turkey-Africa Relations

Turkey's relations with many African countries date back to the late days of the Ottoman empire as a handful number of countries in the continent were members of or influenced by the Empire. As Ozkan points out, the Turkish-Africa relations can be categorized into three significant periods that stretch from the Ottoman Empire's late days until its abolition in 1923. The second era that marks Turkey-Africa relations is establishing the modern Turkish republic, and the third era is the rise of the AKP party to power until now (Ozkan 2011).

Historically, Turkey's relations with Africa go back to several centuries. The Ottomans' first tangible contact and engagement with Africa began after conquering Egypt in 1517 under Mamluk rule for three centuries. At that time, Mamluk's defence forces were fighting against Portuguese expansionism around the Red Sea and Aden with the acceptance of a new government quickly. (Kavas, 2007). Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria were among the countries in northern Africa that the Ottoman Empire had significant relations with. These countries were partially influenced or ruled by the ottoman empire. In Sub-Saharan Africa, some African countries were somewhat affected by Ottoman rule. These sub-Saharan countries include Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and even Niger and Chad. The Ottoman state had helped some East African countries to fight with the colony and played power balance in eastern Africa to balance the Portuguese colonial interests and expansionism strategies (Ozkan 2011).

The most powerful empire in the Muslim world helped Muslims in northern Africa to contain the Spanish occupation in the north part of Africa. The Ottoman Empire also contained the Portuguese invasion in the Indian ocean. The Ottomans supported countries in eastern Africa, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia, against colonialism during the last decade of the 19th century and the early 20th century. The ottoman state enjoyed having good relations with Kanem Burnu Empire, covering Chad, Northern Nigeria, and Niger. The extent and the significance of the relationship between the two parties are shown by a signature of a defence pact under the rule of Murad III in the second half of the 16th century. The Ottoman state supported the kingdom by sending military supplies and trainers (Orakçı, 2008).

The relationship between the Ottomans and Africa was limited to military support. One of the contributing factors was the religious connection that unites both Turkey and Africa, which is home to many Muslims. Responding to a formal request made by the Muslim community in South Africa in the late 19th century, the Ottoman state sent imams to south Africa. After the successful completion of the first mosque built in Nigeria Lagos in the last decade of the 19th century, The Ottoman sultan dispatched a special emissary to Nigeria to confer the staff of office, the Order of Medjidie decoration, and the title of Bey, a higher civilian rank in the Ottoman Empire, to Mohammed Shitta Bey, the head of the Moslem Community in Southern Nigeria.

The Ottomans had a diplomatic mission in Southern Africa from 1861 onwards. The first appointed honorary consul-general in Cape Town PE de Roubaix on 18 February 1861 was later followed with a series of honorary consul-general appointments in subsequent years. The first Turkish diplomat, Mehmet Remzi Bey (based in South Africa from 21 April 1914), passed away on 14 February 1916 (Orakçı, 2008). The Ottoman state enjoyed having significant relations with many northern and east African countries in the continent. The ottomans helped these countries struggle against the colony and supported their fight for independence. The ottomans enjoyed considerable prestige and respect among the African continent. Despite the Europeans' pursuit of colonizing the continent, the Africans saw the Ottomans as the only ally they could trust and ask for support.

## 3.2 Post-1923 Turkey-Africa Relations

After the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, Turkey-Africa relations disappeared and seemed lacking importance as the Turkish foreign policymakers directed the country towards the western world. However, to some extent, during the cold-war era, Africa was back on Turkey's radar, and Turkey started to see Africa as an essential partner. The first official Turkish diplomatic mission in the continent was opened in 1956, the Turkish General Consulate in Lagos, and recognized all newly independent countries (Karaca, 2000, p. 116).

The Republic of Turkey also attached importance to Africa by supporting African countries under colonial rule. Turkey supported the Algerian freedom fighters providing military supplies and weapons against their fight to gain independence from the French colony. Turkey also assisted in Namibia's efforts of securing independence and helped Zimbabwean freedom fighters in Rhodesia against the white racist rule.

Following Ghana's struggle and success to gain its independence in 1957, Turkey immediately recognized Ghana as a state and established a resident Embassy later. As the decolonization process in Africa started in the late 1950s and early 1960's Turkey reacted to this development, recognized all newly independent African countries and engaged through diplomacy, and opened resident embassies in some of the nations. Turkey failed to establish good relations with African countries through economic, cultural, and political aspects. Even though, later, many improvements were made in the late Sixties and late Seventies. During the decolonization process, Turkey did not intend to integrate its foreign policy closely with African countries because the Turkish policymakers did not see Africa as an important actor because African states were newly formed, and others were getting established at the time.

The new modern Turkish republic founded in 1923 had not engaged with the African continent, which downgraded the weak relations that both parties maintained before. As both parties faced their own difficulties domestically, such domestic issues included the organization and structuring of the states in Africa and the fight for independence which continued at the time in some parts of the African continent. During the Cold War, Ozkan argues that Turkey realized and started to attach importance to Africa by developing political and economic relations with North African countries. Still, he mentions that Turkey's engagement at the time was shaped by the dynamic surrounding the bipolarity and the competition brought by the cold war. (Ozkan, 2011). During the cold war era, when most African countries became independent states, Turkey lost a vital opportunity to engage and develop good relations with the continent; Ozkan notes that this happened with a new plan designed in the 1970s to diversify the Turkish foreign policy (Ozkan, 2010).

For more than eight decades since the establishment of the Turkish republic, Turkey's foreign policy was western-oriented. Turkey has extensively campaigned to join the EU, NATO and become an important ally with the US. After Turkey's campaign to join the EU was rejected in 1997 by the European Union, the Turkish foreign ministry immediately started its mission to expand its relations and alliances and engage with Africa. Turkey's approach towards Africa is defined by cooperation and not expansionist-driven vision.

### 3.3 The Turkish Opening Towards Africa

The world has witnessed many changes after the cold war ended and the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the end of the bipolar system, which shaped world politics since the end of the Second World War. This marked the end of an era, and states started to redefine their foreign policy interests and priorities, reacting to world political changes. Turkey started to shift its westernisation policy, opted for multiregional foreign policy, and started to engage with other states geographically close to them and other regions.

This initiative is considered one of the projects designed by the Turkish foreign policy ministry to engage and shift its foreign policy to a multifaceted one. Turkey's opening up Africa policy came after a series of deliberative and discussion meetings were organized in 1998. Delegates representing essential ministries and government agencies, private sector representatives, and individual companies who do have business in the African continent attended the meetings. Turkish diplomats and ambassadors in Africa and honorary consuls' representatives of African diplomatic missions in Turkey also participated in the discussions. A set of topics were discussed during the sessions, and the status of Turkish-Africa relations was a point of debate that the attendants focused on. Hazar argues this meeting and the attendants' discussions contributed to

determining outstanding issues. Various recommendations were suggested to develop and strengthen Turkey-Africa relations (Hazar, 2000).

There has been a revival in Turkey's relation with Africa after adopting the Africa action plan in 1998. Although things did not go as planned due to the domestic economic crisis in Turkey. This meeting and the action plan it yielded were seen as a turning point for Turkey-Africa relations. After 2005 Turkey's interest in developing ties with the continent become more visible. The 2008 Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit marked an essential stage in this relation. It showed Turkey's keen interest in developing relations with Africa. This step is seen as a turning point for a close friendship between Turkey and Africa from political and economic aspects.

One of the key factors determining a diversified Turkish foreign policy is the change in the actors involved in its making and designing. The Turkish foreign policy-makers aimed to include non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, charities, think tanks, and the public, among others, in policy-making to achieve the goal of diversified foreign policy. With this change in foreign policy decision-making design, Turkey's foreign policy priorities widened and shifted from focusing solely on the western world to a more diversified foreign policy (Akpınar, 2013).

Since the founding of the Turkish republic, Turkish foreign policy had given very low importance and priority to engage with the African states. But many Turkish governments have shown their desire to have good political, economic, and military relations with the western world. The majority of the African countries were under colonial rule. And Turkish leaders' primary goal was to build a modern Turkish republic, an ally of the western world (Tepecikliogu, 2019).

Turkey's main goal was to be seen as a valuable and reliable friend by the African countries. To achieve this, Turkey increased humanitarian aid dramatically in the period of the AK party rule. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) report from 2013 remarks that "Turkish overseas aid rose from $85 million in 2002 to $3.3 billion in 2013. Turkish aid to various African countries has reached substantial proportions, standing at $749.47 million in 2012 and $782.73 in 2013. In 2014, Turkey's official development assistance to Africa was $383.3 million, and Sub-Saharan Africa's share in this amount was at $153.6.28 By 2016, Turkey's total official development assistance had nearly doubled from 2013 levels to $6.2 billion" (Venkatachalam, 2019).

There were reasons behind Turkey's shift towards Africa and its engagement with the continent. One of the driving factors of this engagement was a business opportunity and finding alternative markets for Turkish exporters and the emergence of small- medium-sized companies

whose products should be found for customers. In this context, the Turkish policymakers saw Africa as a good option.

According to (Sirdag, 2013), The Turkish opening up Africa policy or "the African Opening Action Plan of 1998" had five main aims.

- To enhance and improve the political relations between Africa and Turkey (high-level visits among the two parties, opening new diplomatic missions, and launching a political consultation mechanism).
- Enhancing economic relations through new trade agreements, reduction of taxes, and economic cooperation
- To develop and improve social and cultural interaction (Scholarships, scientific cooperation, academic exchange programs for both students and academicians, and cultural visits).
- To cooperate in the field of the military security sector (Turks to give training to African military and police personnel and Turkey's commitment to be part of troop-contributing countries to future UN operations in Africa)/
- To establish institutional relations between Turkey and Africa (to improve the institutional Turkey ties is expected to be a member of regional organizations of the continent, i.e., the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union [AU], and the African Development Bank (ADB), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

This action plan was unsuccessful as the government that launched this initiative faced domestic problems. From 1991 till 2002, the rise of AKP to power was marked by successive coalitions governments, and government projects were unsuccessful as there was no single-party majority in the parliament. The action plan was in place and ready for implementation. The 2002 victory for the AKP and the end of coalition governments opened doors for this initiative to be practically implemented. The AKP immediately considered Africa an important actor, started directly engaging with the continent, and started implementing the Action plan adopted in 1998 by many Turkish stakeholders.

## 3.4 Turkey-Africa Relations in The AKP Era

During the first decade of the AKP rule, the Turkish economy saw a significant transformation and boom that led to Turkey's persuasion to become an emerging power. To achieve this goal, Turkey started to engage and improve relations with African countries and build

the infrastructure and a good foundation for future mutually beneficial ties to both sides. Turkish engagement in Africa has grown significantly, particularly in humanitarian relief, development aid, bilateral and economic relations, and Turkey becoming a political actor settling conflicts across the continent (Kagwanja, 2013).

Turkish foreign policy has seen a significant change of direction. One of the main reasons is the ideological shift of the Turkish government during the era of the AK Party with the leadership of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the redirection and redesigning of Turkish Foreign Policy from the Western-centered to more diversified foreign policy. This shift in policy aimed to have good relations with all regions in the world especially considering Africa as a strategic partner for Turkey's efforts of becoming an emerging power. Rudincova argues that the "Turkish policy in Africa has two dimensions: the first one is promoted by the official representation of the State, for example, the Prime Minister's engagement in the reconciliation processes in the African continent, and the second one which is a less visible dimension which is performed mainly by the civil sector of Turkish society, i.e., business organizations as well as various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian aid agencies" (Rudincová, 2014).

Modern-day Turkish Africa relations can be categorized into three periods. The start of the first period is marked by the adoption of the Africa plan in 1998. This era continued until 2005, marking the year Turkey was recognized as the "Year of Africa." During this period, Turkey achieved to pave the way for a productive future relationship with the African continent and to accomplish. They built the diplomatic infrastructure for better and improved relations between the two parties. From 2005 to 2011 marks the second period defined by Turkey's increased efforts to establish good relations with the continent. Turkey opened new diplomatic missions in Africa to show its commitment to fostering ties with the continent. Turkey's interest in the continent was visible when the trade volume increased. To improve the trade relations between Turkey and Africa, Turkey organized the Turkey–Africa Summit in 2008. The summit aimed to build momentum and foster ties among the Turkish and African institutions. Turkey's involvement in the Somali humanitarian crisis in 2011 also marked the beginning of the third period of modern Turkish-Africa relations (Ozkan & Orakci, 2015).

Ozkan defines Turkish foreign policy towards Africa under the AKP party as one of the most successful Turkish foreign policy initiatives over the past two decades. The foundation for the Turkey-Africa relations has been humanitarian assistance and economic ties. Turkey's involvement in the continent and its approaches show its commitment and desire to establish good relations with the continent. Turkey's ambitions in the continent are not only limited to becoming an economic but also to an important political ally for African countries (Ozkan, 2014).

### 3.5 2005 The Year Of Africa In Turkish Foreign Policy

The Turkish foreign policy was not designed and directed in engaging with the African continent over the past decades. This time around, Turkish foreign policymakers started to shift their policy towards engaging with the African continent. In doing so, the first significant step taken forward after the 1998 Africa action plan was announcing 2005 as the year of Africa. Africa was part of the Turkish foreign policy agenda again. Muchly anticipated cooperation started in 2008 with the first-ever Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul with the full participation of representatives from fifty African countries.

The Turkish government started to show its interest in Africa back in 1998. The adoption of Turkey's opening-up policy in Africa was key to the revival of the relations between the two sides. However, the actual engagement and direct ties between the two sides did not begin immediately. As Ozkan argues, Turkey's attempts to establish good relations with the African continent became more apparent when the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002 (Ozkan, 2011).

The AKP's first step to enhance Ankara's relations with the African continent was adopting the 2003 "Strategy for enhancing the economic and commercial relations with Africa." However, the Africa action plan took shape in 2005 with the announcement of 2005 as the year of Africa in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey was awarded observatory status in the African Union, followed by many commercial and trade summits and educational summits focusing on Turkey's Africa relations (Bacchi, 2015).

The first Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit convened in 2008, 18-21 August. Later that year, After an African Union summit held in the organization's headquarter, Addis Ababa, Turkey, was declared a strategic partner by the African Union. Turkey Also applied for membership in the African Development Bank and became a member of the IGAD. Later in 2010, subsequent meetings have resulted in the "Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey partnership for the period 2010-2014" (Bacchi, 2015).

The available literature shows that Turkish foreign policy has changed considerably during the previous two decades under the AKP leadership in the pursuit of gaining international recognition and influence. The interplay between policies and future goals is evident from the gradual shift of Turkish foreign policy from "the logic of interdependence" and soft power-driven approach to strategic autonomy', accompanied by "interventionism, unilateralism and coercive diplomacy" (Kutlay & Oniş, 2021).

It is understood that Turkey has expanded its interests to long-ignored organizations and regions. To achieve their strategic goal of influencing many countries in the different areas, Turkey has immediately started engaging with the African countries. However, the foundations of this engagement were laid down through the 1998 Africa action plan. Turkey-Africa relations got momentum after the declaration of 2005 as the year of Africa in Turkish foreign policy.

After decades of losing its importance in global politics, Africa has gained global attention again for its increasing geo-strategic and economic importance in the international arena. Many middle-power and emerging nations have recently invested in different sectors ranging from energy to infrastructure renovation in the continent. Following the footsteps of China, Brazil, and India, Turkey has also recently begun to exhibit more economic and political interest in the continent. President Erdogan said during the inauguration of the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu that Turkey aims "to inaugurate 54 embassies in all 54 African countries", he mentioned that Turkish embassies were only operating in 12 African countries 14 years ago but now are available and operating in 39 countries in the continent (Anadolu Agency, 2016).

The next big move that shaped Turkey's foreign policy success was its engagement in Somalia in 2011 when drought ravaged the country, and millions of Somalis were on the brink of starvation and famine. The move by the then Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to visit Somalia officially meant the first non-African president to visit Somalia for decades and terminated the no-go zone narrative created by the international community, especially the western world.

## 3.6   Turkish Foreign Policy In Somalia

Turkey's relatively recent engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has been the subject of debate among scholars and policymakers over the past few years. The most important questions are why it is crucial for Turkey to engage with Africa and the significance of the time it started engaging with the continent. The main factor that led to the initial Turkish engagement in Somalia was the humanitarian crisis in the country. Despite the conflict in Somalia and the risks, Turkey heroically intervened in the Somali humanitarian crisis.

According to some scholars, the relationship between Somalia and Turkey dates back to the Ottoman Empire's days. Still, there were no official relations between Somalis and the Ottoman Empire, to be further clarified. However, it is understood that the Ottomans helped Somalis against the Portuguese expansionist attempts during the colonization process of Somalia. There was a growing competition over control and dominance in east Africa between the Ottoman state and the Portuguese. A clear indication of why the Ottomans wanted their presence in Somalia and the Horn of Africa was its geopolitical significance and the religious beliefs connection among the Somali people and the ottomans (Ozbaran, 2009).

The modern-day relations between Somalia and Turkey initially began in 1979. Embassies were opened in the same year in Somalia and Turkey. It is worth mentioning that Somalia was also the first state which receive development assistance from Turkey in 1985. Due to the collapse of the central government, which resulted in internal conflict and civil war in the country, Somalia attracted the international community's eyes. Operations and missions to save and rebuild government institutions began in the early 1990s. The first mission led by the United Nations intervened in the Somali situation, with Turkey being part of the troop-contributing countries in the peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations.

Turkey's contribution to the Somali cause was not limited to only one mission but also took part in peacekeeping operations in Somalia UNSOMI and UNSOMII. General Çevik Bir was appointed as the force commander of the UN operation in 1993. The efforts and peacekeeping operations failed, and no advancements were made. Turkey Somalia relations lost their pace as Somalia's governmental institutions were not working and foreign service stopped,

Turkey's engagement with Somalia was not there until recently 2011. However, previous engagements failed, like when the then prime minister President Erdogan and the late President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed were in attendance in the Addis-Ababa Summit of the African Union. During the summit, Abdullahi Yusuf requested a meeting with Prime minister Erdogan and invited him to discuss the current situation in Somalia, but this meeting did not take place. The next meeting took place when the two leaders met in the UN's General Assembly in 2009 and discussed the general situation in Somalia.

Despite the absence of official relations among the two states, Turkey had rushed to the scene when Somalia needed a saviour. Turkey's engagement in Somalia in 2011 has achieved to attract the attention of the international community and served as a wake-up call to save Somalia from the humanitarian crisis. This initial engagement started a good relationship between the two states, and the Somali people consider Turkey a great ally and a trustable partner.

### 3.6.1 The 2011 Humanitarian Crisis And Turkey's Support

Early 2011, with the security problems and lack of fully functioning government institutions in Somalia, A drought hit Somalia that resulted from famine. Consequently, the humanitarian crisis led to the loss of an estimated number of 226.000 lives and a large number of internally displaced people. In addition, four million people migrated to neighbouring countries (UNHCR. 2012). The United Nations declared the situation in the southern part of Somalia as a humanitarian crisis. They called upon the international community to prevent the escalation of the famine and to contain the hunger and deaths of the Somali people living in southern and central Somalia.

The Security problem was another factor in the country. Many western countries marked Somalia as a dangerous place to travel, advising their citizens not to travel to it. This had a harmful impact on the assistance delivery to the draught-affected areas. In addition, primarily drought-affected regions were controlled by the terrorist Al-Qaida affiliated group Alshabab. Despite all these visible challenges, Turkey's humanitarian intervention in the Somali humanitarian crisis was not hindered, and what at the time seemed impossible to become possible as one of the most influential leaders on the global stage, a leader like Prime minister Erdogan visited Somalia and evaluated the issue on the ground with the presence of several notable government ministries, civil society members and celebrities.

The delegates accompanied by the prime minister included; Bekir Bozdağ Deputy Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Food, Agriculture and Livestock Mehdi Eker Fatma Şahin, the minister of Family and Social Affairs and Recep Akdağ, the minister of Health Alongside the politicians, the music artists such as Sertab Erener, Nihat Dogan, Ajda Pekkan, Muazzez Ersoy, and prominent business people such as the President of TÜSIAD, Ümit Boyner, and the President of ASO, Nurettin Özdebir. This visit showed the commitment of the Turkish government in helping the Somali people, and their pledge was the beginning of a true friendship among the two nations based on mutual interest and cooperation.

Immediately after that historic visit, TIKA and more than 20 Turkish humanitarian organizations have actively started working in Somalia, delivering aid to Somalis affected by the draught. The Turkish government projects led by International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), which was designed and responsible for executing the two nations' bilateral development related projects in collaboration with the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), funded a variety of projects, including drilling wells across the country, rehabilitating the Mogadishu airport, and renovating some government buildings and providing relocation and assistance to the internally displaced people (IDPs). After the UK, Turkey has positioned itself as the second-largest donor to Somalia. According to UN estimates, Turkey's contribution to Somalia amounted to more than $527 million in 2013, up from $97 million in 2010 (Kagwanja, 2013).

**Figure 1. Turkey's Largest Assistant Beneficiaries by Spending size (%) (2012)**



**Largest Aid Recepients from Turkey in 2012**

This shows the importance that the Somali issue had for the Turkish government by looking at the capacity of the delegates and how this paved the way for tremendous humanitarian assistance that followed this visit. This official visit of Prime minister Erdogan has paved the way for a good relationship based on trust. Turkey has spent more than 30% of its official development assistance and humanitarian aid on Somalia during the crisis, while Palestine comes second. (TIKA, 2013) It is understood as a turning point in the relationship between Turkey and Somalia. Since then, the relationship between Turkey and Somalia has improved with time. Turkey started to impact not only humanitarian-wise but also other aspects of security, diplomacy, economy, and trade in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

One of the contributing factors to Turkey's success in its development projects in Somalia is the coordination of Turkish efforts. The projects carried out in Somalia were coordinated by the cooperation of several ministries, including the ministry of foreign affairs, the Religious Affairs Directorate, the ministry of health, the Turkish Red Crescent, and other governmental organizations. The other notable organizations that played an essential role in the coordination of humanitarian and development projects include Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İnsani Yardım Vakfı/İHH) and Kimse Yok Mu (literally, "Is anyone there?"). Dost Eller (friendly hands) provides humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people, the Turkish businesspeople, and (TUSKON) industrialist confederation, which fosters and improves investment and trade between Turkey and Somalia. All those organizations operate in Somalia and work to improve the relations between the two nations. The coordination task of the efforts of these organizations is done at the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) headquarter in Ankara, which is responsible for the coordination and cooperation-related tasks (Bingöl, 2013; Özkan, 2014, p. 35-46).

### 3.6.2 Post-2011 Turkey Somalia Relations

Bingol identifies the main factors behind Turkey's growing involvement in Somalia, mentioning that the "Islamic values the Turkish politicians especially the AKP leaders hold, the engagement aims to expand its business engagement with Somalia and create a new market for Turkish businesspeople, and finally to have influence in a very geostrategic location "the Horn of Africa" and the international arena (Bingol, 2013).

Turkey's foreign policy towards Somalia can be analyzed based on three significant arguments; Turkey's first engagement with Somalia came through Humanitarian purposes at a time Somalia faced famine and droughts that killed thousands of Somali lives, the second argument is development-oriented, and state-building which started after the shift from the bulk humanitarian aid and Turkey's efforts shifted towards rebuilding institutions and development projects led by Turkish organizations started on the ground. The third argument is based on Turkey's strategic interests in Somalia and its long-term national interests in the Gulf of Aden. Somalia's potential natural resources as Somalia seeks a reliable partner that it can trust with its natural resource's exploration.

Two reasons are considered what drives Turkey's engagement with Somalia; the religious and Muslim identity and the ottoman past have been considered by many as the motive and driving force of Turkey's engagement with Somalia. But Ozkan has a different opinion. He argues that Turkey's distinct lack of politico-historical baggage and the fact that Turkey was not involved in colonial activities in the past. Turkey's immediate success in Africa is evident and shown by Turkey's rapid successes in the region from Somalia to Ethiopia to Kenya (Ozkan, 2008).

One of the views of why Turkey chose Somalia is due to a gap left by the others that needed to be filled. With the fact that many actors, including the neighbours, western powers, Arab nations, and non-state actors such as the UN, European Union, African Union, and IGAD are involved in Somalia makes this perspective invalid, but another view suggests that there are 'too many interested actors with competing aims' (Cannon, 2017).

Turkey is also distinguished from other actors involved in Somalia by the timing of its engagement in a critical situation where Somalia needed a saviour. Turkey's willingness to take risks is also applauded, and it's holistic (collective) engagement is considered the foundation of its success in Somalia. The work done by several stakeholders to rebuild the Somali state was ultimately ineffective as competing and conflicting interests were involved in it. This failure continued for almost three decades, and the Turkish government later capitalized on the unfilled vacuum that sought to engage with Somalia and act differently compared to other stakeholders. The Somalis warmly welcomed Turkey's development projects, which created a good image for the

Turks and are widely considered the brothers of the Somalis. The Turkish projects in Somalia are effectively successful compared to other previous projects carried out by other actors. Turkey's engagement in Somalia is also considered showing that it should be regarded as an important actor in global politics. Its influence is seen as an emerging power in the international system.

Turkey's involvement in Somalia goes back to 2011, but the success of turkey's diplomatic and development efforts in Somalia are unbelievably remarkable. As Cannon notes, "Turkey's overall efforts in Somalia and its projection of soft power in the forms of money, trade, in-kind donations, infrastructure rehabilitation, and development projects have met a positive reception inside and outside Somalia." (Cannon, 2017). Looking through the lens of Turkey's efforts in Somalia, the study argues that Turkey's timing, capacity for risk, products, and expertise on offer, soft power assets, and ability to effectively project this power, as well as a coordinated and unilateral approach, have paid dividends for Turkey on humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, security and political fronts, leading to its increased status as a rising power.

To strengthen the two countries' relations, Turkey has immediately opened its embassy in Mogadishu in a temporary building at the heart of the capital Mogadishu in 2013 but immediately started building its new embassy. Turkey opened its largest embassy in Mogadishu in 2016; President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the inauguration ceremony with the presence of the Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. Erdogan called the new embassy the world's number one embassy complex by the Turkish republic. In his remarks, Erdogan said, "Currently, we are in the Mogadishu Embassy Complex of the Republic of Turkey. It is the number one complex in the world" (Anadolu Agency, 2016).

Turkey's involvement in Somalia has resulted in tangible changes in various health and infrastructure sectors. Bilateral agreements, including contracts to train the Somali security force, have also been inked, and Turkish Airlines has launched flights to Mogadishu. Turkey's efforts have paid off, and the two countries' burgeoning ties have drawn regional and international, prompting many to question Turkey's engagement in Somalia (DailySabah, 2016)**.**

### 3.7 Turkey's Humanitarian Engagement In Somalia

Turkish foreign policy rhetoric on humanitarianism has grown since the AKP came to power in 2002, but it has drawn the attention of many after 2011. The humanitarian principles that lead Turkish humanitarian diplomacy portray Turkey as a generous, responsible, and trustworthy actor whose actions are guided by morality. Turkey's engagement in Somalia is described as successful humanitarian diplomacy and an example of how states can formulate and implement humanitarian diplomacy, which is more likely to be successful and welcomed by the recipient country. Turkey's

humanitarian diplomacy is based on two approaches: state-level and civil-society level and or in other words, humanitarian assistance delivered through state actors and non-state actors.

Turkey's primary objective of humanitarian diplomacy is that it positions itself as a global humanitarian actor. Its foreign policy is morally formulated on global values such as equal representation, global governance, and eradicating inequalities. (Senem et al. 2018). Furthermore, the Turkish approach in Somalia is considered a success. It only preferred to work with Somalis and refrain from instructing Somalis what it wanted from them but instead gave space to Somalis and let them take ownership of the development projects and worked directly with the federal government instead of the regional states. Wasuge notes that the "Turkish aid framework in Somalia prefers "working with Somalis" over "working on Somalis" (Wasuge, 2016).

Within the Turkish model of development aid, according to the dominant narrative, the recipient is not seen as a person in need or the weak side but rather as "a living individual that witnesses and symbolizes the global injustice and mistaken policies of 'other states' dominating the world-system" (Hasimi, 2014). Davutoglu argues that fulfilling the objectives of becoming an active actor on the world stage and coping with the pace of the changing dynamics of world order, Turkey uses humanitarian diplomacy. He describes the humanitarian diplomacy approach of Turkey in three dimensions. "The first aspect of humanitarian diplomacy refers to providing independent mobilization of Turkish citizens; the second aspect refers to the protection of people who are facing crises in their geography regardless of their nation and religion, and the last aspect refers to representing human-oriented policy in international organizations and institutions mainly in the UN" (Davutoğlu, 2013).

The basis for Turkish humanitarian diplomacy is building trust and solidarity among the aid provider and the aid recipient. Turkish policy-makers perceive that if there were no injustice in the international system, there would have been no need for humanitarian aid. The Turkish humanitarian diplomacy seeks to create and build a good image of the Turkish republic through cooperation and helping the impoverished countries without portraying them as weak. Turkish policy-makers see humanitarian aid as a human obligation that is expected to be fulfilled, and the credit of the success of the Turkish humanitarian diplomacy is given to the set policy itself.

## 3.8 Turkey's Interests In Somalia

Turkey's engagement in Somalia is not only humanitarian-oriented, but it has its own long-term strategic goals. Ankara's short-term goal is to position itself in a very geostrategic position in the world by politically, financially, and militarily engaging with the Horn of Africa. Indeed, a geostrategic position that has its importance is the horn of Africa as it is surrounded by both the Indian ocean and the red sea, and mention the Bab al-Mendab, a transportation hub and a crossroad

for all commercial ships. Thus, Turkey's interests are not only limited to economic interests but also see Somalia as a strategic position and a centre that it can build its hegemonic power and a mean that it can showcase and prove that it is an emerging power which should be considered and labelled as an essential actor/player in the international system, the potential natural resource availability in Somalia is also another factor that motivated Turkey to engage with Somalia.

According to Turkey's ministry of foreign affairs, "the bilateral trade volume with Somalia in 2018 was 187,3 million US Dollars and 250,850 million USD in 2019". That is an increase of more than 60 million US dollar trade volume. Turkish investment in Somalia reached 100 million US dollars. Turkish-based Favori company runs the Mogadishu International Airport, and Albayrak Company, owned by Turkish businesspeople, operates Mogadishu Sea Port (Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, 2020).

Turkey's security interests in the horn are visible, and its military base development shows how significant it is for them. The Turkish military base in Somalia is located in a very strategic position close to the entry point of the Gulf of Aden. Cengiz notes that Turkey is well aware of the involvement of many actors in Somalia with differing interests and motivations (Cengiz, 2017). Turkey's engagement with Somalia is shaped by political, economic, and security interests. Finding a new market for Turkish exporters is considered one factor that makes Somalia a critical partner.

Turkey's overall engagement with Africa is also shaped by the fact that the 54 members of the African Union are a significant number in the United Nations. Turkey's political interests can go forward with the help of these votes, which makes the African countries politically important, including Somalia. Another Turkish interest in Somalia is to take advantage of the strategic location of the horn of the African nation. This was visible after Turkey built a large military base in Mogadishu that provides the Somali National Army training.

<div align="center">**CHAPTER FOUR**</div>

## 4. TURKEY AS A STATE-BUILDING ACTOR IN SOMALIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED

Turkey's pursuit of becoming a rising power has gained momentum over the last two decades. The Turkish government has taken several steps toward that goal to achieve this. The involvement of Turkey in peacebuilding projects in the region and beyond is the best demonstration of Turkey's quest for rising power status. Turkey has played a critical role in peacebuilding initiatives in conflict-torn countries such as Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Turkey's peacebuilding efforts concentrate on the aspects of peace and development-related projects. Turkish government uses a different tool compared to other established and rising powers. The embassies, consulates, Turkish Development and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and Turkish Airlines play a vital role in the development, humanitarian assistance, and other peacebuilding-related projects. It is also observed that Turkey's engagement with host nations highly regards their sovereignty, and it is based on mutual respect. It emphasizes national ownership and inclusivity by including all stakeholders and useful projects separate from established actors and other emerging powers.

Turkey's peacebuilding activities gained momentum after the Arab spring and its humanitarian support to Somalia in 2011. Turkey's engagement in conflict-ridden countries has shown the desire and commitment to achieving its goal of becoming an emerging power. The increase in ODA and its presence in many countries with different capacities highlight the Turkish commitment to presenting themselves as a rising power in the international system. The evolving Turkish new engagement in countries beyond their region is simple evidence of Turkey's search for global influence and recognition. Despite that, these engagements are not only benefiting Turkey's goals but also the assistance recipient country.

Although The Turkish state-building received much praise from the commentators on state-building, it didn't escape the criticisms either. Scholars have raised whether the combination of humanitarian, development, and business engagement method used by the Turks is appropriate. In contrast, others criticized the lack of accountability and transparency of Turkish activities and projects in fragile states under reconstruction. In the following sections, the study explains and explores the Turkish role in Somalia's state-building process and the Turkish state-building

approach. It also discusses the similarities and differences of the Turkish and other actors' state-building approaches in Somalia.

## 4.1 Turkish State-Building Approach In Somalia

Turkey's involvement in Somalia began on August 19, 2011, when the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Somalia to express solidarity and support to the Somali nation. Somalia at the time was suffering from famine and droughts, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Somalis. Turkey's humanitarian engagement and pledge to Somalia saved it from starvation. Erdogan became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia. The visit and subsequent humanitarian support paved the door for a stronger relationship between the two states.

The vacuum left by the superpowers' non-interventionist policy in Somalia during the last decade produced a void that needed to be addressed. Traditional powers were unwilling to invest in Somalia until it had stabilized. With the arrival of Turkey and its initial bravery to invest in the stabilizing process, which is known as the "First Mover Advantage" strategy adopted by the Turks, they are now seen as genuine investors in the Somali cause. Ankara's attempts to reconstruct Somalia have begun with the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, airports, and other economic infrastructure projects. Turkey's action to engage with the Somalis directly is seen as a success story that lays the foundation of Turkey's long-term interests in the African continent (Ali, 2011).

The Turkish involvement in Somalia, which has lately been discussed, differs from traditional powers that have previously supported the Somali state-building process. The Turkish strategy mixes humanitarian aid, business, and development projects critical to Somalia's recovery. Many authors have criticized and praised this engagement model, defined as "an integrated strategy" that integrates peacebuilding, development initiatives, and business.

According to (Jos et al.) "The first Turkish engagement in Somalia 'combined political, developmental, economic, and humanitarian support, and has brought together a variety of actors – government officials, aid agencies, Civil Society Organizations, religious organizations, municipalities, and the private sector." In their argument, they compare it with the western engagement in Somalia. They emphasized that the engagement of the west is only limited to either humanitarian and development support or security support which is not delivered in an integrated way most of the time. From another perspective, Meester & Berg also argue that it is "uncommon for these international actors to explicitly tie commercial private sector activities into the mix of humanitarian and development programmes" (Meester & Berg, 2019).

According to Akpinar, the Turkish engagement in Somalia can be categorized into several components, including "Humanitarian aid, development aid, peacekeeping, state-building and

peacemaking through mediation" in Akpinar's argument, she describes that "the Turkish peacebuilding efforts combine "Track One" and "Track Two." "Track One" refers to official diplomacy, including the involvement of the state and the government. "Track Two" refers to non-state actors' involvement, including civil society and businesses" (Akpınar, 2013).

Turkey not only succeeded where so many others had failed, but it also succeeded quickly. Brendon contends that if Turkey had begun its engagement with Somalia ten years earlier, when the country was in deep crisis, it is easy to argue that the Turkish influence would have been cut short and success would have been impossible; however, the timing of the engagement was perfect, and the reception of the Somalis demonstrates the extent of the Turkish government's much needed humanitarian and development-oriented intervention (Brendon, 2016).

Turkey's immediate intervention in the Somali humanitarian crisis is considered part of its soft power diplomacy and pursuit of self-interested goals of attaining prestige as an emerging power in the international system and its economic and strategic interests in the horn of Africa region. In the Somali case, Turkey has employed soft power tools providing educational opportunities to humanitarian to a diplomatic fraternity (Özkan, 2012, p. 22). Other arguments consider the Turkish engagement model in Somalia a unique one, and that is also different from that of the western/eastern partners in the African continent, such as the US and People's Republic of China (PRC) (Camacho, 2016).

The reasons behind the Turkish success in Somalia are considered that the Turkish policymakers have designed their policies independently and coordinated them well. The Turkish model was a success as it directly engaged with local actors. It directly engaged with the central government compared to other international actors who engage both the central government in some capacity and regional states on the other hand. The Turkish projects were on the ground, and their implementation was visible to all Somalis, and these factors made their projects successful in Somalia. The diversity of actors and the lack of coherent vision with good coordination have contributed to the Somali problem instead of solving it (Hearn & Zimmerman, 2014; Farah & Handa, 2016).

Ozkan argues that "While Turkey's interest in Somalia has brought it into the international spotlight, the interest that the international community has shown has been nothing more than 'pseudo acts of kindness' towards Somalia. To this day, the international community has been reluctant to solve any of Somalia's long-standing problems" (Özkan, 2014). The Turkish state-building practices in Somalia widely cover different state-building and peacebuilding aspects. The next part, the study is going to analyze Turkey's role in Somalia's peacebuilding and stabilization process, and six main areas are discussed: namely, political support through Diplomacy, Peacebuilding through reconciliation, enhancing the capacity of state institutions, Budgetary

support, Improving social services institutions, improving economic infrastructure and rebuilding security institutions.

**Table 2. Main Areas Of Turkish Support To Somalia**

| Item | Description | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Budgetary support | Monthly budgetary support |
| 2 | Political support through diplomacy | Organizing International conferences/awareness campaigns through diplomatic channels |
| 3 | Peacebuilding through reconciliation | Somalia-Somaliland talks |
| 4 | Institution building/capacity building | Knowledge sharing, trainings, and equipping with skills to government's personnel |
| 5 | Social and economic infrastructure development | Building schools, hospitals, roads, ports, and airports. |
| 6 | Strengthening Security institutions | Providing training, equipment, building military training camp and bringing Somali army personnel to Turkey for further training |

Compiled by the author

### 4.1.1 Political support through diplomacy

As discussed in previous pages of the study, Turkey's first engagement in Somalia was humanitarian in nature. As the 2011 crisis ended, a portion of the humanitarian aid was diverted to development assistance and state-building initiatives. One of the Turks' goals was to raise awareness about Somali issues and reintegrate them into the world. Campaigning on large international forums and convening conferences on Somalia were critical to resolving the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia.

The first notable conference on Somalia organized by Turkey was the Istanbul conference. The Istanbul Conference on Somalia was regarded as a significant achievement for Turkish–Somali relations. It is believed that it paved the way for Turkey to be viewed as a trustworthy friend, with the primary goal of seeing Somalis discussing and contributing to their fate. The Istanbul conference was a three-day event held on May 21-23, 2010, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Republic of Turkey. The conference was not just confined to political debates but also included representatives of the private sector and topics spanned from telecommunications, banking and remittances, transportation infrastructure, fisheries, livestock, and alternative energy. The Istanbul conference declaration emphasized the need to put the Djibouti agreement into action. Promoting political collaboration and strengthening government institutions necessitates a strong commitment and long-term strategies.

Turkey has been interested in the Somali issues since the draught that led to the drought that affected millions of Somalis in 2011. Turkey's support for Somalia started immediately after the deterioration of the Somali situation and was also trying to mobilize support from other actors such as the Muslim world. The Turkish government requested an emergency meeting by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which was chaired by Turkey under the leadership of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. A ministerial-level meeting took place in Istanbul, and the attention of the Islamic world was swayed towards Somalia. A final communique was released later in the emergency meeting, and the OIC secretariat encouraged members to voluntarily extend their support in alleviating the drought and famine in Somalia (AFP, 2011).

During the emergency OIC conference on Somalia, members of the organization donated 105,5 million dollars as part of efforts to alleviate the drought and famine impact on Somalis. Turkey's mobilization of resources and focus on Somalia was also brought to the attention of international actors in the main arena, the United Nations General Assembly. Prime Minister Erdogan devoted a significant amount of his address to the Somali situation, demonstrating the Turkish government's regard for Somalia (Ozkan, 2014).

Turkey hosted and organized the third Somalia conference, the second Istanbul summit. The conference, titled "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015," was organized by Turkey in close collaboration with the United Nations and took place from May 31st to June 1st, 2012. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). The meeting addressed various Somali topics, ranging from development initiatives to political and security concerns. On the first day of the conference, different actors, including bureaucrats, experts, and entrepreneurs, focused on and addressed energy, water, roads, and resilience. At the end of the first day of the conference, participants agreed on the importance of investment, finance, and public sector institutional capacity development. Infrastructure development and the need to alleviate poverty in Somalia by providing job opportunities and enhancing essential social services.

The majority of the discussions on the second day of the conference focused mainly on themes connected to reconciliation and dialogue. In contrast, conference participants underlined the significance of discussion, reconciliation, and political collaboration in searching for lasting peace in Somalia. The conference praised the Somali transitional federal government's accomplishments and supported the continued efforts to terminate the transitional status, create a constitution, and hold elections.

The London conference was another conference where Turkey played a prominent role in supporting Somalia. On May 11, 2017, the United Kingdom and Somalia co-chaired a large international conference on Somalia in London, with the United Nations and the African Union attending. The meeting intended to address Somalia's crucial governance, state-building, and

security concerns. It brought together Somali government officials with representatives from donor nations, the UN, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The conference focused on strengthening national security and international security support, more inclusive and stable politics, and economic recovery. A new framework for a new Somalia partnership was also proposed to formalize international donor support mechanisms and facilitate measures to address these issues (Saferworld, 2012).

Turkish officials had taken the initiative to organize conferences on Somalia independently and collaborate with International Organizations and other state actors. The success of these conferences may be assessed through the lenses of the attention they brought to Somali matters and how the world reacted to the urgency of the Somali humanitarian situation and the quest to reconstruct the Somali state. President Erdogan's statements at various podiums, including the United Nations, imploring the world to preserve Somalia and provide a helping hand are a clear indicator of Turkey's diplomatic efforts to shed light on the Somali issue.

### 4.1.2 Peacebuilding Through Reconciliation

The study here aims to shed light on Turkey's peace-building attempts through negotiation and mediation. Akpınar (2013) posits that Turkish policy towards Africa concentrates on peacebuilding initiatives and serves a mediatory role wherever appropriate. Turkey has already served as a mediator in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and North Africa. Turkish efforts in peacebuilding and mediation provide them with a regional and international reputation, and these activities also assist Turkey to be regarded as a significant actor on the continent. This also offers domestic support for legitimately carrying on its projects in other regions. The Turkish peacebuilding and mediation efforts are the cornerstones of Turkey's foreign policy toward the African continent.

Davutoğlu, in his address at the London conference in 2012, said, "without national reconciliation, we cannot have a real political achievement, as well as real humanitarian development, when there are de facto authorities in different parts of Somalia." He also adds that the groups denouncing violence and terror should be included in the national reconciliation process to be more inclusive and productive (Davutoglu, 2012).

Turkey's actions in Somalia have not just been restricted to humanitarian assistance, but it has also served as a mediator. Turkey's efforts to arbitrate between the self-proclaimed state of Somaliland and the Somali government were just another indication of Turkish policymakers' impact on Somalis. Following discussions between the two sides in Ankara. (Cengiz, 2017) characterizes the Turkish state-building initiative in Somalia as a complete package that includes all of the required instruments for inclusive government and long-term peace. The Somalia-Somaliland issue has been ongoing since the collapse of the central government. It all started when

the warring faction leaders in that region claimed an independent state from the rest of Somalia. Given the failure of previous attempts to bring Somali-Somaliland officials to the table, Turkey took the initiative and brought the two parties to Ankara for official negotiations and discussions on matters essential to both parties in the hopes of reaching an agreement.

The two parties signed the Ankara communique and agreed to continue the talks. This effort was far beyond the leaders' conversations, but Turkey also invited key figures and intellectuals from Somalia and Somaliland to analyze and intensely discuss a possible solution to the Somalia-Somaliland issue. After the two presidents' meetings and committee deliberations. The two parties agreed on seven points, which include, among other things, "building on previous conferences in London and Dubai, a meeting of the two presidents after 90 days to resolve outstanding issues, and a partnership of the two parties in the areas of security, particularly concerning the heinous issue of piracy in the Indian Ocean and the war on terror". Turkey has vowed that it is committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict between Somalia and Somaliland through negotiation and peaceful manner.

Turkey has a special envoy for the Somalia-Somaliland negotiations and is committed to inviting both parties to its nation and serving as a mediator. Olgan Bekar, a former ambassador to Somalia, served as the minister of foreign affairs' special envoy for Somalia-Somaliland negotiations. The appointment of a special envoy to this cause demonstrates the seriousness of this problem, and the terminology employed on the ministry of foreign affairs website indicates that their role is one of facilitation.

### 4.1.3 Strengthening State Institutions Through Capacity Building

The Turkish engagement with Somalia came at a very critical time. The Turkish state-building efforts in Somalia widely cover different aspects of state-building. The most important one relates to institution-building efforts, ranging from enhancing institutional capacity, rebuilding state institutions, and personnel training. The basics of institution-building are limited to the enhancement and improvement of the state institutions and training and enhancing the capacity of the personnel who are supposed to operate in the system.

The need for capacity building and training government civil servants has increased due to the collapse of state institutions due to two decades of dysfunctional government institutions. This need should be matched to ensure that competent civil servants provide services to the general public. Turkey has risen to the occasion and played a pivotal role in developing Somalia's capacity-building programs, considering that a lack of human resources and the inability to provide services to the public may cause confusion between the general public and the government.

The institution-to-institution relations strategy that encouraged good relations between the two countries is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Turkey's engagement in Somalia. Turkish state institutions, including state ministries, the central bank, and other directorates, have actively engaged with their Somali counterparts. Various Turkish government organizations have worked with Somali counterparts to provide training, expertise, and knowledge. The two countries have signed several agreements to strengthen Somali government institutions (Mohamoud, 2021).

Turkish engagement has shifted to technical assistance and capacity-building programs since 2013. Turkish foreign ministry officials have provided training and technical assistance to their counterparts. Since 2014, Somali foreign service officials have travelled to Turkey's diplomatic academy to be trained by Turkish foreign ministry officials, with technical assistance always available at the Somali team's request (Sazak et al., 2017).

Through meetings between Turkish and Somali counterparts, Turkey's support to Somalia also stressed institution building. Many agreements of collaboration between municipalities, ministries, and government organizations have been signed by Somali and Turkish authorities, providing capacity-building support, training, and expertise sharing to Somali institutions; as a result, many Somali government personnel have been sent to Turkey and trained by Turkish counterparts (Ozkan, 2014).

### 4.1.4 Budgetary Support

Turkey has been providing budgetary support to the Somali government since 2013 because the Somali government is not capable of matching its needs in financial terms and generating sufficient funds to run the state institutions. Over the last two decades, the Somali government has depended on foreign aid and donations from traditional donors who provided budgetary support. Turkey initially started donating budgetary support to the Somali government back in 2014 with the official request from the then President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Since then, the Turkish commitment to supporting the Somali government was there.

Turkey has been providing budgetary support over the past few years in the form of monthly instalments. Over the past six years, Turkey allocated $117 million to support Somalia's budget and other international capacity building. In August this year, 2021, Turkey's last donation worth $30 million will be paid in a monthly instalment of 2.5 million (Arabianews, 2021).

When asked about Turkey's role in Somalia's state-building process, Minister of Public Works, Abdi, stated that;

> *"Turkey is the only genuine partner that Somalia possesses, and it is working hard to contribute and prepare Somalia to help stand on its feet again. Turkey has improved revenue collection from the port and the airport of Mogadishu and regularly provided budget support that enforced the government's ability to maintain and provide for its civil servants and the security forces. The port and airport revenue supports the government budget, per month, an estimated 12 million from the port and half of that money comes from the airport which is a big plus for the government income."*

Since 2012, the international community, including Turkey, has provided consistent support and commitment to the Somali government, allowing it to provide its civil servants and security personnel permanently. The semi-structured interview results demonstrate that providing budgetary support to the Somali government has significantly contributed to the government's ability to maintain and pay civil servants and security forces salaries/wages. Not only does the budgetary support of the Turkish government come through a direct monetary donation, but it also supported in the areas of generating revenues from economic infrastructure sources such as the airport and the port, which Turkish companies manage, has substantially contributed to the annual budget of the Somali Government.

### 4.1.5 Improving Social Service Institutions

Turkey's engagement was not only limited to humanitarian assistance, but a state institution-building and government support aimed to make sure that Somalia could successfully survive and prevent itself from the same famine and draughts and be better prepared for these kinds of natural disasters. All of Turkey's overall activities and efforts in Somalia in state-building have been widely welcomed by both Somalis inside and outside the country. These include financial assistance, trade, in-kind donations, infrastructure rehabilitation, and development projects, all of which have been supported by the Turkish government. (Brendon, 2016)

Restructuring and renovating health and education sectors were vital for the common good of the Somali people. The immediate Turkish support in the education and health sectors has conveyed an excellent image to the Somali public, whose perception of the Turks was already positive. Different state institutions and non-state organizations have started to build schools, hospitals and provide scholarships to Somali students (Ozkan, 2014).

The Turkish government has provided scholarships to many Somali students since 1992; according to the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, almost 1200 Somali students have been awarded the Turkish scholarship. Students who won the scholarship study at the different levels of higher studies, from undergraduate to post-graduate levels of study, and the 2019-2020 academic year, 98 scholarship posts were allocated for Somali students (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

In 2012, TIKA and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) implemented various development projects, including drilling hundreds of wells, rehabilitating and rehabilitating Mogadishu port and airport, and government buildings resettling some thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) (Kagwanja, 2013).

TIKA is the driving force of all the Turkish development programmes in Somalia. TIKA coordinator Galip Yilmaz told Anadolu Agency that they had established an agricultural school in Mogadishu where over 400 students are currently taught higher agricultural studies. The TIKA coordinator stated that the TIKA projects changed the dynamics in Somalia, adding to those opportunities created by the Turkish organizations that have benefited many Somalis who are currently working and earning salaries to maintain their lives. He mentioned that the TIKA projects led to a booming economy and business opportunities.

TIKA also rehabilitated and built mosques, schools, and roads throughout the country. The Turkish ambassador Mehmet Yilmaz stated that TIKA renovated the parliament building in Mogadishu. The projects carried out by the Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (TIKA) widely covers different aspects, including education, health, infrastructure, and other development-related projects. TIKA has also provided and established almost 30 orphanage centres across Somalia where orphans live and study. TIKA also set up more than 25 waterwheel projects in Somaliland and 20 in Somalia to improve and boost irrigation and power output. Since 2011, TIKA has undertaken more than 150 projects in Somalia as a whole.

As the central government collapsed more than two decades ago, essential services such as education and health were also inaccessible due to the lack of functioning state institutions. Although providing social services is one of the government's obligations to the public, the Somali government cannot fulfil its obligations due to the lack of capacity to deliver. In this regard, Turkey has played a vital role in improving the Somali education and health sectors. The Study found that Turkish state agencies and non-state organizations have done multiple projects in building and renovating schools that currently provide education services to many Somali students. The schools built by Turkish-led projects include but are not limited to: Turkish Maarif schools, Anadolu educational centre, fishing school, Agriculture school, sheikh Sufi school, nursing school, health science university, and others.

The Turkish contributions in the health sector are unique and incomparable to other projects. The hospitals and health centres built by the Turkish agencies are visible everywhere, and they provide quality services to the Somali public. The amount of investment and effort spent on the health sector is clearly noticeable on the ground. The Somali-Turkey Training and Research Hospital with a-200 bed capacity, Yardimeli hospital, Shifa hospital, and many other hospitals built in Galka'yo, Berbera, and others were removed by the Turkish state non-state agencies.

Yusuf, a prominent academician, explaining the role of Turkey in Somalia state-building process, has emphasized that:

> *"Turkey is playing a key role in rebuilding the Somali state. Turkey plays an important role in enhancing public services such as building roads. They also built the largest hospital in the horn of Africa region, which serves 225 thousand patients every month 24-km length road, and built a military training camp in Somalia providing scholarship opportunities to Somali students. The Turkish activities in the country are valuable services for the Somali people."*

The interview with Yusuf demonstrated that Turkey has been highly effective and has improved Somalia's social service-providing institutions. The findings also revealed that Turkish state institutions and NGOs had contributed significantly. The Turkish contributions in the health sector are widely visible on the ground, and it is considered the most successful Turkish project in the country. The study argues that the Turkish support in improving the social institution's sector has been the most significant and valuable contribution, which is widely applauded by the public. Its positive impact is visible on the ground.

### 4.1.6 Economic Infrastructure Development

Due to the lack of a functioning central government, the country's infrastructure collapsed. Bridges, roads, highways, sewage systems, and energy are all examples of infrastructure. Such a type of asset is vital in a country's growth. To fill that gap, Turkey has conducted several infrastructure developments projects in the country, including building roads, maintaining and rebuilding parts of the Aden Adde Airport in Mogadishu and the seaport. Turkish companies have undertaken projects to rehabilitate and rebuild significant roads in the capital Mogadishu. Turkish personnel was on the ground implementing the project and overseeing the work done by the Turkish engineers and the Somali personnel. A 23-km long road was built in Mogadishu by Turkish engineers. (TIKA, 2013)

In 2013, the Turkish company Favori received an official contract granted by the Somali government to manage the Mogadishu International Airport, which was rehabilitated and renovated by Kozuva, a Turkish company based in Tekirdağ province. The rehabilitation covered most of the airport facilities, including the runways, civil aviation offices, VIP terminal. It provided all technical support and technology needed to improve the airports' security and operations.

Turkish company Favori has operated the Mogadishu International Airport since 2013. International and regional flights have started to increase, attracting many airlines after the continuous flights carried out by Turkish Airlines encouraged others to do so. A handing-over ceremony took place in the seaport of Mogadishu which the federal government of Somalia

formally handed over its management to Al-Bayrak, the Turkey-based company. The company has been operating the Mogadishu Port since September 2014. Favori's contract to manage the port included the extension and modernization of the port. Upgrading and modernizing the port facilities has been a top priority for the Somali officials, and the agreement between Albayrak company and the Somali government obligates this to be fulfilled. A recent agreement between the two sides has led to the signature of a new 14-year contract that came after days of negotiations on revenue sharing and other investments related to the renovation and upgrading of the port facilities (Goobjoog, 2014).

Turkey has built a hospital in Mogadishu that serves hundreds of people daily and offers quality service to the public. This hospital was inaugurated on 25th January 2015 by the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan a 200-bed hospital with the capacity of serving hundreds of people daily. The hospital projects also reached other parts of the country, including the central and south regions and Somaliland, the self-proclaimed breakaway region (Anadolu Agency. 2015).

Despite the risks, Turkish personnel is on the ground working shoulder to shoulder with Somalis during the implementation of the projects. A Turkish construction company has recently renovated Mogadishu-Afgoi Road and Mogadishu-Jowhar Road, funded by the Gulf-state Qatar. This shows that the Turkish heroic and selfless contribution in the process of rebuilding the economic infrastructure has contributed to Somalia's state-building and stabilization effort (Dhaysane, 13).

It is clear from the study findings that Turkey has also improved revenue collection from the port and the airport of Mogadishu. An estimated 12 million from the port and half of that money from the airport is a big plus for the government income. On the other hand, this has significantly contributed to the Somali government's amount of revenue to its annual budget apart from international donations and budgetary support.

### 4.1.7 Strengthening Security Institutions

The main factor of Somalia's fragility and challenges that shaped its post-conflict era and the government institutions established during this period is insecurity. Internal conflict, the fragility, and failure of many attempts to rebuild the Somali state was the lack of functioning state security institutions that collapsed after the central government was overthrown by local militias against the dictator rule. One of the definitions of the fundamental characteristics of a state is that it has the power of coercion, which implies that it has security institutions that are highly disciplined and educated to enforce law and order. The major causes of Somalia's ongoing war have been infighting among clans in the country and the rise of the terror group Al-Shabaab, which has exacerbated the country's instability.

The Turkish presence in Somalia has primarily included all components required for a state-building project. With the threat presented by weak security institutions and the terrorist group al-Shabaab in mind, Turkey's intention was never to leave Somalia to establish its security institutions but rather to give a helping hand. Since 2012, the two governments have signed several military/security agreements. Turkey began assisting the Somali army by providing training and technical assistance to enhance its capabilities in managing security and maintaining law and order. The initial engagement started with bilateral visits and information sharing among the military and police commanders of the two countries.

Although the shift of the Turkish involvement from humanitarianism to the state-building actor in Somalia and their commitment to make the Somali project a success, the Turkish engagement in Somalia was never purely humanitarian. Security interests drive Turkey's engagement in the region. Turkey has positioned itself in the region because of its strategic interests and the existing threats posed by pirates in Somalia.

On September 30th, 2017, Turkey formally opened a military and training centre for the Somali army in Mogadishu. Except for Turkish military stations in Northern Cyprus, Turkish media identified the base as the largest overseas Turkish military base. This action has bolstered the idea that Turkey seeks world recognition as a rising power, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Cannon, 2019).

According to a report by the Anadolu agency, "Turkey has trained one-third of the Somali military forces. Turkey's Ambassador to Mogadishu, Mehmet Yılmaz, told Anadolu Agency (AA) in remarks regarding bilateral relations, "When we look at the total numbers, Turkey will have trained one-third of Somali military forces, estimated to be around 15,000-16,000 personnel." (Ilhan & Demirci, 2020). The military training centre in the base can be trained 1000 soldiers at a time, and later these soldiers are sent to Turkey for further training and education. The two countries have already signed bilateral agreements regarding military training and technical support. According to the plan, it is expected that more than 10000 soldiers will be trained in TURK-SOM military training base. More than 200 Turkish army personnel are stationed at the base (Maruf, 2017).

When asked about Turkey's significant contributions to Somalia state-building, the minister of public works, Mr. Abdi, expressed that:

> *"Another point worth mentioning is the security problem which Turkey sees as an important issue to be addressed. Turkey has planned to train 30 thousand soldiers, both locally trained and then transferred to Turkey for further training. Turkey considers that one of the factors that lead to the recurrent problems in Somalia is the security problem, and solving it, will lead to solving the*

*humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which will also ease the development projects to be carried out in the country. Turkey planned to help the Somali government forces independently take over the security of the capital."*

Turkey has been a reliable partner in Somalia's recovery and reconstruction efforts over the past decade, and one of the areas it focused on is the security sector. Former special forces commander Abdullahi Ahmed Sheikh talking to Anadolu Agency stated that "Apart from infrastructures such as schools, hospitals, and roads, Turkey has been a crucial strategic partner in training and equipping Somali troops, particularly the Gorgor Commando Brigade of the national army and the Haramcad (Cheetah) Special Police Unit" (Anadolu Agency, 2021).

All the achievements mentioned above by the Turkish government in Somalia were achieved in 10 years, and the ongoing projects dedicated to helping recover the Somali state are far from over. Turkey offers wide-range support to the Somali state-building project and expects that its efforts are successful and the goal of getting a stable and strong Somalia is achieved. According to the semi-structured interview results, the study found that the Turkish security engagement in Somalia is purely different compared to states that previously provided security support to the Somali government.

The above analysis indicated that Turkey's commitment to supporting and building the Somali security forces is motivated by the belief that eliminating the country's security problems will assist in the process of finding a sustainable solution to the country's recurrent humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, Turkish policymakers believe that eliminating security threats will facilitate the implementation of development projects in the country. The study results noted that despite Turkey's unwavering support and commitment to rebuilding the Somali army, the objectives set out in the security reform are not fully met due to internal and technical issues.

## 4.2 Characteristics Of Turkey's Engagement In Somalia

Since the arrival of the Turks in Somalia in 2011, after responding to the devastating humanitarian crisis in the country, their focus immediately tilted towards state and peacebuilding initiatives. Interstate-level engagements between the two nations occur through the interactions of state ministries and state agencies. The most notable actors, in this case, are the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of health, Education and Defense ministries, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay), and the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet).

Turkey's collective engagement encompasses a variety of projects that are critical in achieving visible and measurable success. The projects carried out by their organizations address a

diverse range of issues, including the rehabilitation and renovation of economic infrastructures, such as the construction of roads and the renovation of ports and airports, among other things. They improved social services by rehabilitating schools and hospitals, drilling wells in rural areas, and providing sanitary services.

Olgan Bekar, former Turkish ambassador to Somalia, describes the pillars of Turkey's engagement in Somalia as "humanitarian aid, economic development, infrastructure, political assistance, and security sector reform." The projects carried out by the Turkish organization revolve around those pillars. The experiences of Turkish engagement in Somalia show that collective engagement and the combination of aid, infrastructure and economic development, security sector reform, and political support contribute positively to the search for good state-building practice (Murphy & Woods, 2014).

The following characteristics were generated through a thematic analysis done on the literature on Turkey's role in Somalia's state-building process and the semi-structured interview transcripts. The study results have shown that Turkey's engagement was guided by non-interference in Internal issues and promoting local ownership. Apart from these two, unconditional support, strategic interests, tangible projects, on-the-ground presence and efficiency, and good coordination were the other notable characteristics that shaped Turkey's involvement in Somalia.

Turkey's engagement in Somalia has produced some positive results thanks to the policies and engagement methods employed by the Turkish policymakers. One of the clear challenges that intervening countries are accused of is favouring or supporting leaders who hold leadership positions or opposition groups. Turkey's engagement is characterized by a non-interference policy which means that their support is not based on the staying of specific leaders. In most hosting nations where external actors come to support rebuilding state institutions, the public is concerned with the neutrality of those external actors' supporting the process.

In the words of (Ali, 2017), "Turkey refrained from nefariously meddling in Somalia's internal affairs." The Turkish government has labelled itself as "neutral" when it comes to the country's local affairs. This is one of the defining factors of Turkey's engagement in Somalia, and this is why it has earned the support of the public. Addow suggests that Turkey used a civilian power approach in Somalia in order to avoid being directly involved in military conflict and also to remain impartial to political rivalaries (Addow, 2015). Ipek argues that Turkey's peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict states are guided by the principle of non-intervention in their sovereignty. Unlike others, Turkey does not only respect the sovereignty of countries in state-building stages but also does not influence their internal issues.

The study results are in line with the previous research results that show that Turkey has refrained from interfering in the domestic politics of Somalia as it did in other countries. Avoiding the usage of its support as leverage to influence the country's internal politics has earned Turkey a reputation in the country. As a result, the study results emphasize the implications of the Turkish engagement method on how people perceive the Turks and their projects.

Another characteristic that shapes Turkey's engagement in Somalia is that it does not apply conditions to implement its projects in the country compared to other traditional donors whose projects attach different conditions widely ranging from political, economic, and security. Turkey's sincere contribution and unconditional support make it stand out from other traditional donors involved in the country. The semi-structured interview results suggest that Turkey has adopted an unconditional support strategy in its engagement with Somalia, both the humanitarian and the development-related projects which played an important role in Somalia's pursuit for recovery and development.

According to (Ipek, 2021) Turkey, like other BRICS countries and western nations, does not expect something in return, whether it's political or economic, for its peacebuilding initiatives in conflict-affected states. Against the western approach, which imposes conflict-affected nations to adopt democracy and other ideological and economic conditions. In line with the above analysis, the semi-structured interview results align with the above argument and suggest that Turkish support to Somalia's state-building initiatives has no conditions attached to it. Even though western states impose their ideologies and governance systems on the recipient country, Turkey has opted for the alternative to support the recipient without preconditions attached to their support. As a result, this is considered one of the key factors that led to the Turkish success in Somalia.

Most scholars who wrote about Turkey's involvement in Somalia emphasized that Turkey's engagement with Somalia is not driven by short-term interests but rather long-term interests. The fact that Somalia is a conflict-ravaged country, and its recovery will take a long time shows the commitment of Turkish policymakers. Another critical factor is that Turkey's support to Somalia's state-building process is without conditions attached to it. Turkey is not a partner whose aim is to enforce its ideology and values to Somalia but instead a helping partner whose purpose is to assist Somalia recover and prosper.

The other actors have different agendas and interests that shape their support of Somalia. Ali claims that Turkey has earned the status of the non-traditional political actor with its impressive work in Somalia. in contrast, Turkey's success has shed light on the other actors' security and interest-oriented engagement. It has also become a wake-up call for the other actors to act differently and change their inadequate security and interest-oriented policies (Ali, 2011).

Akpinar argues that despite Turkey's significant humanitarian commitment in Somalia, the government's peacebuilding efforts are also motivated by its interests in the country. Akpinar raises the argument that Ankara needs to avoid mixing its national interest with humanitarian diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts. The interplay between the interests and the capability of the intervening country and the reaction from the public of the host nation combined with the international support could facilitate the success of peacebuilding initiatives (Akpınar, 2013).

The findings of the study indicated that Turkey's engagement is not primarily focused on the short term. The investment and efforts made in Somalia by Turkish state institutions and other private companies demonstrate a long-term commitment to the country. One example of the Turks' long-term commitment is constructing a multi-million military base in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. The success of a project depends on the coordination and oversight of the project implementation team. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) played an essential role in simplifying the coordination of the various agencies and identifying the key areas to focus on and delivering those projects on time without delays. The TIKA Somalia office's responsibility is to coordinate and administer all state projects and provide guidance to the non-state agencies in Somalia.

The presence of Turkish organizations and personnel on the ground is considered one of the factors that led to the success of Turkish activities in Somalia. The unexpected visit of the then prime-minister Erdogan in Somalia paved the way for other Turkish government organizations and non-government organizations to immediately follow and start operating on the ground where famine struck severely. The continuing presence of the Turkish organizations and the immediate response to the crisis made them more successful in their humanitarian campaign in Somalia.

Turkey took a risky decision by sending its companies and government employees to Somalia. However, this sacrifice shows the extent of Turkish commitment to contribute to Somalia's recovery and security. Compared to other actors involved in the country whose presence is only limited to a compound near the airport while the representatives of these actors are not even present in the country for security reasons.

The interview with Wasuge demonstrates that Somalis believe that Turkish projects are needed in Somalia, so they are viewed as more efficient than other intangible projects carried out by other actors. The study also argues that what distinguishes Turkey from other countries is that it sends its expertise and knowledge to Somalia, such as teachers, engineers, health professionals, and others. The physical presence of the Turks, on the other hand, is what brings them closer to the people and makes them appear as a trustworthy partner.

Turkey's projects are visible and tangible compared to other actors involved in Somalia which their projects are mainly diplomatic, capacity building, technical support, and workshops. The Turkish projects are long-term development projects that include infrastructural and educational programs that will impact later or be visible after completion (Ozkan, 2014).

It is evident in the interview results that Turkey has achieved many visible and tangible things. At the same time, other projects carried out by traditional donors are invisible. These projects include supporting the governmental system and providing policy formulation training that ordinary citizens cannot understand and see.

### 4.3   Similarities And Differences Of Turkey And Other Actors

Since the collapse of the Somali state, there have been multiple attempts in rebuilding the Somali state, and more than 15 attempts have failed to yield any positive result. Yet, the international community has continued providing support and hope to Somali leaders to come together and rebuild their nation. Many state actors have had contributed to the Somali case, and with time new actors emerged, and one of these actors is Turkey. Turkey's entrance in the pursuit of finding a peaceful Somalia with strong governmental institutions has changed the perception of many Somalis that a foreign nation can immediately have an impact within this short time. The continuing support of the traditional donors and Turkey's new approach led to a visible development towards finding a peaceful and robust institution in Somalia, although the institutions remain fragile. To understand the similarities and differences of the contributions to Somalia state-building by Turkey and other actors, the study focuses on two significant issues: their contributions to Somalia state-building and the approaches and engagement methods employed by both actors.

Since the failure of the Somali state, there have been multiple humanitarian crises in the country beyond the local actors' reach. Foreign aid was needed, and traditional donors filled the gap by providing emergency responses to a humanitarian crisis. As mentioned in the previous pages, Turkey's initial engagement with Somalia, which was Humanitarian-oriented, has shifted towards state-building and institution-building after the famine and hunger threats were alleviated.  Since the start of the non-transitional era in 2012, the institution and capacity building initiatives from different state actors have been visible in the country with a notable presence of USAID, whose capacity building projects widely focused on training on governance and administration to Somalia's government branches, namely, the executive, legislation, and the judiciary. More importantly, training was offered to different members of the communities and the civil society as a whole.

Between 2015 and 2018, the EU and its member states alone have spent Somalia around € 3.7 billion for development, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. This shows the commitment of the international community to the Somali state-building project. The EU has

played an essential role in Somalia's search for becoming a peaceful, stable, and democratic country by gradually supporting the efforts of Somalia to take responsibility for its security. For more than fifteen years, the EU has significantly and consistently supported the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The European Union has spent € 1.73 billion. The EU is currently strengthening its security assistance and is focused on providing more direct assistance to Somali agencies (EEAS, 2018).

USAID is also playing an essential role in Somalia's recovery through programs that promote good governance, economic recovery and growth, youth skill training, and efforts to strengthen social cohesion through stronger community-government connections. The US contributes to long-term stability, democracy, and prosperity through USAID. They also provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate human suffering and durable solution and resilience (USAID, 2018).

The United Nations Somalia Mission (UNSOM) conducts several projects with different government organizations. The UN organizations like UNDP, UNFPA, FAO, UN-HABITAT, and others actively provide capacity building and knowledge to Somali civil servants. Since the collapse of state institutions, the United Nations' role in Somalia's state-building has been visible and played an essential role in Somalia's state-building journey.

Highlighting the differences of the traditional donors and the Turkish approaches in Somalia; Minister of Public Works Mr.Abdi notes that:

> *"The Traditional donors spend on Somalia almost 1 billion every year. This money is spent on logistics and salaries paid to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, resilience programs, and humanitarian aid. These projects are not tangible, and one more thing is that. Projects carried out by traditional donors are not coordinated well, and parallel projects are conducted in different regions, which is a waste of resources. These projects are conducted without the cooperation of the assigned line ministries".*

Turkey is also playing its role in sharing knowledge with Somalia's government organizations to prepare them to serve their country. The civil war had destroyed the country's government institutions and infrastructure, and Somalia required long-term development initiatives rather than humanitarian assistance, which several state actors were giving. Support from international state actors was critical to filling the gap, but traditional donors opted for capacity building and state-building projects rather than reconstructing hospitals, schools, and so forth. Many feel Turkey has done the best in the social services sector, education, and health care with Turkey's arrival.

Another priority for Turkey has been restoring the Mogadishu airport, hospitals, vital roads in Mogadishu, and highways connecting Mogadishu, Jowhar, and Afgoi. Turkey was praised for

accomplishing a lot with little money and time compared to traditional donors with substantial influence in Somalia, who did nothing much tangible, although active in the nation for an extended period. (Wasuge, 2016)

When asked about whether Turkey's projects in Somalia are more efficient than the traditional donors and how? Wasuge, a prominent academician who has done extensive work on Turkey's engagement with Somalia, has expressed that:

> *"When it comes to efficiency, there are many indicators which is used to measure and what creates the difference is that the traditional donors implement intangible projects such as capacity building, salaries, and non-physical projects while the Turks are more involved in visible and tangible projects such as building roads, hospitals, etc. the western world believe that building hospitals, roads, and similar things are old strategies used by westerners in 1970s and this is what the Turkish government is practising now. They indicate that the rebuilding and physical projects are the government's responsibility, and we can only support them set up policies and strategies and training government civil servants. This shows the difference between the two approaches. Mahad indicates that Somalis believe that the Turkish projects are needed in Somalia, which is why it is seen as more efficient".*

Furthermore, security issues have been a significant barrier to state-building in Somalia because Somalia lacks strong security forces capable of combating terrorist groups. Somalia signed multiple agreements to rebuild the Somali army with many state actors to solve this problem. Different countries have provided training and support to the Somali army, but later, when Turkey's involvement started, Somalia and Turkey signed an agreement to rebuild the Somali army and give the necessary support, which consequently paved the way for Turkey to open its most extensive overseas military base after Qatar and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Over the past few years, Turkey has successfully trained and equipped military and special police battalions that are efficient and strong.

The Turks have extensively focused on the security sector, which is vital for solving the eternal conflict and terror groups in the country, Turkey together with other international actors, most notably the USA, UK, Qatar, and UAE, has initiated efforts to rebuild the Somali army to eliminate the need for the presence of foreign troops and establish a self-sufficient army who can fully secure the country and removing the threats posed by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. It is visible that Turkey has helped in this process and still helping the Somali government to rebuild its army. Turkey's approach is a radical contrast to the security-driven approach of the U.S. and is also very different from the strings attached European style (Ali, 2011).

The interview with Wasuge, when asked about the shared similarities and differences between Turkey and other traditional donors? Wasuge has noted that:

*"Turkey and other traditional donors both give the Somali government budgetary support. Also, Turkey works on the security sectors, and other actors are also working on this sector. Traditional actors using international organizations like UNICEF, USAID, Save the Children, and others provide educational opportunities to Somalis and Turkey, providing scholarship opportunities and educational opportunities within the country. The difference is that Turkey sends its expertise to Somalia, for example, teachers, engineers, and doctors. The physical presence makes the Turks closer to the public, and as a result, it is perceived as a good partner."*

It became clear from the interview with Yusuf that the Turkish initiatives are primarily physical in nature, whereas the projects implemented by the other actors are primarily non-physical in nature. Building on this argument, the results of the study concentrated on the features of Turkish assistance to Somalia in the areas of revenue generation and budgetary support, as well as how this assistance has aided Somalia in the debt relief system. While Turkey's wide-ranging support for the Somali government's state-building efforts is not confined to security assistance or infrastructure development, it has also made significant contributions to the welfare of the Somali people through the health and education sectors. Construction of hospitals and schools throughout the country and the provision of scholarships to a large number of Somali students.

### 4.3.1 Approach And Engagement Method

Although Turkey and other traditional and non-traditional actors contribute to Somalia's state-building and stabilization efforts, their tactics and techniques differ. This section of the study will examine the approaches and engagement methods of the two actors based on their interactions with the Somali government and the sorts of support they provide. Considering the engagement and approach method used by the two actors that this study focuses on, the below table will summarize the critical distinctions between the two actors in focus.

**Table 3. Comparing Approaches Used By Traditional Donors And Turkey**

| Description | Other traditional Donors | Turkey |
|---|---|---|
| **Projects** | Invisible/ development, capacity building, training, etc. | More visible/physical projects (Hospitals, roads, airport, ports, and improving infrastructure) |
| **Approach** | More diplomatic/process-oriented | Holistic approach/result-oriented (CSOs. Schools, investment, Diyanet, and diplomacy) |
| **Organization/Personnel** | Security restrictions/ less movement/partner organization | Turkish personnel/officials on the ground/ organizations/less security restriction |
| **Interest** | Both short-term and long-term | No Short-term interests/investing for the future |
| **Policy Approach** | Dual track policy | Mogadishu-Centered |
| **Coordination & efficiency** | Complex structure(process)/ UN agencies/ late delivery | Efficient coordination/TIKA |
| **Engagement Method** | Multilateral/through UN and its agencies | Bilateral/state to state cooperation |

Compiled by the author

The engagement method and the approach used by Turkey and other traditional actors differ in many aspects of their engagement with Somalia. As shown in the above table, there is a big difference in the approach and engagement method employed by the two actors. The defining factors that distinguish one from the other are the projects implemented, policy approach, and engagement method.

Turkey prefers bilateral and direct engagement over multilateral development initiatives. This distinguishing feature of Turkey's development framework that may set it apart from the "West" is the focus it places on increasing economic integration within its area to increase interdependence.

In contrast, economic efforts reflect Turkey's laissez-faire attitude to global cooperation and institutionalization. According to (Teri Murphy, Auveen Woods, 2014),

When it comes to engagement with Somalia, the concept that distinguishes Turkey from other traditional donors is that it favours bilateral engagement over multilateral engagement, fostering interdependence through economic integration rather than relying on humanitarian assistance. Thus, Turkish policymakers choose direct engagement through bilateral channels. At the same time, economic and infrastructure development initiatives contribute to creating a favourable atmosphere that aids the country's road to stability and peace.

When asked about whether Turkey's projects in Somalia are more efficient than traditional donors projects? And how?  Minister of Public Works Mr. Abdi has noted that:

> *"Turkey arrived in Somalia in 2011. Up to now, the overall expenditure they have spent on Somalia is 1 billion US dollars compared to the traditional actors' 1 billion US dollars annual expenditure on Somalia. But the difference is that Turkey did tangible projects, built two major hospitals Yardimeli and Digfeer. Also built roads, the renovation of the airport, and the port, the budget support is significant, trainings, scholarships, humanitarian aid, and the rebuilding the security institutions."*

The interview with Abdi demonstrated that Turkey's spending on Somalia had covered a wide range of visible and tangible areas compared to those of traditional donors. The defining factors that make the Turkish projects more efficient are that in the public eyes, the visible projects are more valued and seen as efficient and needed.

According to (Wasuge, 2016), the factors contributing to Turkey's success in Somalia are Ankara's approach, which combines humanitarianism, business interests, and diplomacy. With this collective engagement having its consequences and challenges, Wasuge argues that Ankara managed it well through direct cooperation with Mogadishu and effective coordination. Akpinar, a Turkish scholar, argues that the Turkish approach is a collective one that covers all aspects of "Humanitarian aid, development aid, peacekeeping, state-building, and peacemaking through mediation" (Akpınar, 2013). From here, we can understand that the path taken by the Turkish policy-makers is different from that of the other traditional approaches who continuously involved in the Somali project. According to  (Terry Murphy, & Auveen Woods, 2014) Turkey uses a hybrid public-private engagement model, representing Turkey's state-building and stabilization model.

Many Turkish NGOs, private companies, and state agencies currently implement various projects in Somalia. One of the most significant projects is the rehabilitation of roads that connect Mogadishu-Afgoi and Mogadishu-Jowhar, a construction project partly funded by the government of Qatar and implemented by a Turkish company. Although this carries its risks, the Turkish

presence is still there while terrorist attacks have targeted Turkish nationals working in Somalia (Dhaysane, 13). In this context, the word efficiency means the speed and on-time delivery of both humanitarian and development-oriented projects to the designated areas. Comparing the on-time delivery of humanitarian projects carried out by Turkey and other actors is not a complicated issue as long as the difference is clear. The other actors use other channels such as the United Nations agencies like WFP. UNHCR, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, WHO, and other states' designated national aid agencies take time and effort to deliver the emergency projects on time.

Highlighting the differences and similarities between Turkey and other Traditional Donors contributions in Somalia state-building, Minister of Public Works Mr. Abdi has noted that:

> *"The Turkish case is different, and the people trust the Turks. It is also noteworthy to mention the Turkish projects are visible on the ground, and their support is unconditional. In summary, there is a big difference between the performance of Turkey in Somalia over the last decade and traditional donor's performance over the previous thirty years. Since Turkey's initial engagement with Somalia, Somalia has started recovering from war, famine, and political instability. The Turkish involvement in Somalia has opened doors for the Somali diaspora to come back and invest in the country. Construction and investment projects have increased, and educated people are coming back to contribute to the recovery and rebuilding of the Somali nation."*

The interview with Abdi, Minister of Public Works, indicated that traditional donors invest more in the Somali case. However, the study results demonstrated that the vast majority of those donations are spent on logistical and administrative issues; furthermore, a considerable portion of those donations are channelled through United Nations agencies and are used for development projects and capacity-building initiatives. Even though the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been implementing projects to improve the lives of farmers, fishers, and other people by providing them with skills to maintain their lives in recent years, the volume of such support for Somalis is small when compared to Turkish projects.

The Turkish policy-makers used Mogadishu-centric approach throughout their engagement with Somalia, which means all engagement and priority-setting agendas were discussed by the Turkish Government and the Central government based in Mogadishu. In contrast, the Obama administration announced in 2010 that the US would deal with the Mogadishu-based federal government and sub-state actors equally to further peace and stability in the country. The building block approach was used by Ethiopia, which is similar to that of the US, for two decades (Elmi, 2011).

The interview with Abdi demonstrated that Turkey seeks a strong Somalia capable of delivering services and protection to its public. For example, the Turkish efforts to rebuild the Somali security sector by opening a military base in Somalia and training the Somali police and the

military forces. The data results also demonstrated that Turkey wants to develop sound and long-term relations. Additionally, their interests are not short-term. Instead, their pursuit is long-term relations based on mutual understanding and cooperation.

According to the findings of this study, Turkish initiatives were likewise found to be beneficial and effective in general. Moreover, Turkish government-led initiatives received more praise than NGOs and civil-led projects. The effectiveness of the Turkish state-building practices in Somalia could be calculated based on the amount of money spent on Somalia over the past decade, estimated around one billion US dollars, and the numerous projects implemented by other actors in Somalia, which is an estimate of one billion US dollars annually.

Turkish-led projects were considered more effective and tangible, considering that these projects are coordinated and implemented through TIKA and with the cooperation of the Somali government. In contrast, the projects of the other actors are mainly capacity building and a few development projects which go through a rigid and complex process implemented by various organizations. The donations of these actors are not directly provided to the Somali government but rather go through different organizations assigned to do different tasks and projects. In contrast, the Turkish approach is more result-oriented than the traditional donors' approach, which is process-oriented.

Another critical feature that distinguishes Turkey from the other actors involved in Somalia is its Mogadishu-centric engagement which is considered one of the distinctive features of the Somali government despite the criticisms that Turkey did not expand its operations beyond the Capital Mogadishu. In contrast, the traditional donors use a dual-track policy that facilitates the engagement of the central government in Mogadishu and the regional administrations simultaneously.

Finally, the study findings indicated that Turkey's state-building experience in Somalia has a distinct feature that should be considered the foundations of Turkey's success in Somalia. The unconditional support, direct engagement with the Somali government, ensuring local ownership, refraining from domestic politics interference, effective coordination, tangible projects, and the holistic approach that combines humanitarian, security, and social and economic infrastructure development makes it an exceptional state-building actor. The study recommends that intervening states employ this collective engagement and techniques the Turkish policy-makers used in the Somali context for future successful state-building projects.

**CONCLUSION**

State-building has always been a complicated endeavour. There have been numerous failed attempts by the international community to stabilize and rebuild state institutions in fragile states over the past three decades. However, the international community views these interventions as critical to the state-building process. As a result, there has been much debate about the effectiveness of the approaches taken by the international community. Somalia has remained without a functioning government since 1991 after the collapse of the central government. The Somali state-building is an example of the failed state-building projects sponsored by the international community. Several attempts to reconstruct state institutions could not yield the expected outcome.

This dissertation intended to investigate and understand Turkey's role in Somalia's state-building process and how its contribuions and approach differs from other actors involved in Somalia. From a broader viewpoint, the study sheds light on Turkish foreign policy toward Africa and assesses whether Turkey's approach to Somalia differs from its general strategy towards the region.

The study also sought to investigate and discuss differences and similarities in state-building approaches used by the Turkish government and other regional and international actors involved in the Somalia state-building process. The study attempted to address the following questions: What is Turkey's role in Somalia state-building? After answering the first question, the study tries to understand if Turkey's approach to state formation is more effective than the alternative approaches used by other actors. In this study, semi-structured interviews and consultations were conducted with policy-makers and academicians in the field of state-building. This, in return, makes a valuable contribution to the literature by providing a clear, first-hand perspective to the issue.

The Turkish engagement in Somalia during the 2011 humanitarian crisis became the bedrock for the revival of increased and still evolving Turkish-Africa relations. With the crisis being solved, the Turkish engagement has shifted from humanitarianism to a state-building and development-oriented approach in an abandoned country, a gap needed to be filled. The success in Somalia drew attention to Turkish efforts in other regions. As a result, Turkey hoped to be acknowledged as an international actor whose primary goal is to become an emerging power.

In line with the study's main objectives, the results indicate that Turkey's recent engagement in Somalia in 2011 marked a new era in Turkish-Africa relations. With the consideration that this relationship has been gaining momentum since 1998. The study results demonstrate that the Turkish foreign policy towards Somalia is intertwined with its general approach towards the continent, moreover, to get a glimpse of the interplay between the overall Turkish engagement with the continent and its strategy towards Somalia, one should look into the success of Turkish engagement in Somalia. Concisely, the study discovered that Turkey's involvement in Somalia in 2011 significantly enhanced the momentum of Turkey-Africa relations. Somalia became the focal point of Turkey's strategy towards the continent.

The study discovered that Turkey's approach to state formation in Somalia differs from other traditional actors. As Turkey adopts a holistic approach that combines humanitarian aid, business, and development projects that improve the well-being of the society by providing education, health, and economic infrastructure development that creates jobs for Somalis, rebuilding the army to enhance citizens' security and safety, political support through diplomatic channels by organizing conferences, and raising awareness on the Somali crisis and peacebuilding through mediation among Somalis.

The empirical findings support the argument that Turkey's state-building practices in Somalia are unique and more influential and efficient than other international efforts to rebuild Somali state institutions. The results indicate that Turkey has been highly effective and made progress in improving Somalia's social services; moreover, the study discovered that both Turkish state institutions and NGOs had contributed significantly. The Turkish contributions in the health sector are widely visible, and it is considered the most successful Turkish project in the country.

Concisely, the study results demonstrate that both Turkey and other actors have contributed to Somalia's humanitarian and state-building projects. Still, the key distinction is their engagement and approach method. The study results suggest that Turkey's bilateral engagement and holistic approach in Somalia's state-building process is the foundation of Turkish success in Somalia.

Per the findings, Turkey's engagement and approach methods are significantly different from those of other actors. The engagement method used by Turkey demonstrated Turkey's dedication and unwavering support for the Somali state-building cause. Turkey's involvement in Somalia came after two decades of violence and insecurity, which blocked development. Despite the challenges, Turkey has significantly and effectively contributed to numerous critical initiatives to Somalia's recovery with little time and money.

According to the study's findings, the comprehensive approach that integrated humanitarian, development assistance, and security aid at a critical time significantly impacted the fate of

Somalia's state-building process; despite the obstacles, Turkey's commitment to helping the process was there. In line with the hypothesis, the study argues that the combination of humanitarian, development, and business engagement should be considered in supporting the reconstruction of failed states instead of using a top-down approach and merely aimed at state-building projects that neglect the need for development assistance.

In line with the literature review, the study claims that effective state-building occurs when the overall state-building process is fully controlled and owned by local stakeholders. This can only be achieved when they can decide on their fate. The solution should come from them because they know their problem, and agendas and decisions should not be made on their behalf. However, one factor that makes this impossible is the reliance on foreign financial, military, and technological resources, which opens the door for international players to intervene in the process. Local ownership and local agendas are critical to forming a state, good governance, and establishing legitimate governmental institutions.

Scholars of international relations who argue that state-building by external actors constitutes a violation of sovereignty point out that the intervening states violate the internal sovereignty of the hosting country that is weak and incapable of protecting itself from foreign intervention. The main concern relates that states pursue their national interest, which makes the peacebuilding initiatives conducted by foreign actors controversial. In line with this argument, even though Turkey has national interests in Somalia and the region, the Turkish support and commitment are unconditional. Their primary goal is to see a strong Somalia emerge from this current state of adversity. Turkey's investment in Somalia is long-term. It aims to create a sustainable relationship with Somalia to reach its long-term interests and maintain its presence in the Horn of Africa region.

Moreover, the findings of this study will be valuable for future research on state-building approaches and the factors that should be considered in future peacebuilding efforts. The study results cast a new light on the gap in the literature of the resulting factors of fragile state-building failures. This study will also serve as a literature resource for future research on state reconstruction and possible alternative approaches to state-building.

The study highlights a series of activities related to development projects, institution building, training and supplies to the Somali army, and so on as the foundation for the Somali state's recovery, bearing in mind that a state is defined by its ability to enforce the law and protect its boundaries. However, even though numerous countries have contributed to the rebuilding of the Somali army, Turkey has been effective in training more than one-third of the Somali army, which is believed to be around 15,000 soldiers. The efficiency of the Turkish-trained soldiers is evident in a variety of ways, and they are specifically trained to perform particular operations and operations against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, among other things. Concisely, the study results

indicate that the Turkish security engagement in Somalia is different from states that previously provided security support to the Somali government.

The results of the study found clear support for the dissertation argument that Turkey's approach is different and effective than other traditional actors whose engagement is limited to support and funding. At the same time, Turkey combines all necessary tools (personnel, expertise, and funding). These factors combined distinguish Turkish state-building efforts from the previously conducted traditional approach. The analysis of this dissertation proves the argument that Turkey's engagement in Somalia is unique. However, Turkey's success in Somalia attracts the attention of other actors who regard themselves as the main actors in Somalia and are discomforted by Turkey's bilateral engagement. Turkey should carefully cooperate with these actors and avoid misunderstanding to sustain its good image and success in Somalia.

Finally, these analyses provide new insight into the relationship between the state-building approach and project success. Despite the failure of top-down state-building projects in many countries like Afghanistan, the study argues that future state-building projects should explore a bottom-up approach and holistic approach engagement. The study results contribute to a clear understanding of the necessity of allowing the host country to own and lead their state-building project while avoiding meddling with and violating state sovereignty.

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