

KARADENİZ TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ * SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI

LIBERAL PEACE AND PEACEBUILDING: THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

IDRISSA TAMBA BINDI

OCAK – 2017

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
ONAY

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ÖZET

Çatışma ortamına geçen devletlerin yeniden yapılandırılması için artan bir farkındalık ve uluslararası destek var. İç savaşlardan ortaya çıkan ülkelere barış getirme yönündeki üçüncü taraf müdahaleleri, liberal barış inşaatı adı verilen temel bir konsept aracılığıyla yönlendirildi. Liberal barış inşası, Soğuk Savaş bitiminden sonra savaş sonrası ülkelerde üçüncü parti müdahalelerinin belirgin bir stratejisi olmuştur. Bu tezde, on yıl süren acımasız iç savaşın ardından Sierra Leone'deki liberal barış inşa sürecini ele alınmaktadır. Liberal barış teorisini ateşli bir şekilde eleştiren, Roland Paris'in Liberalleşmeden Önce Kurumsallaştırma (IBL) barış planlaması stratejisi 2002'deki savaşın sona ermesinden beri Sierra Leone'de kalıcı bir barışın sağlanmasında katkıda bulundu. Barış inşasının nasıl yapıldığına dair kanıt Liberalleşme stratejisi analiz edilmeden önce kurumsallaşmanın altı farklı sütununda savaş sonrası Sierra Leone'de yapısını kurulmuştur.

Bu tezde, Serbestleşme Öncesi Kurumsallaşma stratejisinin on yıl süren iç savaş sonrasında Sierra Leone'de barışı sağlamaya yardımcı olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, bu yaklaşımın peşinde koşmanın çok güçlü kurumların oluşturulmasına zemin hazırladığını ve bu kurumların ülkenin sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel manzarasına nasıl dönüştürdüğünü ve bunun bir nükseden çatışmaya baskı yapmada nasıl yardımcı olduğunu vurguluyor. Yaklaşımın eksikliklerine rağmen, Sierra Leone'de IBL yaklaşımının uygulanması, güçlü kurumların barış ve istikrarın temel direkleri olduğunu gösterdi. Ülkenin görece olarak barışa sahip olması, Liberalleşme Öncesi Kurumsallaşma stratejisinin etkili olduğunu ve diğer barış inşası vakalarında kullanılabileceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal Barış, Liberalleşme Öncesinde Kurumsallaşma, Barış Yapılandırma, Çatışma, Sierra Leone, İç Savaş.

ABSTRACT

There is an increasing awareness and international support for rebuilding states that have gone through conflict. Third party interventions in bringing peace to countries that have emerged from civil wars have been channelled through a fundamental concept called liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding, even though faces much criticism, has been a prominent strategy of third-party interventions in post-war countries after the end of the Cold War. This thesis deals with the liberal peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, after its decade-long brutal civil war. The focus lies on how Roland Paris; an ardent critic of Liberal peace theory, Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL) peacebuilding strategy, has contributed in sustaining peace in Sierra Leone since the end of the war in 2002. Evidence of how peacebuilding has been implemented in post-war Sierra Leone under the six different pillars of IBL strategy is analysed.

The thesis shows that the IBL strategy has helped to maintain peace in Sierra Leone after ten years of civil war. It also highlights how the pursuit of this approach has laid the foundation for the building of very strong institutions and how such institutions have in turn transformed into a socio-economic, political and cultural landscape of the country that have helped in repressing a relapse to conflict. Despite the shortcomings of the approach, the introduction of IBL approach in Sierra Leone has shown that stronger institutions are key pillars of peace and stability. The fact that the country enjoys relative peace indicates that the IBL strategy is efficient and other peacebuilding operation could follow similar approach.

Keywords: Liberal Peace theory, Institutionalization Before Liberalization, Peacebuilding, Conflict Sierra Leone, Civil war

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	: All People's Congress
APA	: Abidjan Peace Accord
ASSL	: Audit Service Sierra Leone
AU	: African Union
BBC	: British Broadcasting Cooperation
CDF	: Civil Defence Force
C-MENT	: Centre for Media, Education and Technology (C-MET),
CJFE	: Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
CSO	: Civil Society Organization
DBR	: District Block Representation System
DFID	: Department for International Development
DDRR	: Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration and Rehabilitation
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	: ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
EO	: Executive Outcome
ERRC	: Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Credit
ERS	: Economic Recovery Strategy
EU	: European Union
FAWE	: Forum for African Women Educationalists
FPTPS	: First Past the Poll System
GDP	: British Pound Starlin
HIVAIDS	: Human Immune Virus
IBL	: Institutionalization Before Liberalization
IDP	: Internally Displaced Person
IFES	: International Foundation for Electoral System

IMATT	: The International Military Advice and Training Team
IMC	: Independent Media Commission
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INEC	: Independent National Electoral Commission
IPRSP	: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
LPA	: Lome Peace Accords
NPRC	: National Provisional Ruling Council
NDI	: National Democratic Institution
NEC	: National Electoral Commission
NGOS	: Nongovernmental Organizations
NPFL	: National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
SLPP	: Sierra Leone People's Party
UK	: United Kingdom
UNAMSIL	: United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone
UN	: United Nations
PLP	: People Liberation Party
PPRC	: Political party Registration Commission
PR	: Proportional Representation
PRDF	: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSP	: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUF	: Revolutionary United Front
SLAJ	: Sierra Leone Association of Journalist
SLP	: Sierra Leone Police
TDS-SL	: Talking Drum Studio -Sierra Leone
TRC	: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNSC	: United Nation Security Council
USD	: United States Dollars
USAID	: United States Agency for International Development

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INTRODUCTION

Introductory Remarks

The shift in the way wars have been fought since the end of the Second World War, and particularly after the Cold War period, poses a grave threat to international peace and security. While many of these wars were between states, the new wars are characterised as interstate, ethnic violence, secessionist, revolutionary, and bloody. Moreover, defenceless civilians have been directly or indirectly the target of these conflicts. Sierra Leone like many other countries across Africa has been home to one of the world's most brutal protracted civil wars since the end of World War II¹. At the same time, democratic political participation has followed the end of these wars. Autocratic and oppressive governments are transforming into multiparty democratic elections and transparent and accountable state institutions. How far this change has gone to remedy the many factors that lead to war has been the question which the international community has shifted its focus to resolve. A total failure of state institutions to protect their people, and in some instances the state itself as perpetrator of widespread violence against its population, is another feature of these new wars. The conflicts are further defined by human suffering, genocide, organised crime, use of child soldiers, terrorism and regional and international instability.²

Before the end of the Cold War, there was no acceptable international model of conflict management because many wars were fought between states, followed by the intense ideological rivalry between the West and East blocks.³ So with the Cold War coming to an end, there has been increasing international engagement in resolving an unprecedented number of civil wars mostly in underdeveloped countries; many of these wars, despite being fought within states, have spillover effects that threaten international peace and stability. Therefore, sustaining the peace and preventing the recurrence of these

¹ T. David Mason & James D. Meernik. *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, London: 2006. United Kingdom: Routledge, -2

² Jennifer Milliken & Kaith Krause, *State failure, collapse and reconstruction*, 2003 EBSCO Publishing

³ Roland Paris, *At War's End*, Cambridge, United Kingdom: 2004 Cambridge University Press, -16

wars poses a series of questions. Consequently, the role of the international body to restore and reconstruct states that have gone through civil wars has become very useful and been at the centre of international discourse over the past few years.⁴ Different theories have emerged as models for conflict transformation. One of the most prominent among them has been the “Liberal peace theory” which suggests that democracy and economic liberalisation predetermines lasting peace.

Against this backdrop, the theory has gained widespread recognition and suggests that western democracies are the appropriate strategy for third party intervention in rebuilding and strengthening democratic state institutions and the free market economy of post-war societies. After some success in western countries, the United Nations as a leading organisation responsible for maintaining international peace and security together with other leading governmental and non-governmental organisations began to intervene in many of the conflicts using this model. It expanded its role of peacekeeping to peace operation that includes amongst other things post-conflict peacebuilding that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping activities for the restoration and strengthening of institutions that support lasting peace.⁵

So, throughout the years following the end of the cold war, democratisation and economic liberalisation became the foresight strategy of international community involvement in war-torn societies. By liberalism, it emphasised the “promotion of multiparty elections, civil society, free market economics privatisations and deregulation, good governance, good relation with the west and humanitarian responsibility to protect”.⁶ Liberalism also aimed at promoting civil and political rights, security and public sector reforms in line with democratic principles.⁷ The key argument is that states that adopt the liberal state model will be more democratic, transparent and accountable to their voters. They will seek international cooperation with other countries in dealing with economic and political challenges that arise. In a democratic state, leaders are held accountable for engaging in practices that will lead to war. Their commitment to the consent of the voters reduces the chances of engaging in wars that have no popular approval, in which the

⁴ Mason & Meernik. *Ibid*, 3.

⁵ Paris, *Ibid*, 13-18.

⁶ David Harris, *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa*, New York: 2012 I.B. Tauris. 3.

⁷ Paris, *Ibid*, 19.

electorate might punish the party in power with electoral defeat.⁸ So, effective implementation of liberal values in war-torn societies reduces the likelihood of engaging in war and thus sustaining the peace.

The theory has, however, faced lots of criticism as the rationale of the approach has prompted a series of debates: the model focuses on creating liberal states, rebuilding and building of effective government institutions in war-torn societies, yet it has turned out to be counterproductive as the model itself serves as a source of many conflicts; it failed to establish liberal states through the peace missions in the 1990s in countries such as Haiti, Sierra Leone Burundi and most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹ The model is driven by western ideologies that are unfamiliar with the situation on the ground where it is introduced.¹⁰ It places more emphasis on politics as a potential source of conflict and less on state cooperation and on mutual economic and political benefit as incentives of lasting peace.¹¹ So it is not only democracies that favour peace. We have also seen that because of interdependence and its benefits, both democratic and non-democratic states have opted to avoid war.

Despite the various constructive arguments put forward by different critiques of liberal peacebuilding, the International community views the model as a viable approach that provides durable peace and economic development in post-conflict countries. Meanwhile, peace building, like many other well-meaning approaches, has been based on its experiences and so continues to be the prominent model of third party intervention in many post-war countries. Even ardent critics strongly acknowledge the empirical evidence that consolidated democracies do go to war with one another.¹²

For critics like Roland Paris, rather than rejecting Liberal Peacebuilding in totality, he pointed out the weaknesses and failures of the liberal peace approach and proposed a more efficient and proactive approach to the existing liberal peace strategy. He labelled this approach IBL. This approach calls for more prudent peacebuilding efforts for

⁸Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace", *The American Political Science Review*, , vol. 99, no. 3, 2005, pp. 463–466., www.jstor.org/stable/30038953, 464.

⁹ Susanna, Campbell et al., *Introduction: The Politics of Liberal Peace*, Zed Books, 2011, 1.

¹⁰ Roland Paris, *Saving Liberal Peacebuilding*, Farnham [etc.]:2012 Ashgate. 15.

¹¹ Toni Ann Paziienza, *Challenging the Democratic Peace Theory - The Role of US-China Relationship*, (M.A). 2014 University of south Florida. <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5098>

¹² ANNA, GEIS et al "From Democratic Peace to Democratic War?", *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 19: 2007, 157-163.

achieving a durable peace in post-war countries through liberal market democracy. The strategy recommends that peacebuilders should shift from hastily promoting democracy and a free market economy in post-conflict societies and first focus on “constructing a framework of effective state institutions”.¹³ International peacebuilding agencies should prioritise a stable government with functioning institutions necessary to handle the various challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and to sustain the peace.¹⁴

This thesis seeks to analyse the peacebuilding operation in Sierra Leone by examining the IBL approach. Sierra Leone being among the first post-war countries to have adopted this approach after warring factions signed a peace agreement, represents a perfect case study on how the IBL model contributes to preventing a relapse to war for countries that have gone through brutal civil wars. In this research analysis, the various reforms and activities of the six pillars of the IBL model in building the peace that Sierra Leone enjoys today will be examined. Moreover, the research will point out some of the gaps and shortcomings of the model and possible suggestions of how it can be further improved.

The emergence of the war in Sierra Leone goes back to its colonial period. In 1961 the country gained independence from Great Britain. Unlike other decolonized countries, Sierra Leone benefited from its abundant natural resources with a low population, high quality of education and less ethnically divided politics. There was hope of a prosperous and influential nation, yet a few years after independence these hopes were dashed with intense political competition and rivalry. From 1968 to 1991 successive regimes were engulfed in excessive corruption and harsh measures such as economic marginalisation, political patronage, gross human rights violations, ethnic nepotism and bad governance, suppression of other political parties and no viable civil society groups.¹⁵

It was only a matter of time before civil disobedience arrived. On May 23, 1991, a group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mostly of disenchanting youth, some who had received training in Libya, attacked Sierra Leone from the eastern town of

¹³ Paris, *At war's end, 187-188*.

¹⁴ Paris, *At war's end, 187-188*.

¹⁵ David Keen, *Conflict & collusion in Sierra Leone*. Oxford [England]: 2005 James Currey. New York Palgrave -8

Bomaru supported by mercenaries of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor. As the war went on across the nation hundreds of lives were lost, millions displaced and hundreds of thousands became refugees. State institutions at almost every level collapsed and became incapable to protect its people from the war. The Government lost control of major regions and its resources as different groups claimed power. For a decade, the people of Sierra Leone were ravaged by a brutal and senseless war whose scars are not easily forgotten by many in Sierra Leone.

Given the terrible effects of the civil war and its impact on the economy and security in the sub-region and the wider world, there were constant calls for major action to reverse the appalling status of the country. After a series of unsuccessful agreements, the parties finally agreed to sign the Lome Peace Accord in July 1999, which was signed by all sides and marked the starting point of a lasting peace. Against this background, Sierra Leone like many other war-torn countries, remains highly dependent on international support in responding to the various challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. The Lomé Peace Accord became the framework for which the international support channelled its objectives. Under this agreement, the international committee ensured that all parties to the conflict were to have a stake in the peace process and elections delayed until institutions that could oversee the peaceful conduct of the elections were in place to prevent any potential threats from the elections.

Following the 1999 agreement, the UN Security Council in Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999 established a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The mission's mandate went beyond the traditional peacekeeping to a more comprehensive and broader one that involved both military and civil personnel. Towards the end of 2002, the mission disarmed more than 70,000 ex-fighters and repatriated them to their various communities for integration. In 2002, the government declared the end of the war, which was followed by multiparty elections and other peacebuilding activities. In theory, the war was over; however, on the ground, war-torn Sierra Leone was at the beginning of a long route to sustainable peace.

Research question

Most research on Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone focuses on its successes and failures. The main objective of this thesis will shy away from these topics. Instead, it will attempt to examine the extent of the current state of peace in Sierra Leone. With this in mind, the study will raise the following question,

1. To what extent has the IBL Liberal Peacebuilding strategy been able to ensure lasting peace in Sierra Leone?

In answering this question, the thesis seeks to specifically examine how the various pillars of the IBL model contributed to the process of Peacebuilding in post-war Sierra Leone. While many claim that Peacebuilding successes are defined by whether the underlining causes that gave rise to the conflict are addressed, the emphasis here will be on the examination of whether the IBL approach has led to durable peace or prevented the likelihood of renewed violence.

Motivation

The author has been inspired and motivated by certain factors to examine the peace building process in Sierra Leone. Firstly, Sierra Leone was one of the first post-conflict countries where a broader mandate of peacebuilding was introduced. The principle of “no exit without strategy” was the overall basis of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, which meant that the operation involved rebuilding and strengthening institutions of governance to ensure that the state was capable of handling the state of affairs when the mandate of the mission ended. The mission mandate among many other things included the maintenance of the ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation and reintegration of combatants, and the building of institutions equipped for democratic governance and a free market economy.¹⁶

Furthermore, Sierra Leone is one of the first countries in which the IBL strategy has contributed to transform a war-torn state into a self-governing democratic and liberal

¹⁶ Roland Paris, *Saving Liberal Peacebuilding*. Farnham [etc.]:2012 Ashgate. -7-8

economy. Since then it has gone through three peaceful and successive presidential and parliamentary elections, three local council elections and a lot of institutional reforms. Despite facing some development challenges, the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, Sierra Leone has been among the fastest growing economies in the world,¹⁷ and has not relapsed into war. Instead, it has gradually moved from the state of building peace to development. Given the factors mentioned above, it is of great interest to both policy makers and researchers to understand the current state of affairs in Sierra Leone and possible lessons of the Peacebuilding approach in post-war Sierra Leone.

Research Method and Procedures

With regard to the research method, this study will primarily use a general inductive approach to analyse the qualitative data to provide evidence that supports the research question. In the inductive approach, the researcher reads vigorously and verifies the raw text data into a “brief and summary format”¹⁸ and link them to the research questions. So, data analysis under this approach is done by multiple reading and interpretation of raw data which in turn guides the researcher in presenting the research findings. Other researchers could come up with different views, but this has no “overlapping components”.¹⁹ With this in mind, the study is used to describe a specific case or event that occurred in Sierra Leone at the end of the ten-year civil war. This study deals with Liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

The focus is after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord in 1999 to the present state of peace the country enjoys. In considering the theoretical framework and analysis for this work, the following will be taken into account; the Liberal Peacebuilding model, its criticism and more especially the IBL model. It will also attempt to discuss the background of the war in Sierra Leone, the different actors involved and various mechanisms employed to achieve the current state of peace in the country.

¹⁷ URL.<http://www.reuters.com/article/leone-imf-gdp-idUSL5N0MV37J2014040>

¹⁸ David R. Thomas "A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative evaluation data." 2006 American journal of evaluation 27.2: 237-246. 238

¹⁹ Ibid., 240

How data was collected and used

The study is built mainly upon document analysis. Document analysis has been used to undertake qualitative research for several years. This method helps in identifying the type of document to use and provides substantive understanding and knowledge about the research topic. According to Bowen “document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents both printed and electronic (computer--based and Internet--transmitted) material and like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge”.²⁰ Documents used in the study may derive from various sources such as institutional reports, books, articles journals, newspapers, and agendas. This method aimed at helping the researcher to organize data collected into themes related to the research question. Bowen further points out that “document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program”.²¹ so it can provide credible information about this study topic.

Therefore, to have credible, genuine and comprehensible information and to answer the research question, books, articles journals, and documents have been analysed. Other sources such as official Sierra Leone government agencies' reports, the UN, ECOWAS and other intergovernmental organisations such as the World Bank, IMF reports have also been used. Book reviews, research papers, and unpublished work are also utilised in this project. Official websites of many local and international organisations have been examined; internet sources have been mostly used since I could not travel to Sierra Leone to collect some of these data by other methods. In this regard, I relied heavily on qualitative data analysis for interpreting the research data.

Organization of Thesis

This thesis has three chapters; it begins with an introduction followed by the research question, motivation, research method and ends with the structure of the thesis. As

²⁰ Glenn A. Bowen "Document analysis as a qualitative research method." 2009 Qualitative research journal 9.2: 27-40. 27

²¹ Ibid., 29

this thesis focuses on Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, in chapter one liberal peace theory and its criticism is highlighted, a conceptual understanding of Peacebuilding is discussed, and the chapter concludes with a theoretical framework upon which the project is analysed.

In chapter two, the study will help us understand the background of the war in Sierra Leone. In this regard, the chapter starts with a short political history of Sierra Leone that led to the polarisation of the country and eventually the outbreak of violence in 1991. After which the Abidjan Peace Agreement as a first attempt of liberal peace will be presented, ending with the Lome Peace Accord of 1999 as the framework for the current peace in Sierra Leone. Chapter three concludes the study with the analysis of which IBL pillars have contributed to the Peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, whether these pillars were able to achieve the liberal objective of peacebuilding, their effectiveness and a conclusion of the current state of peace in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER ONE

1. THEORY

1.1 Liberal Peace Concept of Rebuilding War-shattered Societies

Over the years, many theories have emerged as the best models for conflict transformation. Among the most prominent has been the liberal peace theory, sourced from the democratic peace theory, which states that stable democracies are less likely to go to war with each other and that an extension of democracy will lead to international peace and security.²² The concept of Liberal peace goes back to liberal ideas rooted in the liberal political thought of classical liberals, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant amongst others, that every man is equal, condemn war against liberal states, but go to war against illiberal states.²³ This was explored by classical liberal Immanuel Kant, over 200 years ago, in his essay, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’,²⁴ which asserts that the interaction among Republican states leads to peace since states with a republican form of government are more transparent and accountable to their citizens, hence their commitment to the consent of the voters reduces the chances of engaging in war.²⁵ On the other hand, a non-republican form of government is more likely to be motivated to wage war, putting them in a constant state of aggression with their citizens as they do not require their approval.²⁶

Therefore, focusing on politics as the source of war, Kant calls for the universalization of liberal republicanism to prevent non-republican states from threatening and oppressing their citizens and those of other liberal states. To Kant, the sustainability of peace rests on the willingness of each state to adopt the necessary criteria of a liberal state. This includes respect for the rule of law, upholding the principle of human rights, a

²² Roger Mac Ginty, Warlords and the liberal peace: state-building in Afghanistan, 2010 *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10:4, 577-598, 579

²³ John M. Owen, How liberalism produces democratic peace, 1994 *International security* 19.2: 87-125, 93

²⁴ Jeff Pugh, Democratic Peace Theory: A Review and Evaluation, 2005 CEMPROC Occasional Paper Series. <http://www.cemproc.org/democraticpeaceCWPS.pdf>, -2

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3

²⁶ Michael W. Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace.” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 99, no. 3, 2005, pp. 463–466., www.jstor.org/stable/30038953, 464

separation of power, checks and balances of government functions, economic and social interdependency, and a government by the people and for the people.²⁷ When the government is controlled by liberals, their relations with other liberal states are peaceful, so in an incident of war, liberals prevent the escalation of the war by using their freedom of expression accorded to them by law. On the other hand, illiberals are unable to rally their people to take up arms in the fear that an unpopular war could lead to their downfall.²⁸

This theory received further recognition at the end of World War I under the rubric of Wilsonianism a liberal peace doctrine adopted and promoted by former President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. The theory relied on the central theme that governments based on the approval of the people lead to political stability within states and eventually to international stability and domestic peace, underpinned by the democratisation and marketization of the state. Although his focus was mainly on establishing lasting peace in Europe at the end of World War I, in recent times the strategy has been adopted by many westerners based on the similar belief as a prominent model of building peace in war-torn states.²⁹

This theory, also known today as liberal peacebuilding, became prominent in post-Cold War discourses of western democracies. Linking democracy and peace became a notable political ideology that informs the external relations of western democracies. It has become the foremost strategy to promote peace and security around the world³⁰. The concept of liberal peace has since evolved and been used as a political tool of Western conflict interventionism as the basis for democratic development and the maintenance of peace and stability. These interventions come against the backdrop that democracies do not fight against other democracies. Since the dyads of democracies, such as economic interdependence, transparency, multiparty election and other common grounds for cooperation, prevent their conflict of interest from escalating into full-blown conflict it makes going to war infrequent and less possible for democratic states.³¹ Also economic interdependence has long been linked to peace and stability; political scholars have argued

²⁷ Ibid.- 4

²⁸ John M. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, 1994 *International security* 19.2: 87-125, 89

²⁹ Roland Paris, *At war's End*. Cambridge, U.K: 2004 Cambridge University Press. -40-41

³⁰ ANNA, GEIS et al "From Democratic Peace to Democratic War?" *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 19: 157-163.

³¹ Andres Eduardo Fernandez OSORIO, *Democracies do not fight each other. Why?* (1st ed., p.3). London: 2012 University college London school of Slavonic and East European studies London. Retrieved from http://www.banrepcultural.org/sites/default/files/colf_fernandezosorio_andreseduardo_articulo2.pdf

that when economic interdependence between states is strong they seek to find peaceful solutions to conflict than go to war. It enhances integration and cooperation and tries to avert war.³²

Furthermore, in the work of Liberal peace, researchers like R.J Rommel, maintain that democratic states seek to resolve their social indifferences through cooperation, negotiations, holding of elections, encouraging constructive, rational debate, tolerance and compromises. So influences such as terrorism, rebellion, civil wars, coup d'état and revolution have a more limited impact on democratic states than nondemocratic states.³³ For liberals, the process of building lasting peace in a war-torn society must go through democratisation, economic and political liberation. They see the existence of human rights, a free market economy and development of democratic institutions as an inextricable link to peace and security within any given state.

The main point here is that if the values of liberal peacebuilding were implemented largely in post-conflict societies, there would be a greater chance of economic growth and lasting peace in those countries and at the same time this would allow them to become part of the interdependent global democracy, hence limiting the likelihood of conflict.³⁴ Moreover, the existing liberal economic policies lead to economic interdependence and enhance international cooperation among the states. States see themselves as rational bodies that benefit from cooperation on mutual economic and political problems.³⁵ Therefore, for the international community democracy is highly regarded as the key to addressing the root causes of a conflict and despite the fact its practice in many forms is not flawless, at its highest level it stands as a method for a peaceful settlement of conflict based on mutual trust.³⁶

³²Michiel S. De Vries, Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 4, 1990, pp. 429–444., www.jstor.org/stable/424266,429

³³ Paris, At war's end, *Ibid*, -43

³⁴ Zenonas Tziarras. "Liberal Peace and Peace-Building: Another Critique" *The Globalized World Post 2012* Available at: http://works.bepress.com/zenonas_tziarras/46, P.3

³⁵ *Ibid*. -3

³⁶ Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy* (1st ed.). Cambridge:2012 Cambridge University Press. -4-5

1.2 Critiquing Liberal Peacebuilding

For decades, there has been enormous international support and effort to promote liberal values in countries emerging from war. Liberal values are considered as a fundamental aspect of sustaining peace and enhancing economic growth and development. However, many questions arise as to how the strategy aims to achieve its goals. The critiques of liberal peace theory posit that the theory is in crisis as it has failed to put forward a substantive explanation as to why democracies do not go to war with each other. The Liberal Peace model has also come under severe criticism from the fact that although the model focuses on creating liberal states, rebuilding and building effective government institutions in war-torn societies, it has to some extent been counterproductive as the implementation of the model in war-torn states has led to a renewal of all-out violence or tensions as in Angola and Rwanda.³⁷

In commenting on the liberal peace theory, challengers of the theory have focused on the methodology, assumption and the hegemonic nature upon which the theory is based. In so doing, they have categorised their criticism under two distinct but related perspectives, “Power- base and Idea base critiques.”³⁸ First is the power base critique: this approach argues that liberal peace was a mere extension of western ideology that has relatively no genuine interest in securing peace and stability in countries where it is introduced. This critique focuses its attention on the role of Western powers in determining world economic policies and how these impact the rest of the world. Therefore, the emphasis on implementing free market economy policies in war affected states has in many ways re-ignited the very conditions that cause the war in the first place because such policies only seem to serve the interests of international institutions controlled by Western powers. It further highlights that the liberal peace strategy is aimed at spreading western power by transforming war-torn states and “dysfunctional” societies into cooperative and representative peaceful states. This approach tends to ignore local methods and values in rebuilding war-shattered states.³⁹

³⁷ Paris, *Ibid.*, 151

³⁸ David Chandler, *The Uncritical Critique of "Liberal Peace"*. In S. Campbell, D. Chandler & M. Sabaratnam, *A Liberal Peace? the Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (1st ed., pp. 174-190). London [etc.]: 2011 Zed Books Year -174

³⁹ Chandler, 2011, 174-8

Secondly, the Idea-base critique; the idea base critiques are less concerned about the interests behind Western intervention methods, but instead on the standardisation of the model as key to the international response to post-conflict intervention. They insist that the framework was inadequate for countries emerging from war or failed states. Therefore, focusing on rebuilding or building war-torn states into stable political entities alone cannot resolve the numerous problems faced by post-war countries. They further argued that the effort to universalize the Western model into non-western states who are unprepared for such a challenge and the assumption that democratisation and free market leads to political stability and a better life ignore the pitfalls that the transition itself poses. Both democratization and marketisation call for competition which if not handled properly by a well-functioning state, might exacerbate violence and lead to war.⁴⁰

For critics like David Chandler, the liberal strategy of rebuilding war-torn states, as purported by Western intervention, is merely an ‘empire in denial’. The actual strategy of state-building has failed in restoring the capacity of these states to self-govern and instead leads to the creation of what he called ‘Phantom states’ that depend largely on external support and lack political and social legitimacy.⁴¹ Mark Duffield also adds that the whole concept of rebuilding war-torn states is an instrument of ‘global liberal governance’, where a transnational network of states and not states actors tend to be promoting peace, security, and development, but actually are preserving their own interest by promoting western liberal values⁴²

Furthermore, opponents like Jeffery Herbert claim that restoring peace in many post-conflict states in Africa could be tantamount to establishing a political arrangement that does not reflect the reality on the ground. He is saying that new forms of state authority and political arrangement should come from within the cooperation of the various elements involved in the conflict rather than international intervention to establish the entities through which state most functions.⁴³

Jeremy Weinstein agreed with Herbert’s argument. He argues that a self-sustaining peace, and political and economic development will be possible with less international

⁴⁰ Ibid. P .179-180

⁴¹ David Chandler, *Empire in Denial*. London: 2006 Pluto. -9-24-44

⁴² Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*.2001. London: Zed Books, 12

⁴³ Ibid.,9-24

involvement in ending wars and rebuilding war-torn states.⁴⁴ Liberal peace critic Michael Pugh also concluded that the liberal peacebuilding approach is the strategic tool of powerful western states to spread their values and ideologies in another part of the world, especially in developing countries with the aim to maintain the exploitative nature of the core nations over the periphery.⁴⁵

For critics like Roland Paris, the process of transforming war-torn states into market democracies poses a serious challenge to the very objective of liberalisation. However, rather than rejecting the liberal peacebuilding strategy in totality, he pointed out the weaknesses and failures of the liberal peace approach and proposed a more efficient and proactive approach to the existing liberal peace strategy. While liberal peace campaigners believe that the competition created through democratisation and marketization promotes effectiveness and accountability in both the political and economic stage, they ignored the fact that this will not lead to effectiveness when the existing institutions are weak as in the case of war-torn states.⁴⁶

For Paris, a country undergoing transformation to the market, democracy is vulnerable to five main pathologies. 1) “bad” civil society; 2) opportunistic “ethnic entrepreneurs”; 3) the risk that elections can lead to unhealthy competition; 4) the threats posed by local “saboteurs”⁴⁷ who claim to promote democracy but seek to weaken it. Finally, 5) the challenges that come along with economic liberalisation that threatens internal peace.⁴⁸ These pathologies exist in post-war countries because first liberalisation starts with intense society conflict in place, second war-torn states lack the tradition of resolving conflict peacefully and third there is a lack of effective government institutions capable of containing the risk of liberalisation. Therefore, building stable and strong political institutions is the sure way of overcoming these challenges.⁴⁹ He labelled this approach Institutionalization Before Liberalization, which he further distinguished into six different pillars under which Peacebuilding operations should be carried out in the war-shattered environment:

⁴⁴ Roland Paris, *Saving Liberal Peacebuilding*. Farnham [etc.]: 2012 Ashgate - 343

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 2012, 344

⁴⁶ Paris, *At War's End*, -159

⁴⁷ *Ibid*. -159-166

⁴⁸ *Ibid*. -159-166

⁴⁹ *Ibid*. -159-168

- Wait Until Conditions Are Ripe for Elections
- Design Electoral Systems That Reward Moderation
- Promote Good Civil Society
- Control Hate Speech
- Adopt Conflict-Reducing Economic Policies
- The Common Denominator: Rebuild Effective State Institutions⁵⁰

The IBL strategy aims to improve and enhance more sustainable peacebuilding approaches for achieving durable peace in post-war countries through liberal market democracy. The strategy recommends that peace builders should shift from hastily promoting democracy and a free market economy in post-conflict societies and first focus on “constructing a framework of effective state institutions”.⁵¹ International peacebuilding agencies should prioritise a stable government with functioning institutions necessary to handle the various challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. In other words, international peace builders should focus on priorities of stabilisation and security rather than promote liberal ideas in the first stages of the transition.⁵² However Paris’ understanding of institutions tied to western understanding of democratic institutions and not local ownership has faced a lot criticism on the basis that, the rush to institutionalisation itself poses a serious challenge, including destabilisation of the already weak state structures and encouraging the growth of new spoiler groups.⁵³

1.3 Theoretical Framework

I accept the leading role and prominence of liberal peace theory, meaning that despite several criticisms and few successes of liberal peacebuilding, liberal democratic forms of governance are still the key strategy of international community efforts in transforming war-torn states to self-sustaining peaceful societies. Nevertheless, I believe that rushing the implementation of liberal peacebuilding to a large extent reproduces tensions and possible renewal of violence in failed states and countries emerging from war. Therefore the theoretical emphasis is based on Roland Paris’s six elements of

⁵⁰ Paris, *At war's end*, 156

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 187

⁵² *Ibid.* -187-188

⁵³ Chandra Lekha. Sriram, *Peace as Governance: Power-Sharing, Armed Groups, And Contemporary Peace Negotiations*. 2008. Palgrave MacMillan, 191

Institutionalisation Before Liberalization peacebuilding strategy. This will help structure the research analysis and therefore the meaning will be further explained in the following section;

1.3.1 Wait Until Conditions are Ripe for Election.

From 1989 towards the end of the 1990s, peacebuilding operations considered immediately holding elections in countries emerging from war as a litmus test for determining the first step of transforming war-torn societies into peaceful and democratic states. Competitive elections were widely expected to build the legitimacy of the political system. However, elections do not always lead to a government that adheres to democratic principles; elections sometimes undermine the very objective of peaceful liberal democracy when the elected government begins to engage in activities that result in a major step back in reaching the objective of liberal democracy.⁵⁴

Therefore, the IBL strategy's first pillar is to ensure that elections are held when the conditions that permit free and fair elections and restoration of a legitimised democratic system are present thus reducing the potential of revival of violence. To determine the existence of these suitable conditions for conducting elections depends firstly on whether all parties involved in the war and represented in the election are not promoting hatred and inter-communal violence that could lead to polarisation and future renewal of conflict as they seek to gather support to run and win the election. Elections must be delayed until there is evidence of genuine commitment from all parties to resolve their differences through peaceful means.⁵⁵

It allows time for community hatred towards one another to heal at the same time as international peace builders embark on activities that moderate any risk of violence and promote healthy relations among parties.⁵⁶ A well-equipped and impartial functioning judiciary capable of addressing possible complaints resulting from elections is the second factor that determines the readiness of a post war country to administer elections. Peacebuilders must engage in the building and strengthening of law enforcement agencies,

⁵⁴ Paris, At war's end, -188 -189

⁵⁵ Ibid.,190

⁵⁶ Ibid. -189-190

i.e. court judges, advocates and police force to ensure that every citizen upholds the constitution. In summary, the strategy calls for resisting an early election until the necessary political and institutional elements are in place to foster lasting peace.⁵⁷

1.3.2 Designing Electoral Systems that Reward Moderation

Designing the electoral system is aimed at bringing together former adversaries to participate in a healthy political competition rather than ‘polarising extremes and centrifugal patterns that characterise so many divided societies’⁵⁸. In countries emerging from war, the designing of electoral rules hopes to establish a government in which all the parties involved in the conflict can competitively participate in electing their leaders, and it further gives legitimacy to whatever party might win the election— since it draws its mandate to govern from across all segments of the country.⁵⁹

The designing of the electoral system further aims at creating a government of national unity, i.e. a government that includes every segment of the society in making policies and decisions of National Interest. Therefore, designing electoral laws before conducting elections aims to ensure that whoever wins the election has a significant amount of the vote throughout different parts of the country and should form a government of national unity. So, electoral rules must be designed to ensure cross sectional acceptance of the government that will be in power.⁶⁰

1.3.3 Promote Good Civil Society

Promoting a healthy civil society is a big challenge for both the international community and the civil society themselves. While civil society can promote reconciliation across communities that were engaged in war and bring together grassroots support for parties that preach national unity, societies have also been at the forefront of increasing tensions between formerly war divided communities. A vigorous and robust commitment from the international community is needed for the development of non-partisan national

⁵⁷ Ibid, 190

⁵⁸ Ibid. 190

⁵⁹ Ibid., -191-192

⁶⁰ Ibid. -194

associations that promote activities that enhance lasting peace and liberal market democracy in war-torn states.⁶¹

Before undertaking rush elections, peace builders should provide guidance, financial support and logistics to all civil society organisations creating social, political and economic awareness across the country. Those receiving support groups must be able to meet certain criteria, with the possible dismissal of any member or organisation found wanting or not meeting the set criteria and inciting violence. The aim is reducing possible intensifying conflict effects of political liberalisation at the same time as encouraging the development of civil society groups that promote democracy and cooperation and negotiations among communities. However, peace builders are sometimes faced with the challenge of differentiating between good and bad civil societies as they aim to not be taking a side or supporting any cross-factional association.⁶²

1.3.4 Control Hate Speech

A free and responsible press is vital to the establishment and survival of democracies. It is of more significance to countries in transition to democracy, particularly those emerging from wars, which are struggling with the uncertainties of the transition from war to peace and democratic states. Misinformation, disinformation, spewing out hate messages, lack of expertise, inadequate structures and systems for censoring information, affect the transition from war to democratic peace. It is, therefore, one of the key responsibilities of peace builders to develop a responsible free press in war-torn states that disseminate unbiased information to their audiences and censor or regulate the activities and information sent out from media houses.⁶³

International peace builders should adopt a code of conduct for both the print and electronic media that calls for the dissemination of cogent news and publication of stories that do not lead to violence or hatred toward one another, as well as a well-regulated

⁶¹ Ibid. -194

⁶² Ibid. -195-196

⁶³ Paris, At war's End, -196

license. It is also their responsibility to levy sanctions and in extreme cases revoke the license of anyone found violating the code of conduct or failing to meet certain standards.⁶⁴

The existence of capable institutions to manage possible challenges emerging from the liberalisation of the press is vital for the survival of a free and responsible media. As the peacebuilding operation concludes, it should build or strengthen national institutions such as the court, a council or set a committee during the peacebuilding process capable of taking over responsibilities in making sure media outlets comply with the set code of conduct. The key point of this approach is building the required institutions before press liberalisation manages press freedom during and after the transition to peace.⁶⁵

Early peacebuilding operations financially and technically supported national media outlets to be independent and impartial in their activities but were reluctant in dismissing or shutting down media groups that spread false and malicious information towards a particular group in the country— a right that they have to exercise, especially in war-shattered societies that lack the structures and capacity to carry out such functions. Their reluctance could be based on the fact of maintaining the principle of press freedom and not wanting to set a precedent of clamping down on the media by governments in the future, but not when the principle is misused by inciting hatred across the country.⁶⁶

1.3.5 Adopt Conflict- Reducing Economic Policies

Rapid economic development programs in countries emerging from war tend to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots and leads to further economic deprivation of certain classes in the society, which serves as a major source of conflict. Two major economic models can be implemented in post-conflict countries. Firstly, the Orthodox structural –adjustment model which believes that although the model may have short term severe consequences, in the long run, it will lead to sustainable economic growth and eventually the economic development of the state and its people. So similarly, the IMF and World Bank economic reforms claim that market-oriented policies are the

⁶⁴ Ibid. -198

⁶⁵ Ibid. -198-199

⁶⁶ Ibid., -197

best possible conditions for the sustenance of economic growth in the war-shattered environment.⁶⁷

However, the aforementioned economic approaches can serve as an impediment to building lasting peace in post-war countries as they tend to neglect the various challenges faced by countries just emerging from war. Moreover, the IMF and World Bank conditionality and austerity policies have led to the suppression of economic growth in war-torn states as the prevailing conditions were not ready to promote such policies. For countries where conservative structural adjustment policies were introduced instead of people benefiting from what peace might have brought they tend to suffer from the slow pace of economic growth and poverty.⁶⁸

The IMF and World Bank conditionalities stress good governance; public sector reform of facilities such as education, health and physical infrastructures upon which the growth of the economy lies. With this in mind, both institutions have gone ahead with the implementation of economic policies in war-torn societies similar to other countries that are transforming their economies to free market (capitalist), without taking into consideration the weaknesses or challenges of post-conflict countries.⁶⁹

Therefore, a proper strategy would be to wait until there are important functioning institutions equipped enough to implement successfully such a strategy. These institutions' goals will be extended even when the peace builders shall have left the country. Also by resisting the fast implementation of any of these models or extending it for a longer time can help in designing flexible economic policies that are necessary for countries just emerging from war.⁷⁰

To sum up, implementing comprehensive economic liberalisation in war-torn states should be resisted until the necessary political conditions to monitor and regulate the market economy are in place. Gradual economic reform policies should be implemented rather than implementing everything at the same time. Furthermore, peacebuilders must be ready to apply economic reforms that aim to support and sustain the fragile peace

⁶⁷ Paris, At war's end, -199

⁶⁸ Ibid. -200

⁶⁹ Ibid. -203

⁷⁰ Paris, At war's end, -201-2

particularly in countries where the extreme level of inequality has led to war. High level of income equality consolidates democracy and peace more than low levels. Having learnt from their experiences and criticism, international financial institutions since the early 2000s have prioritised establishing strong political and economic institutions fit enough to carry out economic reforms in war-torn states.⁷¹

1.3.6 The Common Denominator, Rebuilding Effective States Institutions

All of the above mentioned IBL strategies come down to one thing: liberalisation should come after the needed institutions are in place to reduce the challenges that come with it. Promoting a liberal market democracy in failed or collapsed states does not lead to lasting peace, but rather increases violence and renewal of conflict.⁷² Democratisation and marketization depend on strong, effective and efficient national institutions to contain any potential threats resulting from the strategy.⁷³

The existing viable state institutions are key in consolidating democracy and economic growth in post-war countries. These institutions include a constitutional court to address disputes from elections or other sources, and a well trained and equipped police force to enforce the law; also, a body to regulate the activities of the media, a system for the development of good civil society organisations and censoring the behaviour of political parties. Moreover, electoral rules that seek to reward every segment of the society and a legal framework capable of regulating the market economy are all key components of post-war peacebuilding.⁷⁴

The main argument of the IBL strategy is not the order in which peacebuilding operation is being conducted; it focuses on the willingness of donor countries and Peacebuilding organisations to ensure that a stable political system and lasting peace is restored in war-shattered states. Restoring a fully functioning government in war-shattered states requires a longer term commitment and more effective approaches of peacebuilding than what was being practised in the early 1990s.⁷⁵ IBL calls for no time limit on

⁷¹ Ibid., -204

⁷² Ibid. -205

⁷³ Ibid., -205

⁷⁴ Ibid. -205

⁷⁵ Paris, At war's end, -206

peacebuilding operations. It further calls on international peacebuilders to take the lead in nation building and have direct involvement in leading war-torn states to recovery, where there was no functioning central government to restore such a political body or rebuild existing institutions. These responsibilities should be transferred to locally qualified state apparatus and personnel when the time is right.⁷⁶

Peacebuilding should not rely on the claim that, by introducing liberalisation and marketization in a quick way this would lead to self-sustaining peace. The road to transforming war-torn states into a democratic and free market economy should be a gradual process. Hence, implementing IBL strategy in war-torn states is highly considered to achieve lasting peace. Moreover, IBL is not in total denial of the liberal peacebuilding (Wilsonianism) approach to achieving durable peace; instead, it aims at achieving this goal through a more sustainable and reliable mechanism. Therefore, since 1999 many peacebuilding operations from Kosovo to Sierra Leone have adopted this strategy as a reliable approach to consolidate peace in countries emerging from war.⁷⁷

1.4 Conceptualising Peacebuilding

Until the end of the cold war most conflicts had been fought between and among nations and resolving them was limited to UN peacekeeping missions with the mandate of monitoring a ceasefire agreement, creating a buffer zone and using force only in self-defence. This type of peacekeeping commonly known as first generation peacekeeping was to prevent mainly intrastate conflict from escalating, contain the conflict and assist in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict through political means between the states in conflict. Under the UN principle of non-interference, the principle of impartiality, seeking the consent of warring parties and the minimum use of force only in self-defence, is based.⁷⁸

However, with the Cold War coming to an end, new-complex types of conflicts that threatened international peace and stability emerged. These wars were no longer between states, but rather within states, with ordinary civilians directly being targeted and in some

⁷⁶ Ibid. -206-207

⁷⁷ Ibid. -207

⁷⁸ Edward Newman et al, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (1st ed.). Tokyo: 2009 United Nations University Press. -5

cases the state failing to protect its citizens and instead becoming a major perpetrator of untold suffering on its people. Therefore, they require a thorough understanding of the causes of the conflict, those involved in it and how it could be resolved. Unlike the old generation of peace operation, in post-Cold War peacekeeping the aim does not only contain the conflict but goes further to addressing the root causes of the conflict.⁷⁹

With this changing paradigm, it was clear that the UN traditional peacekeeping approach could no longer stand the challenges and threats posed by new conflicts. Therefore, the search for a suitable solution for international peace and stability began. After a series of consultations, a new type of concept of peace operation within the international system was adopted as a strategy of the UN, aimed at helping the transformation of war-torn states from just monitoring ceasefire agreements and establishing buffer zones, to a more multi-task operation. The concept became known as post-conflict peacebuilding. It goes beyond the traditional role of peacekeeping to undertake complex tasks like providing domestic security, humanitarian assistance, development, governance and the rule of law, reflecting the liberal approach of going beyond managing conflicts to building peace within states based on the principle of liberal democracy and market liberalisation.⁸⁰

Namibia, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador to name but a few were the first post-conflict countries where this concept of peace operation was introduced, mandated with a broader responsibility which includes monitoring of ceasefire agreements to as far as involving political, humanitarian and economic aspects.⁸¹

The concept became prominent following the recommendation submitted by the then secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the UN security council on how to strengthen and make the UN more effective in dealing with the growing threat of intrastate conflicts, under the title “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping”⁸². It was in the Agenda for peace that the concept of peacebuilding was

⁷⁹ Ibid., -4

⁸⁰ Ibid., -5

⁸¹ Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of State Building Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations* (1st ed., p. 4). New York: 2009 Routledge. Retrieved from http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134002146_sample_510329.pdf

⁸² *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking.* (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/CHAPTER%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2029>

introduced as part of the UN approach to resolving the new conflicts. The secretary general acknowledged that the existing UN peacekeeping mechanism at that time could not withstand the threat of post-conflict interventions.

He, therefore, called on the organization to, “seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence resulted; where conflict had erupted, to engage in peace-making aimed at resolving the issues that had led to conflict; through peacekeeping. To work to preserve peace where fighting had been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers; to stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts, and to address the deepest causes of conflict.... economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”⁸³

Within the text, it was clear that understanding peace went beyond the termination of war to a broader perspective of addressing underlying structural causes of the conflict. Enhancing economic development and political stability should not rest on the UN’s shoulders alone but also on other international actors like regional organisations, financial institutions, governmental and non-governmental organisations to undertake and promote this strategy to maintain international peace and security.

The concept is, however, faced with many challenges when it comes to fulfilling its objectives, such as maintaining security, enhancing a vibrant civil society, transforming warring groups into competing political parties and the provision of humanitarian assistance among other things.⁸⁴ The concept is further faced with criticism, as the international community in many operations assumes an authoritative role, involving directly in the domestic affairs of the states which can lead to coordination problems.⁸⁵

Also, peace builders in many post-war countries had tended to use a standardised approach or experiences from other peace missions even when such experiences had faced huge criticism in the past. They have failed to take into consideration the context, environment and nature of the newly deployed area and instead many have adopted what

⁸³ Ibid., An agenda for peace.

⁸⁴ Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy* (1st ed.). Cambridge: 2008 Cambridge University Press. -. 6

⁸⁵ Ibid. -7

Autesserre called “one-size-fits-all approach of Peacebuilding” paying less attention to the conflict sources, actors and location.⁸⁶ So despite the relative success of peacebuilding missions around the world, the road to peace has not been a smooth one. Therefore, Peacebuilding must take into account the challenges ahead.

Sierra Leone has gone through a decade of brutal and devastating civil war; the initial implantation of the Lome Peace Accord at the end of the war was formally declared in 2002 and International post-war reconstruction was underway to address the causes of the conflict and prevent its recurrence. The Peacebuilding process included the presence of the largest peacekeeping mission ever deployed heretofore that time with a broader mandate of peace operation supported by huge support from the international community to rebuild Sierra Leone. Today peace continues to reign in Sierra Leone thanks to continuous support from the international community through the Peacebuilding Funds and agencies like the Peacebuilding Commission, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.

⁸⁶ Severine Autesserre, *The Trouble with The Congo* (1st ed.). Cambridge, 2010 Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER TWO

2. BACKGROUND OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

2.1 Political History of Sierra Leone

The Republic of Sierra Leone is found in West Africa, with an area of 71,740 sqm. Surrounded to the north and northeast by Guinea, Liberia to the south and south-east and the Atlantic Ocean to the West, the name Sierra Leone was adopted in 1462 when the Portuguese sailor Pedro de Cintra sailing along the coast of West Africa discovered an area surrounded by hills which he later named ‘Serra Lyoa’ which means Lion Mountains. In 1787 the British occupied the region and in 1808 Sierra Leone became a British colony. It gained independence from Great Britain on 27 April 1961. Sierra Leone like many other former British colonies, after independence adopted a Westminster-style parliamentary democratic system of government⁸⁷ with Sir Milton Margai as the country’s first Prime Minister.

Currently, Sierra Leone has a population close to seven million. Its population is ethnically and culturally diverse with 16 ethnic groups, the Temne and Mende are the biggest ethnic group. Political party politics of Sierra Leone dates back to the colonial period of indirect rule by the British. Since then several political parties with different ideologies have emerged to take the seat of power that directs the politics, economy and development of Sierra Leone but only two have been able to do so, the present ruling All Peoples Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). Both parties have ruled the country since independence and have endured many years of struggle for power in a country still trying to find its feet as a viable liberal democracy.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Abass, Bundu, *Democracy by Force? A Study of International Military Intervention in the Civil War in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000.*, 2001 Upublish.com USA. -19

⁸⁸ The Sad State of Sierra Leone? Political Parties: Sierra. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://slconcordtimes.com/the-sad-state-of-sierra-leones-political-parties>

Independence in 1961 gave way to a prosperous country that went on to enjoy peace and stability. However, with the death of Sir Milton Margai in 1964, a political vacuum was created, and his brother Albert Margai became the new Prime Minister under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). During his leadership, the country became divided on ethnic lines, patronage, corruption and a series of authoritarian tactics,⁸⁹ such as suppression of the press and freedom of speech and a crackdown on opposition.

Then came Siaka Stevens, a leader of the trade union and opposition, All Peoples Congress (APC) party after winning the 1967 elections. The elections were seen as a boost to democratic changes in the continent and Sierra Leone was serving as a leading example to other countries across Africa. However, it lasted only for a short time; just days after the new President took the oath, he was ousted by a coup d'état⁹⁰ led by Brigadier John Lansana, who was later ousted by junior officers, and in 1968 Siaka Stevens was reinstated.⁹¹

After that Siaka Stevens sought various measures to keep himself in power. Under his leadership there was a severe economic meltdown, corruption became pervasive, with co-opting vocal civil society leaders to keep them silent by giving them lucrative government positions. Above all, state security became ineffective as he created a paramilitary force that was responsible for his security.⁹² Continued polarisation of the country led to student demonstrations in 1971; to suppress the protest, Stevens called for early elections. The party was re-elected following intimidation of voters and opposition parties; with a majority in Parliament, he passed the law making Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978.⁹³

The country's economy continued to decline, inflation increased and there was a lack of basic public services. Also, the Judiciary system was solely on the side of the government; education quality fell as teachers were left without pay, ethnic nepotism and detention of anyone daring to criticise the regime were characteristics of the one party

⁸⁹ Denov, Myriam, *The Making and Unmaking of child soldiers in Sierra Leone*, 2010 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -.53

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, -19

⁹¹ Magbaily C. Fyle & Patrick Cyril Foray, *Historical dictionary of Sierra Leone*. Lanham, Md.:2006 Scarecrow Press. xxiii

⁹² *Ibid.* Xlii

⁹³ *Ibid.* Xliii

system. Stevens finally retired and passed on power to his trusted and loyal force Commander Brigadier Joseph Saidu Momoh, who later won a highly contested election in 1985.⁹⁴

Under Momoh's presidency, the economy further crumbled, corruption increased, political patronage and ethnic discrimination continued, suppressing the voices that called for freedom, democracy and dignity. Unemployment was also at a high rate. With the fall of the Soviet Union, IMF conditionalities of democratisation before financial assistance and other internal pressure, the government was forced to call for a review of the national constitution. Hence a new constitution was written and endorsed by the citizens through a referendum. The constitution called for, among other things, multiparty democratic elections.⁹⁵ However, the beginning of the war in 1991 disrupted the plans to go ahead with the adoption of the new constitution.

2.2 Outbreak of the War

In 1991 on May 23 war broke out in Sierra Leone when the Revolutionary United Front launched an attack on the eastern part of the country with little or no resistance. The attack was initially led by a group of Sierra Leoneans who had been trained in Benghazi, Libya, mostly unemployed and Sierra Leonean youths living in Liberia at the time as well as mercenaries from the National Patriotic Front Liberation in Liberia (NPFL) who were loaned to the RUF.⁹⁶ Many Sierra Leoneans living in the capital did not take the war seriously. Likewise, the government was quick to brand them as bandits which the Army was to defeat within days. However, as their number increased and they captured more areas the government shifted the blame of the insurgency as a spillover from the civil war in neighbouring Liberia.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Ibid. xliii

⁹⁵ Magbaily C. Fyle & Patrick Cyril Foray, *Historical dictionary of Sierra Leone*. Lanham, Md.:2006 Scarecrow Press. xxiii

⁹⁶ Ibrahim Abdullah, *Bush Path to Destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone*. 1998 *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(2), 203-235. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x98002766>. -203-235-221

⁹⁷ Ibid. -203

The initial motive for the revolution was to overthrow the corrupt regime of President Momoh and bring back multi-party politics⁹⁸ It received strong support among the youth who were ready to vent their resentment at their hardship and political suppression. Choosing the east part of the country to launch the attack was a very tactical move by the rebels. Firstly, the decision to rebel was very more likely within the ethnic groups in this region who were suffering from a series of government repressions, therefore mobilising unemployed youths to take arms against the weak central government. Secondly, the war in neighbouring Liberia allowed them to use Liberia as a base where they organised and launch an attack just a few meters from the Sierra Leonean border.

As the war progressed the group moved towards the diamond-rich district of Kono, where they concentrated on the control of mining areas to extract resources and use the proceeds to support the rebellion and enrich themselves— something many were deprived of in the past by the corrupt government. The benefit from the mines made the rebellion attractive and eventually prolonged the war.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the group did not abandon their political ambition as claimed by many writers.¹⁰⁰ The rebellion became hostile to communities that accommodated it, as it sought for more areas to control. Furthermore, marginalisation of the youth was a fundamental underlying cause of the war as many of them were unemployed, with a high rate of illiteracy and incapable of making individual decisions or setting up a family.¹⁰¹

Therefore, many youths joined the rebellion to seek self-determination from the patrimonial client relations that existed in their communities. They wanted to have their right and freedom on how they should live in their community and not as a whole decision taken by the community. So, it was not surprising when they joined the war and became destructive and rootless against their people, especially the elites who had repressed them, reflecting many years of local division built up by autocratic rule. The killing of innocent civilians, raping women, forceful abduction, hacking off limbs and destruction of

⁹⁸ Paul Richards, *The Political Economy of Internal conflict in Sierra Leone*. 2003 Netherlands Institute of International Relations Working Paper Series, (21). - 2

⁹⁹ Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and grievance in civil war*. 2004 *Oxford economic papers*, 56(4), 563-595. - 588

¹⁰⁰ Abass Bundu, *Democracy by force? A Study of International Military Intervention in the Civil War in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000*. 2001. Upublish.com USA. -20

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* -21

properties were series of untold suffering committed by the RUF against the civilian population. Hence, this led to the residents deserting the movement.¹⁰²

This situation later undermined their very existence and eventually led to the fall of the RUF as people became tired of their atrocities. Once hailed as a liberator, it became the main perpetrator of violence and increased suffering across the nation. The RUF was not the only faction that brought untold suffering to the people, other factions including state apparatus desired control of the state and its resources.

In 1992 a group of soldiers who called themselves the National Provision Rolling Council (NPRC) returning from the war front, toppled the corrupt and weak government of President Momoh. They claimed that the then APC government was ineffective in defending the state and bringing the war to an end.¹⁰³ The coup was welcome both internationally and locally as they announced to end the war, with some gains already made in that direction; above all, they promised to hand over power to an elected civil government and revive the economy. The group appointed captain Valentin Strasser as the president of the country;¹⁰⁴ at the age of twenty-five, he became the youngest ever president of the Republic of Sierra Leone.

The group's first three years in power showed some promising signs. However, this soon ended when the army started engaging in corruption and misuse of offices. In 1995 infighting within the group led to an internal coup with Captain Valentine Strasser fleeing the country and Major Brigadier Madda Bio resuming power and who later handed over to the democratically elected government of President Tejan Kabbah in 1996.¹⁰⁵

After five years of brutal war that led to the killing of hundreds, displacement of thousands and destruction of the economy, a peace agreement was signed between the rebels and the government in Abidjan in 1996, but this did not end the war. The agreement was hindered by both parties and the war continued and became more ruthless. With the government disbanding the regular national army and unable to defeat the RUF, it turned to foreign forces and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) locally known as the Kamajors. The

¹⁰² Ibid. -224

¹⁰³ Ibid. -20

¹⁰⁴ Abass Bundu, Democracy by force? -20

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. -20

CDF became more active and popular as the government provided them with huge support and other privileges over the regular army. With the RUF advancing in the main cities, the national army seized power in a coup d'état in 1997, led by a small group of disgruntled soldiers. The group formed an alliance with the RUF and became known as the Arm Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).¹⁰⁶ Their rule and the period that followed the war was characterised as the “darkest chapters” in the country’s history since independence.¹⁰⁷

Across the nation, brutality was carried out against defenceless civilians. The group rule lasted for nine months when foreign fighters, mainly Nigerians drove them away and reinstated the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah in 1998. The government responded by heavily clamping down on all those it alleged of being behind the coup, and treason sentences were handed out leading to the execution of 24 members of the army. This event aggravated the RUF and resulted in increased violence with the capital city captured on January 6, 1999, causing hundreds of dead, thousands of children abducted and destroying millions of properties.¹⁰⁸

With the assistance of the Nigeria led Forces of the Economic Community Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and other private security forces like Executive Outcome (EO) and Saline International from the UK, the rebels were kicked out of the capital. Diamonds were also critical in exacerbating the conflict. All warring parties, including the various governments, fought for control over diamonds and smuggled them illegally. Diamond proceeds became vital to all the warring factions.¹⁰⁹ However not downplaying the attractiveness of the diamonds, all parties had a political agenda which they propagated during the signing of the Lome Peace Accord.

With the reinstatement of the elected government and the AFRC out the capital, consultative conferences for peace were held by the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights.¹¹⁰ Civil society groups, such as women movements and religious leaders continued to call for a return to democratic rule and pressurised the government and the RUF to come to the negotiation table. On April 17 a ceasefire agreement was

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.-23

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. -24

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. -25

¹⁰⁹ David Keen, *Conflict & collusion in Sierra Leone*. Oxford [England]: 2005 James Currey. -50

¹¹⁰ Magbaily C. Fyle & Patrick Cyril Foray, *Historical dictionary of Sierra Leone*. Lanham, -XXV

signed by the main warring parties, in the Togolese Capital Lome, followed by the signing of what became known as the Lome Peace Accord on the 7th of July 1999, bringing an end to the war on paper, even though on the ground peace was elusive.¹¹¹

2.3 The Abidjan Peace Accord: First Attempt of Liberal Peacebuilding

After the coup in 1992, the military leaders in a bid to keep their promise of ending the war provided support and boosted the morale of the soldiers on the frontline. The RUF suffered heavy casualties as the soldiers opted for a similar guerrilla strategy of the RUF and chased the group into their hideout in the forest. By 1993 the RUF was on the verge of being defeated. The group was incapable of launching direct attacks, but engaged in hit and run tactics throughout 1994 and 1995 leaving the NPRC government to claim victory, saying the RUF had been wiped-out with only a few ‘bandits remaining.’¹¹² Like its predecessor, the government underestimated the capacity and determination of the RUF to regroup. Towards the middle of 1995, the RUF launched sporadic attacks causing mayhem for vulnerable citizens. The government under serious pressure to stop the aggression turned to foreign forces and mercenaries. A UK based private security company mainly of former Gurkha Soldiers was hired, but the company left Sierra Leone after its commander, and twenty soldiers were killed during a reconnaissance mission by the RUF. So the government turned to another private security firm from South Africa called the Executive Outcome.¹¹³ In a joint operation of the government and EO, the rebels suffered serious setbacks which led the rebels choosing the path of peace rather than military which was likely to lead to their defeat.¹¹⁴

The desire for peace was also shown by the new democratically elected government of President Tijen Kabbah as well as the international community as it pressured the government to accelerate the peace talks before donor assistance for post-war reconstructions could be released.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Paul Richards, The political economy of internal conflict in Sierra Leone. 2003 Netherlands Institute of International Relations Working Paper Series, (21) -15

¹¹³ Ibid. -16

¹¹⁴ Julius Mutwol, Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa. Amherst, N.Y.2009, Cambria Press, P.219

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 219

In the negotiations that followed, elections were to be held before the peace agreement despite the RUF insisting on peace before elections. The peace broker (the international community) was in total support of elections before peace, which meant excluding a major faction in the war, the RUF from participating in the political arena, and demonstrating how proponents of liberal peace viewed elections as a means to an end in war-torn countries. The first official encounter of the peace negotiation was on February 25, 1996, just days before the elections. During the four days of talks, the RUF leadership made it clear that they would not accept the election results and were not ready to cooperate with the would-be civilian government. It threatened the continuation of hostilities if the elected government was sworn in.¹¹⁶

The civilian government was, however, sworn into office. President Kabbah was quick to extend his hands to Foday Sankoh the leader of the RUF to bring the war to an end. So, in May 1996 talk resumed in the Ivorian Capital in a bid to draw a comprehensive peace plan; it failed as the RUF stood by its initial refusal of the election results. However, with international pressure and the threat of sanctions against the RUF among other things, on the 30 of November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between the government and the RUF.¹¹⁷ The agreement included cessation of violence, the transformation of the RUF into a political party, Amnesty for all RUF members, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants, reformation of the army and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Sierra Leone.¹¹⁸

The peace agreement did not end the war; many of the field commanders did not agree with the deal because they were not sure of any provision made in the accord about what become of them when they eventually laid down their arms¹¹⁹. Within weeks of the signing of the peace accord, fighting resumed as both sides were involved in bridging the peace deal which was further worsened by the failure of the external peace guarantors to support its implementation effectively. Reflecting the failure of liberal attempts to hasten peacebuilding in countries emerging from war, the international community did little to

¹¹⁶ Lansana, Gberie First stages on the road to peace: The Abidjan process (1995-96). In L. David, Paying the price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process (1st ed., pp. 18 -25). 2000, London: Conciliation Resources. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/downloads/09_Sierra_Leone.pdf. P.21

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 22-23

¹¹⁸ Julius Mutwol, 2009. -220

¹¹⁹ Ibrahim Abdullah, 1998 -227

ensure that the peace agreement was consolidated and instead wanted direct involvement in the process.¹²⁰

The international community was more interested in holding an election, ignoring the political ambition of the RUF. The deal failed as most of the rural areas were under the control of the rebels. More importantly, there were no effective institutions capable of implementing the agreement, and international actors were quick to reduce their support for the peace process. It was not a surprise that after the peace deal the RUF engaged in more hostile activities, raping children and women, chopping the limbs of many they accused of voting for government and abducting boys and girls. It was a sign of protest and a warning to future peace brokers that their participation must be recognised fully.

2.4 The 1999 Lome Peace Agreement: The Framework for Liberal Peacebuilding

The agreement although seen as an extension of the previous 1996 Abidjan peace accord, was the result of the atrocities that follow this period and that of January 6, 1999, invasion of the capital city Freetown by a section of the army, the RUF alliance. The invasion lasted for six weeks and cost a lot of lives and destroyed thousands of properties. Their actions left the country divided with a decline in public support for the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces and their role in the conflict. Moreover, the fear of the rebels taking over the capital city again forced the government to negotiate for peace. Also, there was international willingness to bring the war to an end as it did not want to see a rebel movement overthrow a democratically elected government.¹²¹

The government was pressured to come to the negotiating table with the factions of the conflict to reach a peace agreement.¹²² There was also a growing concern for the withdrawing of Nigerian troops for whom the war claimed about 800 of their peacekeepers and cost approximately one million dollars per day to maintain them in Sierra Leone. With

¹²⁰ Paul Richards, 2003.-17

¹²¹ Ismail Rashid, The Lome peace Negotiations. In L. David, *Paying the Price* (1st ed., p. 26) 2000 London: Conciliation Resources, Retrieved. http://www.cr.org/downloads/09_Sierra%20Leone_2000_ENG_F.pdf.-26

¹²² *Ibid.*, -26

little or no support from another regional leader, negotiation was the best option for the government.¹²³

At this stage of the war, it was clear that the conflict had reached a military stalemate, where no single party was assured of outright victory. Also on the part of the rebels, their invasion of the capital did not receive public support, their leader was in Nigeria and the alliance was deteriorating. Therefore, the rebel groups opted for negotiation as it presented them with the opportunity of power sharing and amnesty for its leaders against war crimes¹²⁴. Given these factors, all parties to the conflict had no choice but to enter negotiations which ended with the signing of the Lome Peace Accord on July 7, 1999.

During the pre-negotiation period, while a military solution continued, on the ground various organisations and individuals were working to rebuild the gaps that were not attained after the Abidjan peace accord in 1996. Secret meetings were held regularly between the president and the rebel leader. Furthermore, generals, foreign diplomats, ministers, parliamentarians and civil society leaders held straight meetings with Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader, encouraging him to convince his men to end the war.¹²⁵ Several meetings were also held abroad in the Ivorian capital Abidjan between the United Nations envoy and the rebels on the need to resolve the conflict through dialogue. Initially, there was disagreement over the venue of the negotiation, the rebels wanted Burkina Faso or Ivory Coast, but the government rejected these based on the fact that these two countries were supporting and sympathising with the rebel movement.¹²⁶

With the region divided over how the conflict could be resolved, the Togolese president who was chairing ECOWAS at the time opted to host the committees for the negotiations. The Togolese government guaranteed the RUF's safety and accommodation in Togo as well as quickly returning to Sierra Leone. Under the pre-agreement, the UN transported the RUF leader and his Commanders to Togo and back to Sierra Leone.¹²⁷

¹²³ Pham, J. P. (2005). *Democracy by Force-: Lessons from the Restoration of the State in Sierra Leone*. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 6, 129.P.135

¹²⁴ Ismail Rashid,2000.-28

¹²⁵ Ibid, 28

¹²⁶ Ibid., 29

¹²⁷ Ibid 29

The consultation meeting started on April 25; it took longer than expected. The RUF used part of the time to sell its position and be sympathised internationally and back home in Sierra Leone. The AFRC-RUF prepared a document of fifty-nine pages called 'Lasting peace in Sierra Leone: The RUF-SL perspective and vision'. The proposal called for the release of all prisoners, a transitional power-sharing government before the election in four years, acknowledgement of their control in some parts of the country, integration into the new Sierra Leone army, withdrawal of ECOMOG forces from Sierra Leone and the establishment of a peacekeeping force.¹²⁸ The government, on the other hand, had consultation meetings back in Sierra Leone with conferences held in various major cities in the country, bringing together parliamentarians, paramount chiefs, political parties, women's groups, professional associations, students and trade unions to come up with a comprehensive proposal for the peace process.¹²⁹

The Togolese Foreign Minister Koffigol presided over the negotiation. Other representatives included the UN envoy Okelo, Adwoa Cole from the OAU now the AU, Lansana Kouyate ECOWAS executive secretary and diplomats from the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone and Libya. American and UK diplomats were also active in the negotiations part of the international team. Also, there was an inter-religious council and other civil society groups from Sierra Leone. The US government founded the negotiation. After three days of deliberation, the committee was able to bring out a flexible agreement structure for all parties involved.¹³⁰

According to the agreement the leader of the RUF was to become the country's vice president and chairman of the board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources. The rebels were promised amnesty for war crimes committed from the beginning of the war up to the signing of the 1999 peace deal in Lome. The agreement was adhered to by the two parties and international actors like the UN to see the full implementation of the agreement.¹³¹ The agreement further proposed other measures in relation to governance, politics, humanitarian socio- economic and military and security

¹²⁸ Ibid 29

¹²⁹ Rashid, I. (2000). P. 30

¹³⁰ Ibid. P. 30

¹³¹ Pham, J. P. (2005). P.135

issues. The agreement was to be implemented under four important commissions or committees.¹³²

Firstly, the Joint Implementation Committee, according to the agreement was to assess how far the peace accord was being applied. It was headed by ECOWAS and included regional diplomats, moral guarantors of the agreement i.e. Togo, the UN, OAU and the Commonwealth and members of other commissions.¹³³ Despite the challenges faced by the committee, it was able to oversee the transformation of ECOMONG into the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Sankoh was appointed Chairman for the Commission on Mineral Resources and the RUF group transformed into a political party under the government of national unity and was given a ministry position and diplomatic mission appointments.¹³⁴

Secondly, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace; from the agreement, it was clear that the major actor in the conflict was left out as the AFRC –RUF alliance deteriorated. To compensate the AFRC, its leader Johnny Paul Koroma was appointed as chairman of this commission. Under the peace agreement, the commission was responsible for monitoring and supervising the implementation peace process on the ground as well as all other committees and commissions established through the Lome peace agreement. The commission was to ensure that all the other commissions have the necessary funding needed to carry out their responsibilities. It was also intended to care for the victims of the war and oversee the repatriation process.¹³⁵

Although initially the commission received less political and financial support, it soon became popular as it focused on confidence building at the level of society as the surest means to maintain the peace process. The commission received huge support as it organised confidence and trust building conferences across the country with participants from warring factions, which encouraged voluntary disarmament.¹³⁶

¹³² J. S. Omotola, *The Sierra Leone Lomé Peace Accord. conflict trends*, 2007, 1(3), 38-43), p.40

¹³³ Denies Bright, *Implementing the Lome Peace Agreement*. In D. Lord, *Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process* (1st ed., pp. 36-40), 2000, London: Conciliation Resources. Retrieved from <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/implementing-lom%C3%A9-peace-agreement>. P.35

¹³⁴ Bright Denis, 2000 P. 36

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 36

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* 36

The Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and development. Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader, headed this commission based on the Lome peace agreement. The Commission was to adopt a new approach to the exploitation of minerals in the country and use the proceeds from them for the reconstruction and development of the post-war state. It, however, was faced with contention over its role. The commission was not able to fulfil its responsibilities and Sankoh continued to support his men based on the proceeds.¹³⁷

Lastly the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. The commission was to supervise and monitor the disarmament of all factions, demobilise them and reintegrate them into their societies. A total of 72,490 combatants were disarmed and 71,043 demobilised, and 63,545 former fighters participated in the reintegration segment, including 6,845 child soldiers.¹³⁸ The search for peace in Sierra Leone heavily rested on the implementation of the agreement. Despite the challenges faced by various commissions in carrying out their responsibility in the first two years of the agreement, in 2002 the country celebrated the end of the ten year brutal civil war. The accord became the framework for implementing peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

Today although the country is faced with challenges of a weak and post-conflict state, since the signing of the Lome peace accord Sierra Leone has made remarkable progress. The state has gone successfully through its peacebuilding process to the development phase. It has established strong public institutions, well-trained and respected military force and police. Investors are now confident to invest in the country; with a lot of foreign direct investment the country's economy has been among the fastest growing in the region.

¹³⁷ Ibid.P.37

¹³⁸ Christiana Solomon, & Ginifer, Jeremy Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone. Centre for International Cooperation and Security. 2008.http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4024~v~Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf

CHAPTER THREE

3 ANALYSIS

3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding

International intervention in post-war countries throughout the 1990s were channeled through liberal peacebuilding, with the focus on ensuring multi-party democracy and a free market economy with the objective of addressing the structural root causes of a conflict. Within the UN system, a leading agent of liberal peace, peacebuilding has come to mean going beyond the ending of the war, to engaging in activities that promote good governance, lasting peace and economic recovery after a long, devastating spell of violence. However, there is no particular standard. Hence many peacebuilding initiatives have faced series of obstacles and in turn failed or in some cases contribute to renewal of violence. With this in mind, an ardent critic of Liberal peace, Roland Paris, coined the IBL strategy not as an alternative but as a complement to the liberal peacebuilding approach. Building peace through the LBI strategy played a critical role by making a decisive break with the country's past.

Its impact has been key to the current democratic and peaceful atmosphere that Sierra Leone enjoys. Although the strategy faces hiccups, it has proven that it is a model peacebuilding can adopt. First under the political system, the delaying of elections for the inclusion of all parties created a sense of satisfaction across adversarial communities and it has since been able to maintain a cycle of competitive democratic elections. Secondly, the LBI model did not just put the guns to silence, but it has gone further to consolidate the hard-earned peace and avert a slide back towards violence. Thirdly, through conflict reducing economic policies the country's economy grew at a faster rate and stood slightly above 11% growth before the outbreak of the Ebola virus. Pundits had even projected a 13% GDP growth in the second half of 2014 when Ebola struck. The growth in the economy also inspired strong investment, especially Foreign Direct Investment which

encouraged the government to adopt standards for international financial programs. Finally, the LBI strength lies in long-term peacebuilding commitment and continued engagement with key public institutions, the media and civil society in providing sustainable development.

3.2 The Pillars

From my theoretical framework, I have been able to examine how the six IBL pillars have been able to achieve lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The sections below will analyse the extent of these pillars in maintaining peace and democracy in Sierra Leone.

3.2.1 Wait Until Conditions Are Ripe for Elections

The importance of elections is meant to legitimise the representation process. “Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, inescapable sine qua non”¹³⁹ In today’s politics most political systems tend to use elections as a facade to lend credence and legitimacy to their regime’s hold on power. It is also seen as a viable means by which change and continuity are fostered in societies. Given the end of the Cold War and ensuing success of liberal variant democracy, more societies embraced the tenets of the dominant system that had relied on elections as a component change to democratic rule. Africa, a continent where many states had espoused the one party system of government, was soon affected by the wind of change.

However, many countries found the transition from autocracy to democracy a tedious challenge to overcome. Eventually, some made it through, but others were unfortunate to escape open conflict and war. For those states emerging from conflicts, it became a norm for holding elections to help consolidate democracy and sustain the fragile peace. Also, other stakeholders including Western countries came to perceive elections as an entry point or a viable approach to peace and democratisation in collapsed states.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. London; Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Pr., 1993. Print 8-7

¹⁴⁰ Mayrina Ottaway, *Rebuilding state Institutions in Collapsed States*. *Development and change*, 2002 33(5), 1001-1023. P. 100-104

However, while elections have aided democratic transitions and have served to create the enabling environment for sustainable peace for post-war countries, they have also provided the pretext for the kindling of conflict or its re-ignition for post-conflict countries. Some analysts have, however, argued that a key reason for elections not serving their intended purpose stems from the fact that they are often hurriedly held amidst conditions not too conducive to their hosting. While this is true in some instances, I am more inclined to believe that it is rather the lethargically and half-hearted support by the international community to countries on the brink or emerging from conflict that has been more than responsible for (re) ignition of violence. Also “donors have considered transitional elections as a single event, without focusing on the elements that may help sustain the cycle”.¹⁴¹

Such lukewarm attitude has mostly been based on the assumption that elections were ends in themselves rather than means. As a result, post-conflict states that were expected to be nurtured through the peacebuilding process were abandoned and immediately returned to violence after elections. Therefore, the IBL strategy’s first element is to create an enabling environment for the holding of free and fair elections and restore democratic systems, thus surmounting the challenges that post-conflict countries often encounter in their struggles to conduct the post-war election and recover from the challenges of post-war.¹⁴²

As is the case with many post-conflict countries, Sierra Leone was not in a position to undertake post-conflict elections alone. It sought help in the form of the UN, while the UN did not involve directly in organising and conducting elections as it did in Cambodia in 1993. Through its mission in Sierra Leone it provided electoral assistance during the 2002 and 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The UN and other stakeholder involvement in the 2002 elections was crucial in ensuring the 1999 Lome Peace Accords held. Unlike the 1996 elections which were conducted in a hasty manner and violence returned as explained below, in the 2002 elections, the international community was very much aware of the insufficient capacity of the government institutions to conduct such an election. As such the UN peacekeeping

¹⁴¹ Marina Ottaway, 2002-2

¹⁴² Roland Paris, 2004-188

mission including other core issues was to “Provide support, as requested, to the elections which were to be held in line with the Constitution of Sierra Leone.”¹⁴³ With the fragile government lacking control over some parts of the country, poor road network, fear and insecurity in certain communities, it was certainly clear that the UN role would be decisive if eligible citizens were to participate and accept the first post-conflict elections outcome. With this in mind, the UN adopted Resolution 1389 in conjunction with Paragraph 8 of the 1999 resolution 1270 to undertake the following roles to support and assist the election process.¹⁴⁴

(a) Assisting with logistical support to the National Electoral Commission for the transport of electoral materials and personnel, including the use of the air assets of UNAMSIL to reach areas inaccessible by road. The storage and distribution of election materials before the elections, the movement of ballot papers after the elections, logistic assistance to international election observers, and the use of the civilian communications facilities of UNAMSIL in the provinces; all helped in giving credence to the electoral process.

(b) Facilitating the free movement of people, goods and humanitarian assistance throughout the country;

(c) The provision of wider security and deterrence, through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, throughout the period of preparation for the elections, the polling period itself, and the period immediately after the announcement of the election results. Exceptionally be prepared to respond to situations of public disorder, with the Sierra Leone police taking the lead, especially in the vicinity of polling stations and the locations of other related activities.”¹⁴⁵ It further calls on the mission to train, advise and support the Sierra Leone police force on election-related matters.¹⁴⁶

UNAMSIL presence was all over the country from the primary process of voter registration to polling day, something which gave credibility to election results. The UN

¹⁴³United Nation Security Council Resolution 1270

¹⁴⁴ documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/215/96/PDF/N0221596.pdf -2

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1389. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1389

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. P.2-3

performed similar roles during the 2007 elections. Also, other UN agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental peacebuilding agencies like National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFFES) and local organisations like Campaign for Good Governance provided support to the National Election Commission to ensure a peaceful outcome of the election. Their roles were significant in filling in the gaps that the 1996 elections could not.

The 1996 Elections: The problem, however, with the 1996 elections in Sierra Leone was that though the politicians in Freetown, supported by the International Community, had accepted to host elections, the rebel movement was left out of the political equation. That was an exceptional political blunder on the part of the politicians and the peace brokers. They failed to recognise the enormous power the RUF possessed through the use of force. This group compelled the then one-party regime to move from one party dictatorship to political pluralism. It was as a result of the RUF invasion that the army once unarmed found itself equipped enough to overthrow a system that had held sole political domination over the country for 23 years.

Leaving out such an important movement, which had both political intentions and a clear agenda, was a blunder that came to haunt Sierra Leone. The dissatisfaction of the rebels was expressed in several ways during and after the inception of a civilian regime that they had not participated in electing. They were hence quick to lend their support to the May 1997 Military Coup plotters of the Arm Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which for the first time gave them recognition and included them in the running of the state affairs. In 1997, the country was once more thrown into renewed violence as the rebel forces joined the national army to rule. The co-operation remained so until the Lome peace accord in 1999.

The administration and management of elections in Sierra Leone are currently in the hands of two bodies; the Independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) all established after the war. The electoral body in Sierra Leone in its early days of post independence was very successful in conducting free and fair elections. It, however, lost its credibility and public confidence in the 1970s and 1986 election as the body was highly influenced by the incumbent regimes, with many elections organised during this time fraudulent and not free and fair

and full of intimidation.¹⁴⁷ After a series of negotiations, the first multi-party democratic election took place in 1996 conducted by an Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) created in 1994. The elections, however, did not end the war. To enhance the election's credibility, a new National Electoral Commission (NEC) was established in 2000 and two years later through an Act of Parliament received details of its functions and structure replacing INEC.¹⁴⁸

Sierra Leone emerged from a decade civil war with several governance and development challenges attributed to the war and an extended period of autocracy. Surmounting such challenges would require a democratic space and an environment that would allow all stakeholders and political actors the window of opportunity to express and exercise their rights. With the lesson learnt from the previous election, before the 2002 elections, certain key elements were considered for the timing of the elections. Firstly, to ensure that the state with support from the international community guarantees the peaceful conduct of elections in a competitive, transparent, free and fair manner, enhances the capacity of national institutions responsible for resolving any complaints arising from the elections and ensures that all warring parties were involved in the election process.¹⁴⁹ Even though the first term of government ended in March 2001, many NGOS and political parties were in favour of delaying the elections. Elections were delayed for one year to give time for the disarmament of ex-combatants and properly prepare for elections.¹⁵⁰

The 2002 elections granted the opportunity to all parties including the RUF to form political parties to contest elections slated for that year. The preparations ahead of the 2002 elections took into consideration full-scale disarmament and registration of voters across the country, which had not been the case in 1996 as the presence of the rebels in areas beyond government control automatically, disenfranchised some people. The RUF Party and the People's Liberation Party (PLP) of the former AFRC were allowed to transform themselves into political parties, though they did not in any way create a significant impact on those elections. They were subdued by the democratic voice of the people, limited by

¹⁴⁷ Mohamed N Conteh, *The Electoral Commission and the Management of Sierra Leone's Electoral Process: An Introduction*. 2013 Sierra Leone. February.-.25-26

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, -.29

¹⁴⁹ Samauel Atuobi *Peace Support Operations and Post-Conflict Elections: The Case of Sierra Leone*.2009, *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Monograph*, .P.5

¹⁵⁰ David Harris, *Post-conflict elections or post-elections conflict: Sierra Leone 2002 and patterns of voting in Sub-Saharan Africa*. 2004 *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, (5/6), 39-49, P.47

the complete disarmament of their troops and the insistence and commitment of the international community to the pursuit of peace and democracy. “Consolidating democracy involves electoral events which follow each other: if stability is maintained, elections will become cyclical; other types of elections will be held.”¹⁵¹ Sierra Leone has been on this track since its first post conflict elections in 2002.

The 2002 elections thus created the enabling atmosphere and provided the bedrock for sustainable peace and adequate space for the growth of democracy. Since then, there have been various successful elections at both national and local level. These elections have transformed Sierra Leone’s democracy from fledgling to a robust and mature one. In fact, the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections were a total upset as the opposition succeeded in winning both elections. The 2004 local government election was a means to widen the democratic space further to devolve power to local entities. Today, local government elections are viewed by districts and municipal entities as a means of allowing greater participation in the day to day running of the affairs of the state, which they have had no stake in since 1977.

In 2012, Sierra Leoneans went to the polls for the third time after the long, brutal civil war. The elections showcased another milestone in the transformation to a well-functioning post-conflict democracy. At this time, the country’s National Election Commission solely organised and conducted the elections. The elections were considered both by local and international observers highly transparent and well managed. With the new Biometric system of voting, over 87% of voters turned out in a complex election consisting of presidential, parliamentary and local elections conducted on the same day.¹⁵²

Today in Sierra Leone the ballot box has silenced the gun and the bullet as means to gained power by all costs. Successive elections in Sierra Leone since the end of the war, though having met with a few skirmishes, have been a strong pillar in consolidating, democracy and sustaining the hard-won peace in the country. Elections, instead of leading to relapse or violence in the country, have served as a peaceful alternative to war for contesting the leadership of the country through effective existing national institutions.

¹⁵¹ Vidar Helgesen Elections are no quick fix in post-conflict countries. Editorial 2007, http://www.idea.int/news/editorial_apr07.cfm?css=new2013-2

¹⁵² The Carter Center. <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sierra-leone-112412.html>

3.2.2 Designing Electoral System that Rewards Moderation

The rules that govern and guide transparent, free and fair elections are crucial to ensuring democracy and peace in post-war countries and those transiting from non-democracy to democracy. Electoral systems are used to promote a series of peacebuilding key objectives like making sure minority groups are represented, citizen participation and satisfaction and providing a less complicated electoral process to administer in post-war countries to consolidate the fragile peace.¹⁵³ At the same time, provide the pretext for division of society, increase in tension and renewal of violence as seen in many post-conflict elections. Choosing an electoral system is a significant part of building a democracy, it has a great impact on how politics will be run in the future for a particular country. Designing of the electoral system is common nowadays in post-war countries by considering the history, economic, cultural and political context of a particular country.¹⁵⁴

Electoral systems refer to a system used to ‘translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates’.¹⁵⁵ It involves the various formulas used to calculate the result of the election assigned to individuals or parties. Deliberately designing an electoral system in war-torn Sierra Leone became a priority for peace builders when organising and conducting elections. As experienced from other post-conflict elections like those in Sierra Leone in 1996, there was a divisive element in the multi-party politics in societies highly divided along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. Although the Sierra Leonean war was not directly a result on any of these divisions, the political landscape in Sierra Leone, especially when it comes to elections has a long history of ethnic sentiment and division. To this end, designing electoral laws or systems that mitigate such division was critical to holding peaceful democratic elections in Sierra Leone after the Lome Peace Accord. Several types of elections are conducted in Sierra Leone, but nationally there are five key elections.

¹⁵³ Tobias Von Gienanth, *Elections in Post-Conflict Countries – Lessons Learned from Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Kosovo* (1st ed.). 2008 Report of a ZIF/KAIPTC Seminar, June 12–14 Accra. Ghaba. Retrieved from http://www.zifberlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Report_Elections_in_Post-Conflict_Countries_2009.pdf -.

¹⁵⁴ Andrew Reynolds et al, *Electoral System Design: 2008 The New International IDEA Handbook*. https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/esd_english_0.pdf-1

¹⁵⁵ Andrew Reynolds et al, 2008-.7

Firstly, presidential elections are held every five years. During this election, the president and the vice president are chosen directly by voters. A registered political party must nominate the candidacy for the presidency and be eligible as a member of parliament. Secondly, the Parliamentary elections are based on a simple majority, wherein the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a constituency is declared the winner. Each candidate is nominated by a political party which he or she represents for each constituency. However, an independent candidate can also contest a seat in parliament and serve for a two-term period of five years each.¹⁵⁶

Paramount Chiefs and Members of Parliament elections, the currently legislative branch of Sierra Leone are composed of 124 seats or members where 112 of these seats are filled by direct election of the representatives while the remaining 12 are occupied by paramount chiefs from the 12 provincial districts of Sierra Leone. The Paramount Chiefs to parliament are elected indirectly by members of an electoral college called chiefdom councillors who in turn are selected by taxpayers in each chiefdom with the mandate to elect paramount chiefs. Also, there is a local council election held every four years to elect heads and councillors of municipalities, cities, wards and local councils as well as bye-elections and referendums. Recently, paramount chieftaincy elections have been conducted to elect traditional leaders of the chiefdoms.¹⁵⁷

Sierra Leone like her colonial master, since independence, has been practising one of the oldest and simplest electoral systems— the Majoritarian election system. It is a system where the candidates with the most votes, but not necessarily the overall majority, becomes the winner or the candidate with the absolute majority of votes (50 plus) is declared the winner.¹⁵⁸ Presidential elections use the two round system and first past the post system is used for parliamentary elections. In the plurality system, the aim is to ensure that the leading party has enough seats to form an efficiently functioning government. Under this system effective governance rather than inclusion of all sides is the focus and Round off aims to allow cross-national alliances in the running of the government.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Mohamed N Conteh, 2013-70

¹⁵⁷ Mohamed N Conteh, 2013-71

¹⁵⁸ Pippa Norris, Choosing electoral systems: proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems. *International political science review*, 1997 18(3), 297-312, P. 2

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*-3

In 1996 and 2002 the country used Proportional Representation and District Block Representation System for its parliamentary elections. Proportional Representation is a system that intends to deliberately transform a ‘party’s share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the legislature.’¹⁶⁰ This means in the PR systems, political parties are allocated seats in the legislature according to their overall proportion of national votes.¹⁶¹ It also means the entire country can be used as a single district as was the case with the 1996 general elections in Sierra Leone. This system was used mainly because, at the time of the elections in 1996, the then electoral body could not come up with a clear distinction of constituencies due to internally displaced people and insecurity in certain parts of the country controlled by the RUF.¹⁶²

During the elections, political parties submitted a list of preferred parliamentary candidates to the voters who in turn voted for a party and not individuals. Moreover, a party needed a threshold of 5 percent of the national votes before occupying seats in the parliament.¹⁶³ According to the 2002 amendment of section 38 of the 1991 constitution, where there is no demarcation of constituencies, the president with advice from the national electoral body can direct the use of the District Block Representation System. In the 2002 parliamentary election, the DBR system was used with the 14 districts in the country being considered as a constituency. A block of eight seats in each constituency was to be contested by all the Political parties. A Party gained a seat based on the proportional distribution of total district votes. With the threshold at 12.5%, any party that could not meet this amount of valid votes was unable to have a seat in parliament.¹⁶⁴ Like the 1996 elections, the DBR system was used as a result of instability to carry out boundary delimitation to distribute the population into constituencies.¹⁶⁵

With funding, equipment and training support provided by the international community coupled with the return of internally displaced persons and most refugees and electoral reforms that undertook the boundary delimitation and eventually demarcation of new constituencies, Sierra Leone reproduced the FPTPS for electing parliamentarians and

¹⁶⁰ Andrew Reynolds et al,2008 -.57

¹⁶¹ Mohamed N Conteh, 2013-74

¹⁶² Ibid.P.76

¹⁶³ Ibid. P.75

¹⁶⁴ Mohamed N Conteh,2013-.75

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. P.75

local councillors.¹⁶⁶ While in other countries that use the Majoritarian elections system like Great Britain the Prime Minister is the head of the executive whose powers are drawn from the members of parliament, in Sierra Leone, the president is the head of government and is directly elected by the citizens. Therefore, the presidential election in Sierra Leone is based on the second round majority system. Under this system, the presidential candidate must produce an absolute majority vote of at least 55 percent of the overall vote cast during the first round. If no candidate was able to secure this threshold of votes the second set of elections are held between the two leading candidates in the first round from two weeks of the announcement of the first round results. The winner of the runoff election will be president with a simple majority of votes. This system is also used for the elections of paramount chiefs. The current electoral system has been crucial in the consolidation of peace by ensuring that a winner in the presidential election gets support from across the entire country.

3.2.3 Promote Good Civil Society

A healthy and vibrant Civil Society Organization is an important agent in building peace in war-torn societies. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the active role the civil society tends to play in societies with deep ethnic, social, religious and cultural cleavages. It is seen as a complementing agent in providing a strong pillar for post-war democratic transformation, respect for human rights and the rule of law. This increase in CSOs as indispensable agents in peacebuilding comes from the continuous neglect of the use of local actors and approaches in enhancing democracy and reconciliation and absence of a clear entry strategy of an international interventionist.¹⁶⁷ Civil societies, however, have their problems as some do promote hatred and violence.

The role of CSOs in peacebuilding goes across all phases of the conflict, from prevention to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These roles include protection of citizens against attack by the state or other authorities, monitoring the activities of government and its institutions, human right violations, corruption and peace agreements. They engage in advocacy and public communication for democratic principles, enhancing social cohesion

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. P. 76

¹⁶⁷ Roberto Belloni, Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of peace Research*, 2001, 38(2), 163-180. P. 163-166

by strengthening the relationship between the people from different groups, and cement societal cleavages. Also, they act as an intermediary and facilitator between the state and the citizens by setting the platform for communication and negotiations between all sorts of actors and the participation of direct service delivery to citizens where the state is incapable of providing such public goods.¹⁶⁸

After signing the LPA, the search for peace became an indispensable journey in Sierra Leone. With the enormous task of post-war reconstruction, a vibrant civil society was seen as the key answer to the various challenges posed by the war. In Sierra Leone, although the number of civil society organisations increased and have become more active after the war it is essential to note that civil society was not a new phenomenon in the country. Throughout the country's history and during the war civil society has played a major role in its political system. While it is true that CSOs like the National Students Union, Teachers Union, Sierra Leone Bar Associations and Labour Union to name the most important ones existed before the war, their activities were for the campaign against corruption, republicanism and media clampdown.¹⁶⁹

Their active involvement however, ended with Siaka Stevens becoming the prime minister in 1968 when his party adopted a one party system and attained its political objectives of a one party system engaged in repressive, corruptive clientelism and co-optation thus the civil society became the target since it could expose the government's illicit activities and corruption. Civil Society members were harassed, banned and passed laws that reduced the influence and power of the outspoken CSO and sometimes co-opted their leaders in accepting higher positions in government.¹⁷⁰ So the CSOs continued to exist but in a weakened or compromised form so they could no longer affect the real mandate they were set up to accomplish.

¹⁶⁸Christoph Spurk Understanding civil society. Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment.2010 Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. p 21

¹⁶⁹ Mohamed Gibril Sesay et al, The Civil Society Landscape in Sierra Leone Understanding Context, Motives and Challenges, World Bank Africa Region External Affairs Report No. (06062007AFRS)

¹⁷⁰ Mohamed Gibril Sesay et al, The Civil Society Landscape in Sierra Leone Understanding Context, Motives and Challenges, World Bank Africa Region External Affairs Report No. (06062007AFRS Understanding Context, Motives and Challenges, World Bank Africa Region External Affairs Report No. 06062007AFRSL, -6-22

With the end of the war, Civil societies resurfaced and some new ones, mostly by marginalised groups, youth and women were established. With support from members and external funds they were able to address issues like good governance, peace and security corruption, human rights, food security and shelter for the needy. Donors like World Bank, British Department for International Development (DFID) provided funding to help develop CSOs and help promote dialogue in the implementation of the peace process The European Union (EU) rehabilitation and reconstruction projects provided much support to CSOs in the early stages of the peacebuilding process.¹⁷¹

Within the first decade of the end of the war, CSOs received enormous support regarding designing projects or proposals that were responsive to different challenges of post war. Logistical, financial and technical assistance, capacity building and monitoring, coordinating the activities of local and international CSOs were among some of the support rendered by the international community. Civil society in Sierra Leone has also been supported by partner international and regional civil society organisations and from the peacebuilding funds to Sierra Leone

Formal Civil Society groups in Sierra Leone include professionals, trade unions, religious, human rights, gender, development and economic interest based groups. Women associations like the 50/ 50 group Sierra Leone Association of University Women, Forum for African Women Educationalist (FAWE) have been very active in promoting gender equality, advocating for women increased participation in politics and playing an instrumental role in bringing the war to an end and promoting peace and reconciliation.¹⁷²

Another important group is the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone. Its establishment coincided with the overthrow of the democratically elected government by the AFRC in 1999. The council was quick to shift its objectives which were to ensure harmony amongst Muslims and Christians - the two main religious groups in the country advocating and campaigning for the restoration of the elected government. The Council initially received funding from the UN, Rockefeller Foundation, and Swedish government as it engaged in a series of programs in education, reconciliation, reintegration of ex-

¹⁷¹Ibid., 7-15

¹⁷²Ibid., 14

combatants, consultation with the head of warring parties and, most importantly, acting as a key facilitator in the Lome peace negotiation.¹⁷³

Other groups worth mentioning are the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, the Sierra Leone Bar Association, Sierra Leone Labour Congress, youth movement, National forum for human rights and Campaign for Good Governance. These groups have been very vocal in lobbying, campaigning, raising awareness, providing training on human rights protection and played a key role in the DDRR process. They were also involved in the reconciliation, trauma healing of war victims and the process of repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Today, the important role of the civil society in ensuring lasting peace and restoration of democracy and good governance cannot be overstated. Despite the series of constraints it faces it has been a key player in the peacebuilding and democratic process in Sierra Leone since the end of the war. Over the years, it has engaged in veracious peacebuilding activities. It usually engages in voter education, information, encouraging broader involvement and voter turnout, elections monitoring, promoting the code of conduct of candidates with the aim of enhancing public trust in the elections process. It acts as a watchdog on the government for the public regarding corruption, violation of the constitution and ensuring the government is more responsive to its citizens through advocacy, monitoring and lobbying.

Moreover, it has been able to build bridges across various communities through dialogue and public communication, assisting in the recovery of the economy by supporting economic recovery programs like poverty reduction strategy projects, ensuring that the country's natural resources benefit the people, campaigning for more women in leading positions in governments and private offices, service delivery in areas where the government cannot afford and monitoring public institutions and process and supporting victims of human rights violation through legal means.

¹⁷³ Ibid, P. 15

3.2.4 Control Hate Speech

It is quite clear that the media role which has used any means of expression to communicate, inform, publicise, entertain and educate its audience in conflict goes back to World War I, and used by allied forces and Nazi Germany. It has evolved and become increasingly used as a tool in civil wars today, but at the same time, it has been more efficiently used post-cold war by peace builders as a prominent tool in facilitating the transition to peace and democracy. The media is a powerful tool in influencing opinions, attitudes and beliefs that eventually turn into positive or negative action. Therefore, it is essential to assume that the same tool the media uses to divide communities and incite violence could be used to unite the people and bring lasting peace.¹⁷⁴

The media has been closely linked with many conflicts today; it is one of the major sections of society which every side in the conflict seeks to have control over and use as a weapon of war by disseminating hate messages and gathering support for their movement. As was the case in Germany when the Nazis through the media influenced German public opinion against Jewish people; the Serbian media in former Yugoslavia revived documents and videos of past violence as part of a campaign to manipulate public view, camouflaged as news to motivate popular sentiment against Albanians and others. More intriguing was in Rwanda by Radio Mille Collines that incited hatred towards one ethnic group in the country by legitimising the war as self-defence.¹⁷⁵

However, the media has been involved greatly in rebuilding war-torn states. It has used the same means that it used to exacerbate conflict to bring an end to war and consolidate peace. Peacebuilding has used it as a reliable tool in counteracting hatred, misperception and intolerance in war-torn environments. The media role has extended from initially spreading information and educating its listeners on how the peace agreement is being implemented, to long-term initiatives such as acting as a watchdog on government activities, giving information on early warning signs of a possible renewal of

¹⁷⁴ Vladimir Bratić Media effects during violent conflict: Evaluating media contributions to peace building.2006, Conflict & communication online, 5(1), 1-11, www.cco.regener-online.de ISSN 1618-0747.

¹⁷⁵ Rose Howard, An operational framework for media and peacebuilding (1st ed.). Vancouver:2002 IMPACS. Retrieved from <http://docplayer.net/22622655-An-operational-framework-for-media-and-peacebuilding.html>

conflict and the monitoring of human rights violations.¹⁷⁶ The media in Sierra Leone has had its portion of responsibility for the war and peace in the country, so, in a way to better understand these responsibilities, the role of the media, before, during and after the civil war is analysed.

The media before the war: The independent press in Sierra Leone dates back to the 1700s when, Freetown, now the capital city of Sierra Leone, was chosen as a suitable place for the resettlement of freed slaves. This period gave rise to press freedom as demonstrations were launched against the activities of the colonial administration. As the years went by, albeit underfinanced and with constant government control and regulation, media outlets, mostly personal owned, were established in the country.¹⁷⁷ Throughout the years that followed independence, the media was engaged in a continuous fight with successive governments for its survival.¹⁷⁸

The media during this period was focusing mostly on exposing corruption within the government system, and since corruption was inevitable amongst government officials, they sought to clamp down on the press to stop it publishing information that could scare away investors. The government created a series of draconian laws to suppress and limit the free media from reporting on corruption practices of state officials.¹⁷⁹ Amongst such suppressive laws was the Newspaper Amendment Act passed in 1980 by the then ruling one-party dictatorship government of the All People's Congress, (APC). It gave authority to the responsible minister to issue newspaper licenses or denial, and suspend and dismiss any media outlet that violated these laws. Nevertheless, the media continued to struggle for free expression and to safeguard their image as a professional journalist.¹⁸⁰

The media during the war: Up to the start of the war, radio broadcasting was the reliable way of disseminating information across the country; this included both government owned, private and international radio stations like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio France International and Voice of America.¹⁸¹ There was a

¹⁷⁶ Ibid 6

¹⁷⁷ Vladimir Bratić. -2006- .4

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 9

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.,9

¹⁸⁰Ibid.,3

¹⁸¹Amadu Wurie Khan, *Journalism & Armed Conflict in Africa: the civil war in Sierra Leone*. Review of African Political Economy, 1998 25(78), 585-597

gradual increase in print media, some independent and others controlled by government and representing state interests. Television broadcasting was limited to eight hours screening in the capital city Freetown. There was one single body that could coordinate and represent journalist interest, The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, but it was fragile and ineffective. During the conflict, all parties in the war fought for control over the media at the same time that parties were able to run the state and pass draconian laws that muzzled the media.¹⁸² The media became an element of propaganda and war rhetoric as each side tried to consolidate its position and present a positive image to the general public.

The media was seen as biased in the way in which it covered the stories during the war; it was involved in the use of pejorative language, such as giving different names or status to describe certain factions of the war. Newspapers were constantly involved in exaggerating atrocities committed by one group while human rights violations and other appalling abuses carried by another group received few if any headlines. The amount of air time and timing frequency accorded to cover the activities of the warring parties was unevenly balanced. International press like the BBC Focus on Africa Program was accused of giving more air time to the RUF, an opportunity which the rebels exploited well enough to bring fear and panic among its opponents and motivate its fighters.¹⁸³

Furthermore, the media was accused of spreading false information., The information they published, or broadcast did not represent the reality on the ground. The international press was mostly involved in such acts as well. During this period, all the information published by the press was based heavily on eyewitness accounts of the story, this was a result of the impoverished nature of the media economy and infrastructure, which discouraged most of the local news media from covering the conflicts live. Moreover, the media was blamed for its selective reports of events at the war front. While much of the information provided to its audience was facts, it was based on stories for one group against another.¹⁸⁴

Moreover, all the parties in the conflict sought to use the media to propagate their gains, claims and counter claims, so the press became biased as each outlet was reporting

¹⁸² Ibid.,596

¹⁸³ Khan, A. W. (1998). 586

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.,12

stories that favoured those that it sympathised with or controlled it. This kind of reporting not only affected the soldiers but always left the civilian population in panic and great fear. Thus the media to a considerable extent was involved in the escalation of the conflict as it failed to maintain its independence and non-political stance. Notwithstanding the roles mentioned above of the media during the conflict, in Sierra Leone, unlike other countries like Rwanda, Serbia and Nazi Germany, the local media was not in sympathy with the rebellion and electronic media was government controlled, although this position was reversed when the AFRC government was in power in 1997.

Moreover, the media was not used as an element of war to incite hatred and violence against another ethnic group, preach intolerance, and divide the communities. One key reason for this could be the causes of the war. The conflict in Sierra Leone among other things was a result of increased call for change from dictatorship to a democratic system of government and economic development and not an ethnic, ideological or a secessional war. The media was being manipulated by various factions to misinform and withhold information to create fear in the opponents' camp and strengthen their relation with the rest of the public but not to incite violence against other tribes.

So in Sierra Leone, the international community in the build-up to the signing of the Lome peace agreement was quick to realise that well-trained and responsible media outlet whose activities must be regulated not to incite hatred and violence against other groups was needed in rebuilding post-war Sierra Leone. From the agreement, it was clear that all parties should respect the independence of the media and refrain from using the press for propaganda purposes or suppressing freedom of expression. The aim was to work together to create an independent media body that will oversee the conduct and activities of all media institutions in the country.¹⁸⁵

The media being aware of the factors that could lead to a relapse to violence, became proactive in complementing the peacebuilding efforts by providing accurate information to the general public. With the majority supporting the peace process there has been a sharp increase in the media audiences and so the proliferation of news outlets across the country. The media has become competitive as it focusses on reporting peace and

¹⁸⁵ Amr Abdallah, et al, Evaluation of Talking Drum Studio-Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone:2002 Search for Common Ground, -1

reconciling messages and voter education. Through the international community's financial and logistical support, setting up media outlets became easy. Training for journalists on information gathering and reporting together with various workshops were conducted with the assistance of the international community.¹⁸⁶

Since the end of the conflict, the media has become an important player rebuilding war-shattered Sierra Leone. Organisations like Search for Common Ground were amongst the first to enter the country and establish a radio program, the Talking Drum Studio, to use the media in a constructive way to bring an end to the war and sustain the peace.¹⁸⁷ Similar to its sister radio station in Liberia, the Talking Drum Studio of Sierra Leone began operation in April 2000: a multi-media production studio that created five different radio programs but with the same goal to encourage peace and reconciliation¹⁸⁸. Its programs would not air across the country as it aimed, since only a few radio stations were available at the time. It therefore established a few local radio stations in the east, north and south of the country as well as stations in the capital city Freetown with funds from the European Union and Cause Canada.¹⁸⁹

Through programs like the "Golden Kids News" and a Soap Opera drama called "Atunda Ayenda" it reached out to children affected by war to discuss their hope for the future, and created a dialogue between victims and perpetrators and informed and sensitised former fighters about the disarmament and demobilisation process. The TDS – SL was instrumental in the early days of the post-war reconstruction with popular programs on issues such as injustice, media and human rights, good governance, gender equality and HIVAIDS.¹⁹⁰ Also, Search For Common Ground (SFCG), used radio to create national and community discourse, successfully across the frontiers of the rebel armies and engaged in direct communication with combatants. SFCG convinced rebel commanders to disarm and release child soldiers. Reporters went into the bush, talked with commanders,

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 1

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 2

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., -1

¹⁸⁹ David Tam-Baryoh Sierra Leone. Africa Media Development Initiative:2009 Sierra Leone Research findings and conclusions. <http://africanmediainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/AMDI-Report-Sierra-Leone.pdf> -.22

¹⁹⁰ Amr Abdallah, et al, 2002 P.1

established credibility and then gradually took truckloads of children back into civilian life.¹⁹¹

Other instrumental media development entities included the Centre for Media, Education and Technology (C-MET), established in June 2000 to carry out training of journalists, provided modern equipment to some media outlets and engaged in advocacy to remove laws that tend to suppress press freedom. Also, a non-profitable media organisation called, Initiative for Mobile Training for Community Radio(Informetric) provided training and equipment in areas of recording, transmitting and broadcasting. The Thomson Foundation funded by the UK Department for International Development was involved in training staff of the national broadcasting services on how to report on business and the environment.¹⁹² Also with funds from the Canadian International Development Agency, a group of Canadian journalists from the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) came to Sierra Leone in partnership with local NGOs and undertook training programs on issues of cross-cultural reporting and teaching of local journalists to be the trainers of others.¹⁹³

Finally, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone radio (Radio UNAMSIL) established as part of the Public Information Section of the peacekeeping mission had the task of helping to rebuild peace in war-torn Sierra Leone. The radio provides peaceful and unbiased information substituting incitement of hate heard on radio stations controlled by warring factions.¹⁹⁴ The station operated twenty-four hours (24) daily and was heavily relied on for providing accurate information on voter education during the 2002 election: it generated public dialogue and debate, advocated specific issues relating to peace, educated key stakeholders on their role in restoring peace, broadcasted important live programs and hosted political parties' leaders and government officials.

In 2000, through a legislative act, an Independent Media Commission (IMC) was established as an independent entity with responsibility to regulate all media outlets in the country as well as handle all media related matters. The President appointed the commission members in consultation with the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists

¹⁹¹ Ibid, .2

¹⁹² David Tam-Baryoh, 2009-19 -20

¹⁹³ Ibid., 20

¹⁹⁴"Radio UNAMSIL, Freetown, Sierra Leone: Dxing.Info". *Dxing.info*. N.p., 2016. Web. 12 Aug. 2016.

(SLAJ) subject to the approval of Parliament. Its functions are to promote a free and pluralist media in Sierra Leone, ensure the provision of high level and efficient media services, promote fair competition and protect the public against media abuse and manipulation. Together with the ministry of information they adopted a code of conduct for media institutions and advised the Ministry on the issuance of licenses.¹⁹⁵

As a lead agency in media matters in the country, the IMC is responsible for the overall management and implementation of media projects in collaboration with the UN and other peacebuilding agencies. The agency has two regional offices, one in the south and the other in the north. It is composed of a secretariat that runs the day to day activities of the committee and three central working committees, Complaints, Advisory and Application and sub Finance, Technical, Applications, Policy review and Awards. The commission is expected to provide regulatory oversight, legal arbitration, editorial guidance, monitoring, and training for media practitioners.¹⁹⁶

The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists was boosted with logistic and financial support to coordinate the activities of journalists and represent their interests. With the IMC Amendment Act 2006, the Commission has continued to provide leadership in matters related to media. The Commission continues to regulate the activities of media institutions independently from government. Today the landscape for media institutions in the country has changed significantly. The media continues to play a major role in democracy, good governance, peace in the country and acts as a watchdog for the public. The audience now has a greater choice of which radio station or program they can tune in to.

With the media constantly regulated over reporting false news and with the support received from the international community, the media was able to provide information that enables the public to understand better how the the peace agreement and the different phases of the peace process are implemented. Moreover, it was engaged in sensitising the public on conflict issues and the need to move forward through education, drama, talk shows, soap operas. It encouraged debates on various conflict transformation issues that allowed all members of the public including former parties to the conflict to give their

¹⁹⁵ Sierra Leone Independent media Commission act 2000, <http://www.mrcgsl.org/independent-media-commission-imc>

¹⁹⁶ Ibid P.2

opinion and sometimes possible solutions to how the peace can be sustained. Through local and non-governmental organisations and media programs both the perpetrators and victims were able to communicate with each other, thus promoting forgiveness and acceptance. Protection of all factions and the public against abuse and manipulation was ensured through independent and nonselective reporting.

3.2.5 Adopt Conflict Reducing Economic Policies

Economic mismanagement was also a leading cause of the outbreak of the war in 1991. With independence in 1961, there was a promise of a better life and development in the new nation because of its natural resources and raw material endowment. Nevertheless, hopes were dashed a decade after independence as political instability ensued, and the economy declined drastically. Economic growth reduced to 1.5 percent in the 1980s as compared to 3.5 percent in the 1960s and 1970s respectively. To save the country, the government and its partners introduced economic structural reforms towards the end of the 1980s that included “reduction of the budget deficit, liberalisation of the exchange rate, the abolition of price controls and exchange restrictions”; the reforms were however halted by the RUF invasion in 1991.¹⁹⁷

During the war the economy continued to decline, growth became stagnant as all the warring parties engaged in controlling the sources of the economy to support the war. From the 1990s to 2000 the economic growth regressed to 4.5 percent, poverty increased and the country’s GDP was halved reaching 142 U S dollars per capital in 2000.¹⁹⁸ With the war coming to an end, Sierra Leone like most other war-torn societies was characterised as a failed state incapable of undertaking the implementation of the LPA; the UN was quick to encourage donor countries to make a contribution towards the reconstruction of war shattered Sierra Leone. Under the UN Security Council(UNSC) Resolution 1289 in 2000 the UN requested the international community for, “sustained and generous assistance for the longer terms tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, it urges all States and

¹⁹⁷ Sierra Leone: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 05/191, February 2005 <http://www.imf.org>

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, P.1

international and other organisations to provide such assistance as a priority’’.¹⁹⁹ The international community indeed provided such an offer but with stringent conditions attached—conditions assumed as essential for promoting economic growth and development if adopted by the government in its post-war recovery process.

The compound challenges of the post-war country led the country to benefit from the surge of donors of all kinds. The international actors learning from the experiences of previous peacebuilding programs were keen to prioritise the strengthening of strong political and financial institutions capable of implementing various projects including economic reforms. So international governmental financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, international development agencies like the Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contributed significantly to the Sierra Leone recovery process by focusing on different sectors but with the same goal of rebuilding the country at the end of its devastating civil war in 2002. Private international funders such as the Ford Foundation and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation²⁰⁰ were also involved greatly.

The donor support at the end of the war showed the shift in international interest in peace and security around the world. The EU and Britain contributed nearly US\$800 million to boost the newly elected government in 2002.²⁰¹ The World Bank launched an Assistance Strategy Program in the country and provided 244.6 million dollars towards the peace process. In the middle of the DDDR program, the UN was spending close to 16.4 billion dollars per year; at the same time DFID was disbursing about £100 million a year in the country’s reconstruction process. From 2004 to 2005 alone the United States through its agency of international development spent 45 million US dollars for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, reintegration of former fighters and revamping the economy.²⁰² Therefore it was thought wise that the major players like World Bank and IMF, USAID AND DFID disbursing these funds adopt proper policies capable of improving the country's economy and consolidating peace and democracy.

¹⁹⁹ United Nation Security Council Resolution 1289, 2000, P.4

²⁰⁰ Vandy Kanyako, Donor Policies in Post-War Sierra Leone. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 2016,11(1), 26-395, - 26-27

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, -27

²⁰² Vandy Kanyako Donor Policies in Post-War Sierra Leone, - 26-2727

Since independence, a series of IMF standby stabilisation and institutional reform programs were provided to support the various governments to deal with the causes of economic decline in the country. However, the policies intervention did not lead to improving the economic conditions as the programs were followed by a series of conditionalities which governments were unable to implement.²⁰³ This was a situation which many analysts point to as one of the leading causes of the war as it led to increasing poverty, inequality and robbery. With the end of the war, it was evidenced that the country's economy required major policies and substantial investment. Given the signing of the Lome peace accord, post-war economic recovery policies aimed at improving the standard of living and ensuring the continued expansion of the economy focused on two key policies: the "stabilisation policies, which sought to restore the overall economic balance and control inflation; and the structural reforms policies which aimed to set the economy on a high growth and sustainable development path by correcting institutional and systemic inefficiencies".²⁰⁴

An Economic program such as the IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance Facility, and the World Bank Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Credit (ERRC I) were aimed at re-establishing macroeconomic stability, rehabilitating the economic and social infrastructure as well as rebuilding capacity for policy formulation and implementation.²⁰⁵ As the security situation continued to improve, an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRSP) was approved in 2001 by the IMF to work in line with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRDF) for the initial three years and running until 2005. This program was aimed at comprehensively addressing the stricken poverty situation and facilitating the prospect of economic growth in the country.²⁰⁶

It was complemented by full PRSP policies that shift a bit from the immediate post-war challenges and concentrate on good governance, peace and security, food security and job creation and economic growth and human development. The challenges of the postwar also led to structural reform programs during the country's peacebuilding process which included the economic dimensions and social impact of the reforms, raising productivity

²⁰³ Sierra Leone: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 05/191, February 2005, <http://www.imf.org>. -5

²⁰⁴ Ibid.P.55

²⁰⁵ Ibid. P. 57

²⁰⁶ Ibid. P. 57

and accountability. Furthermore, expansion of the role of the private sector in investment, production and employment and administrative capabilities for implementing the measures and policies of the programmes with emphasis on civil services capacity building, improving service delivery and strengthening financial and economic management.²⁰⁷

Progress has also been made in the financial sector. Structural reform programs led to the establishment of financial institutions such as the National Commission for Privatisation to implement programs for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises to bring trade and investment opportunities.²⁰⁸ The National Revenue Authority to improve tax collection and future increase in state revenue reduced government dependency on donor funds to run the country. Also, Acts were enacted to improve the country's economy. For example, The Public Procurement Act 2004 aimed at reforms in government procurement; the Anti- money Laundry Act and Code of Conduct for Investment Act have been adopted, and human resource and functioning of government ministries has been reviewed.²⁰⁹

There is no doubt that international community intervention since 1999 serves as the force behind the rapid economic and political stabilisation in the country. Since 2000 economic liberalisation policies have yielded a relatively high level of economic growth. Also, over the years, other economic policies have been adopted to enhance economic development: a stable macroeconomic environment with strong economic growth, inflation reduction, declining current and fiscal imbalances, increased foreign reserve, a stable exchange rate and reduced external debt level;²¹⁰ In addition, integrated public financial management programs aim at supporting sustainable public finance management,²¹¹ which all aid economic recovery amid the global economic challenges.

The GDP has been expanding from 6.3 percent in 2002²¹² to 20.70 in 2013, the country's highest ever²¹³ until the recent outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in 2014 when the

²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁷ Sierra Leone: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 05/191, February 2005, P.59 <http://www.imf.org>

²⁰⁸ Ibid.,59

²⁰⁹ Ibid 59

²¹⁰ Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Document of The World Bank Report No. 50351-SL, 2

²¹¹ Ibid.,2

²¹² Ibid 46

state's economy contracted to 21.5 percent in 2015.²¹⁴ It, therefore, suffices to conclude that economic reforms have led to a market-oriented economy that includes privatisations, lowering government subsidies, removing barriers to foreign investment, reducing wages and price control. Some analysts say with the sources of income of Sierra Leone the economy should be performing better than it is now— a situation which is not limited to Sierra Leone but many other African countries categorised under such a profile.

With the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 the economy came to a standstill. However, as was the case with the post-war recovery there has been positive donor sentiment towards the post-Ebola recovery. The government has adopted the new Economic Recovery Strategy(ERS) to implement reforms and rebuild the economy. With uncertainty in the international financial market affecting the country's second largest source of income, the focus of the new economic strategy is more on strong tax policies than natural resources.²¹⁵ According to the IMF Representative in Sierra Leone, Iyabo Masha, "unlike the post-war, economic recovery, the Ebola crisis will be less challenging as many sectors of the economy are well placed". With proper implementation of the ERS along with the ongoing Agenda for Prosperity Program, Sierra Leone could achieve its vision by 2035; that is to become a middle-income country.²¹⁶

3.2.6 The Common Dominator, Rebuilding Effective State Institutions

All the activities mentioned above were undertaken to restore peace; democracy and a viable economy depended on the existence of national institutions to implement, monitor and enforce them. The presence of strong government agencies capable of hosting these various post-conflict activities is not only vital for their implementation but for the consolidation of peace; this is essential in countries like Sierra Leone where the state failed as a result of weak institutions. The objective of the LBI model, therefore, suggests that international peace intervention must ensure the availability of healthy and proper functioning government institutions if they are to succeed in restoring a viable political system and lasting peace.

²¹³ Sierra Leone GDP Annual Growth Rate | 1961-2016 | Data | Chart | Calendar". Tradingeconomics.com. ., 2016. Web. 30 July 2016.

²¹⁴ Iyabo Masha, "Sierra Leone's Economy in The Post- Ebola Era, And Op-Ed". International Monetary Fund. , 2016. Web. 12 Aug. 2016.

²¹⁵ Ibid 1

²¹⁶ Ibid 2

Sierra Leone emerged from a ten-year brutal civil war with the political, social and economic system totally destroyed. The war led to the already weak institutions largely handicapped in delivering services. As the framework for peace was set with the LPA in place, it was apparent that well-functioning institutions were necessary to hold the fragile peace, promote governance and foster economic growth. To this end, the donor countries together with government embarked on ambitious institutional building and reform programs. The reform programs went across all the major sectors, from security to political and governance, justice, financial, welfare, media and development sectors.

With regards to the liberal peacebuilding strategy, multi-party democratic elections were first on the agenda for political reforms. In 2000 a new electoral act was enacted to strengthen the electoral management body. This body with huge support from the international community successfully organised competitive presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007 respectively. The 2007 elections showcased how effective the institution has been in managing both internationally and locally recognised transparent, free and fair elections that saw the incumbent losing to the major opposition party—a party attributed to have been the cause of the conflict, a situation very rare in many other African countries. In 2004 the local government elections were held after nearly three decades, reintroducing local level participation in politics. As the peacebuilding process continued, the institutions continued to develop to guarantee the survival of the emerging democracy. In 2012, the institution single-handedly conducted successful presidential, parliamentary and local government elections.

Corruption was another major trigger of the war. To resolve this, in 2001, the Anti-Corruption Commission was created, and charged with the responsibility to investigate all corruption practices in the country.²¹⁷ The Commission was strengthened by an act of parliament (Anti-Corruption Act 2008) which allowed the institution to investigate, prosecute and recover assets lost due to corruption. Since then the institution has gone to prosecute key government officials and others involved in corruption malpractices and has been able to recover lost assets. In 2014 alone the commission recovered ‘seven hundred and sixteen million, sixty-two thousand Leones (Le 716,062,000)’²¹⁸ and was ranked by

²¹⁷ Anti-Corruption Commission Sierra Leone Annual Report 2014, .46

²¹⁸ Ibid., 46

the Transparency International corruption perception index 119 out of 174 countries surveyed.²¹⁹

The institution continues to work with the public and law enforcement agency in improving governance systems across the nation. The commission work is monitored by another established post-conflict institution, the Audit Service Sierra Leone. The ASSL monitors the productivity and efficacy of institutions delivering public goods and services, governance and economics. While gains have been made in the fight against corruption in the country, the battle is yet to be won as corruption continues in all sectors of the society.

The Security sector of Sierra Leone before and during the war was fragile in that it could not stop the rebels from invading. As some analysts argue, the army was caught unawares when the RUF attacked in 1991. As the war progressed, the security deteriorated with the military joining forces with the RUF in 1997 and the policy became very much unresponsive. The international community especially the UK was quick to engage in reforming the armed forces, the justice sector and the ministry of defence.²²⁰ The International Military Advice and Training Team (IMATT), mainly of British soldiers, trained and equipped all the units of the military that included ex-combatants, and restructured the various institutions of the armed forces.²²¹

The UK government in collaboration with the UN further undertook the rebuilding of an effective police force capable of maintaining an internal threat while the army concentrated on external threats. Training and equipment were provided to the Sierra Leone police, establishing auxiliary mechanisms such as police chatter, and new prisons and courts built, along with a community relations department and a trained Justice for peace to maintain a robust and responsive force and build a sense of public trust.²²² The strength or effectiveness of these institutions was manifested in 2009 when Sierra Leone started contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Today the SLP has become a force for good in providing internal security with their presence all over the country.

²¹⁹ Statement of the commissioner, Mr. Joseph FitzGerald Kamara on the Commemoration of international anti-corruption (IAC) day 9th December 2014 in http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_200526846.shtml

²²⁰ Patrick W Skora, Analysis of security sector reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone: a comparison of current versus historical capabilities 2010, Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School,-2

²²¹ Ibid, P.3

²²² Ibid, P.2-3

To ensure that the atrocities committed during the ten-year civil war are not repeated, the Government of Sierra Leone in consultation with the UN established the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002. The court was tasked with the responsibility to prosecute all those who bear the greatest responsibility for atrocities committed against civilians during a given period of the war.²²³ The court began prosecution in 2003 of leading figures of the RUF, AFRC, CDF and Charles Taylor, the then president of Liberia. While Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie of the RUF died before trial and Johnny Paul Koroma was presumed dead, the court was able to indict nine of the ten convicted persons to long-term imprisonment. The court ended its initial mandate in 2013. With support from the UN, the court currently under a new name ‘Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone’ engages in managing the court records, providing protection to witnesses and supervising prisons.²²⁴

Another institution that needed reform and strengthening was the Public Service Commission. The Sierra Leone Public Service Commission was known for its effectiveness and standards just after independence; however, this soon ended when the APC-led government of Siaka Stevens declared a one party system in 1978. Employment to the Civil service was based on political patronage, and discrimination based on ethnicity resulting in the recruitment of unqualified²²⁵ trained staff. Against this backdrop, over the decades the civil service credibility and capacity of service delivery eroded as service delivery deteriorated.²²⁶ The situation further worsened during the war and immediately after the war as the public service lost a skilled workforce as many fled the war and resettled abroad.

After the war, reform of the public service was one of the keys plans of the governance reform programs. Also, the international community acknowledged that the civil services must be rebuilt to transform into an effective, efficient and accountable body of delivering service geared towards improving the lives of the citizens. Since 2009, the commission has gone through restructuring and training to meet with the demand of the public. Today the civil service’s main function is the development and implementation of

²²³ UHL, <http://www.rscsl.org/>

²²⁴ Ibid.,

²²⁵ Brian Thomson, "Sierra Leone: Reform or relapse? Conflict and governance reform." London: Chatam House (2007).27

²²⁶ Ibid.,27

government policies, monitoring and evaluating those policies, training and staff development, recruitment, public sector performance and pay policies of the civil service²²⁷ and above all strong ethic to the needs of and loyalty to the government in power. Despite progress made to improve the public service, low remuneration appears to be a major obstacle and the reason why the Civil Service has not been able to attract highly technical and committed staff.²²⁸

Regarding restorative justice, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created in 2000 by an Act of Parliament. “To create an impartial historical record of violation and abuse of human rights and international humanitarian law, related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from the beginning of the war in 1991 to the signing of the Lome peace agreement”.²²⁹ The commission was also mandated to address impunity, to respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the violence and abuses suffered.²³⁰

The focus was on victims rather than punishing perpetrators. The TRC was high on the agenda of international peace builders as one of the mechanisms that will support national healing and sustainable peace. After listening to and recording a series of cases, the commission recommended the continued involvement of all stakeholders including national and private actors in establishing institutions for the protection of Human Rights, to promote good governance and the rule of law.²³¹ And to provide protection for women, youth and children and embark on reparation programs such as education, skills training, health, micro credit facilities and community and symbolic reparation.²³² Many of these recommendations have been implemented successfully: the Human rights commission established in 2005, provision of skills training in amputee camps, the establishment of the youth commission, free education in primary schools, reparations of many war victims and female participation in politics. The TRC was a success story that serves as a reference to international peacebuilding.

²²⁷ Public Service Commission | Public Sector Reform Unit". *Psru.gov.sl*. N.p., 2016. Web. 13 July 2016.

²²⁸ Thomson, B. (2007). P.27

²²⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (2000). Section 6

²³⁰ Ibid 1

²³¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 2004 vol. 2, Chapter three, p, 123-124

²³² Ibid., 123-124

Since the end of the war in Sierra Leone, the international community role has been critical in strengthening and building institutions such as the special court, TRC, Human Rights Commission, security and justice sector, electoral systems, media civil and public service, financial agencies and eradication of poverty. Notwithstanding the gains made so far, the government continues to work with international donors and creditors to support stable, effective institutions for the sustainable development of Sierra Leone. Note that the institutions mentioned above are not only the institutions that were built or strengthened during the peacebuilding process but have been playing key roles in sustaining the peace the country enjoys today.

3.3 Efficiency

In contrast to the liberal peace theory model of democracy and economic liberalisation, the LBI model has proven to be successful in bringing lasting peace to Sierra Leone. Despite extensive peacebuilding after the war ended in 2002, many lacked faith in the process because of previous interventions that sustainable peace and development was not possible. But strong state institutions have been in place and governance reform has taken place in different sectors including security and finance. Rotation of government elites through multiparty elections, respect for human rights, national reconciliation have also taken place, and an independent free press, well-functioning civil society and economic and political progress have meant the country has not returned to war.

Despite the criticism that these institutions are driven by western values and lack local ownership, these institutions have become the base upon which to address long term political, economic and social problems that might arise. Also these institutions have come to be occupied by locals who could not have had the capacity to structure and strengthen them after they collapsed before and during the war; therefore, “reforming governmental structures in war-torn situations that are severely damaged or completely in ruins is essential in creating the institutional capacity and necessary security for preventing a relapse into violence”.²³³ This is what the IBL achieved through these institutions and Sierra Leone has become a peacebuilding success story.

²³³ Jeroen. De Zeeuw, Building Peace in War-torn Societies: from concept to strategy." Research Project on „Rehabilitation, Sustainable peace and Development“. 2001, Netherlands Institute of International Relations „Clingendael“ Conflict Research Unit, 20

At this juncture, it is important to note that this would not have been possible without the continuous international support for large scale peacebuilding projects in the country. The state continues to receive this support, under the peacebuilding cooperation framework adopted in 2008. Since then the country has been receiving support from the UN Peacebuilding Funds and other donor assistance to carry out various developmental projects as the country moves to a level of development and prosperity.



CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have outlined the strength of the IBL strategy and how it has helped to maintain peace in Sierra Leone. I have also underscored the socio-economic benefits of the approach and how its pursuit has largely laid the basis for the erection of very strong institutions and how such institutions have in turn transformed the socio-political, economic and cultural landscape of the country and helped to repress the tendency of a return to war. Albeit these merits, I have not departed from critically looking at the shortcomings of the approach and its implications in countries emerging from conflict.

However, what I have sought to do in this thesis is to demonstrate that war-torn societies can pursue the path to lasting or relative peace as well as economic rejuvenation if the right approach is utilised. Invariably, the IBL is posited in this thesis as the true panacea for addressing not only a specific problem but the whole gamut or structural problems that initially led to war in the first place. It is also seen as an appropriate and efficient tool to pre-empt and deal with issues that might emerge in the future. To achieve this, however, depends on the political will of all stakeholders in the conflict as well as the international community whose resources and patience to stay the course is as important as the yearning of the suffering masses in IDP or refugee camps to return home and build the peace.

In giving the case of Sierra Leone, I have painstakingly attempted to illustrate how the IBL approach has proven to be an effective strategy for sustainable peace despite its downsides. In doing so, I have looked at this strategy and its pillars as well as previously used strategy to draw a dichotomy between what has worked and what did not, and why peacebuilding interventions have sought to prefer the IBL approach as against previous approaches that did not faithfully address the systemic problems or root causes of war or even strive enough to extricate war-torn countries from conflict onto a strong footing for lasting peace.

Furthermore, the failure of the international community and other stakeholders in past interventions seems to be compensated by the results and successes that tend to be emerging from countries where the IBL strategy has been introduced. Sierra Leone being a test case for this strategy so far has proven that stronger institutions are fundamental pillars of socio-economic and political stability. The fact that the country has enjoyed relative peace, a stable political landscape and steady economic growth over the years with the exception of the Ebola period, shows that the IBL strategy is fully gaining ground and could be a starting point for the sustenance of peace in future peacebuilding operations.

In general, even though there has been enormous progress made in building and strengthening institutions over the past few years in the country, the sustenance of these institutions presents a tough challenge to be further researched. It is significant to emphasise here that the study aim was not to imply that the IBL strategy was the overall peacebuilding objective, but the focus was to highlight how important it is for post war societies to adopt the approach and how so far it has become the bedrock of peace and development in post war countries such as Sierra Leone.

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